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"It is fashionable among industrialized nations to deplore acquisi-
tion of high-technology weapons by developing nations, but this
moralistic stand is akin to drug pushers shedding tears about the
weaknesses of drug addicts."'
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INTRODUCTION
Proliferation of catastrophic weaponry2 threatens peace in our age.
At the millennium's end, with the bipolar superpower confrontation
fading into memory, dozens of nations have or are pursuing cata-
strophic weapons. The flow of advanced weapons technology to Iraq
and the advent of chemical and ballistic missile programs throughout
the Middle East and the Southern Hemisphere warn of impending
global violence.4 Currently, the specter of a North Korean nuclear
2. This Article focuses on four types of weapons: nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, and ballistic missiles. Military literature uses various terms to refer to these and other
types of weapons. The term "weapons of mass destruction," coined to refer to nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, is not used here because it generally does not include ballistic
missiles and because, to be precise, chemical and biological weapons are lethal but are not
nearly as destructive as a wide variety of conventional ordnance. Neither is the term "high
technology weapons" appropriate because chemical and biological weapons generally involve far
less sophisticated technology than many types of other weapons.
This Article focuses on these four types of weapons because they signify total, as opposed to
limited, war. Other weapons can be restricted to battlefield use and are primarily designed to
overpower an adversary's military force. If used, these four types ofweapons would necessarily
devastate civilian populations with catastrophic consequences. Hence the use of the label
"catastrophic weaponry."
3. Proliferation Threats of the 1990's: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1993) (testimony of James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence
Agency) [hereinafter Hearing on Proiferation Threats].
4. See generally id. at 51-56 (noting advances in weapons technology and weapons
proliferation in various nations). The market for catastrophic weapons is only a subset of the
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bomb presents an apparently intractable threat to global security and
highlights the limitations of existing nonproliferation efforts.- It is
time to rethink nonproliferation efforts-it is time to take rigorous
legal steps to shut down the international market in catastrophic
weapons.6
The simple truth is that restricting the international trade in
catastrophic weaponry will substantially limit their proliferation.
Accordingly, pursuit of strategic security in the coming era should
include legal efforts to regulate weapons technology by stipulating
penalties for merchants of mass destruction. Perhaps a few nations
could acquire a catastrophic weapon if a government willing to
sacrifice to such pursuits has domestic access to critical materials and
a sophisticated technical elite. But such efforts would be difficult and
expensive, and fewer nations would try than would if given ready
access to an international marketplace of weapons-making technolo-
gies. Closing the weapons market may not end proliferation, and an
end to proliferation would most certainly not guarantee strategic
security. Nevertheless, the reforms suggested by this Article could
make the world a comparatively safer place.
The remainder of this Article contains five Parts. Part I briefly
defines "catastrophic weaponry." Part II sets forth the theoretical
underpinnings of two approaches to nonproliferation and compares
their relative attributes. In the central argument of this Article, this
Part asserts that the "realpolitik" approach to nonproliferation must
be replaced by an approach based on legal regulation. Part III
describes the recent history of proliferation by analyzing the activities
of four important weapons-supplying nations. Part IV analyzes
nonproliferation arrangements currently in existence and identifies
their strengths and weaknesses. Together, Parts III and IV provide
evidentiary support for the proposition that current efforts to control
proliferation are more well-intentioned than effective. Part V is
intended as this Article's cardinal contribution to the nonproliferation
debate. It takes up the regulatory approach from Part II and
recommends far-reaching reforms to establish a comprehensive and
market for all weapons, which supports the world's second biggest export industry. FRANK
BARNABY, THE ROLE AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS IN THE 1990s, at 23 (1992). In total, the world
spends approximately $250 billion per year on weapons. Id.
5. See Ted G. Carpenter, Life After Proliferation, Closing the Nuclear Umbrella, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar. 1994, at 8; see also Patrick E. Tyler, Living with N. Korea's Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994,
at 5.
6. See Defense Department Briefing, The Administration's Nonproliferation and Export
Control Policy, Sept. 30, 1993 (announcing Clinton administration plans to control proliferation
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). Consequently, the time could not be more
propitious for this discussion.
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integrated regime that can more capably restrict the proliferation of
catastrophic weapons. The Article concludes by advocating a greater
reliance on legal institutions and processes to control the internation-
al market in weapons.
I. DEFINITION OF CATASTROPHIC WEAPONRY
A. Nuclear Weapons
An atomic bomb is composed of a core of fissile material7-- a
minimum of either eight kilograms of plutonium (Pu-239) or twenty-
five kilograms of uranium (U-235)-surrounded by superfast
explosives. When the explosives are detonated, the core is implod-
ed,' and the fissionable material instantly achieves critical mass,9
causing a sustained chain reaction that releases vast quantities of
energy. A thermonuclear bomb uses that energy to initiate a fusion
reaction whereby hydrogen atoms are fused to form helium, thereby
releasing even greater quantities of energy."0
The primary difficulty in producing a nuclear weapon lies in
obtaining sufficient quantities of fissile material." Neither plutoni-
um nor uranium-235 exists naturally in fissile form. These materials
can only be fabricated from uranium-238, which is naturally available
but cannot itself sustain a chain reaction.1 2 Uranium-238 contains
small percentages of uranium-235 that must be separated by enrich-
ment.13  Although fuel for nuclear reactors (three percent U-235)
7. An element is fussile if the nucleus of its atom can be split as a result of neutron
bombardment with a wide range of velocities such that a chain reaction is possible. LEONARD
S. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR 333 (1987) [hereinafter SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR]. Uranium 235
and plutonium 239 are examples of fissile materials. Id. at 356.
8. . Two basic designs used to achieve a fission explosion are the implosion technique and
the gun assembly technique. See generally id. at 333-34 (describing basic nuclear weapon design
approaches). The implosion technique uses superfast detonators called krytons to compress a
mass of nuclear fuel into a supercritical configuration. Id. The gun assembly technique propels
two subcritical masses of uranium together to create a supercritical mass. Id.
9. Critical mass is the minimum amount of material necessary to sustain a chain reaction;
supercritical mass is an amount in excess of that level. Id. at 333.
10. The public record contains no evidence to indicate that any of the alleged proliferating
states have the capability of constructing thermonuclear weapons, even with substantial assistance
from an industrialized state. Accordingly, if a nonproliferation regime were successful in
preventing the spread of atomic devices, there could be no spread of the capability to produce
thermonuclear weapons. Thermonuclear weapons are only a proliferation threat because of the
possible theft or sale of completed weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union, a
problem that the existing nonproliferation regime was not designed to contend with. See Cold
War I: Proliferation, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 11, 1993, at A28, A28.
11. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR, supra note 7, at 327-28.
12. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR, supra note 7, at 327-28.
13. LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB 447-48 (1988) [hereinafter SPECTOR, THE
UNDECLARED BOMB].
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also requires enrichment, such fuel is not sufficiently enriched to
make a bomb. Making warheads with uranium-235 requires unique
equipment and technology to fabricate highly enriched uranium
(HEU) composed of at least ninety-three percent U-235.14 The
alternative to U-235 is plutonium, which does not exist in nature but
which can be made from uranium." The proliferation problem is
that all uranium-fueled nuclear reactors, including those that generate
electric power, produce plutonium. 6 Thus, any nation with a
peaceful nuclear power fuel cycle that includes reprocessing will
acquire significant quantities of plutonium, although serious technical
complications attend efforts to use that material for bombs.'
7
Since their cataclysmic debut in Hiroshima nearly a half century
ago, the military significance of nuclear weapons has centered more
on deterring aggression and attaining a unique status of prominence
than on the immediate accomplishment of war-related objectives. 18
The United States and the former Soviet Union deployed nuclear
14. Id. at 447-48. Various enrichment processes are in use such as gaseous diffusion,
centrifugation, electromagnetic, or laser isotope separation. Any enrichment technique requires
considerable engineering sophistication to achieve the high concentrations needed for nuclear
explosives. Id. Because uranium enrichment is extremely complex and costly, it is generally
considered an unlikely path to proliferation. Id. at 448. Nevertheless, South Africa, Argentina,
Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Israel have developed uranium-enrichment capabilities. Id.
15. See generally SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR, supra note 7, at 327-32 (explaining basics of
nuclear materials production).
16. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, supra note 13, at 449-50. Irradiation of U-238 fuel
in a nuclear reactor results in the absorption of a neutron, converting stable U-238 into fissile
Pu-239. Id. The plutonium can be separated from the uranium through a chemical separation
process that is simpler than the isotope separation processes to separate U-235. Id. Virtually
every nation that has attempted reprocessing of "spent" fuel rods (other than the declared
nuclear weapons states), however, has sought outside help from the more technologically
advanced nuclear-supplier countries. Id. at 450.
17. According to a recent report, scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory successfully
used impure plutonium from civilian reactors to produce bombs. Uranium, Plutonium,
Pandemonium, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1993, at 98, 98. While such a bomb uses approximately seven
times as much plutonium and has a low and unpredictable yield, it would still be devastating.
Id.
18. "The global public is more impressed by what nuclear weapons can do to cities than by
what such weapons might accomplish to reverse the military outcome on potential battlefields."
George H. Quester & Victor A. Utgoff, Deterrence and Proliferation, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 129.
In recent years, the superpowers' possession of nuclear weapons has not successfully deterred
non-nuclear nations from acts of localized, conventional aggression because the attackers
discounted the possibility of a nuclear response. Iraq attacked Kuwait notwithstanding Kuwait's
nuclear-equipped allies; presumably, Saddam Hussein believed that the United States, Britain,
and France would not use their nuclear weapons. Similarly, Argentina seized the Falkland
Islands despite Britain's possession of nuclear weapons. See generally LEONARD S. SPECTOR,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, NUCLEAR EXPORTS: THE CHALLFGE OF
CONTROL (1990) [hereinafter SPECTOR, NUCLEAR EXPORTS]; David S. Yost, The Delegitimization
ofNudearDeterrence? 16 ARMED FORCES & SoCy 487, 488-89 (1990) (noting focus of significance
of nuclear weapons with various countries).
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weapons to deter each other's military threat, 9 although the salience
of the mutual threat was potentially offset by each nation's second-
strike capability.2" Perversely, as the United States and Russia now
agree to slash their nuclear arsenals, the threat that nuclear weapons
will be acquired and perhaps used by other nations is growing.2
In addition to the five declared nuclear powers,22 at least a half-
dozen nations from the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent to the
Korean Peninsula are actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability
and may already possess the basic technology for atomic bombs.2"
For non-superpowers, nuclear weapons offer a mixture of perceived
prestige and potential security options.24 A nation that is engaged
in a long-term struggle with an adversary can radically change the
rules of that confrontation by acquiring nuclear weapons.' Especial-
lywhere one nation faces superior conventional forces, the acquisition
of nuclear weapons may be militarily attractive. Of course, that
development also encourages the adversary to acquire nuclear
19. For an overview of the strategic role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, see
Michael J. Mazarr, Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War, WASH. Q., Summer 1992, at 185
(comparing role of nuclear weapons during Cold War with role after Cold War). The military
relevance of nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom and France seems to center on
maintenance of influence and independence in security matters within NATO. See generally
McGeorge Bundy et al., Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753 (1982)
(discussing relative positions of France, West Germany, United States, and United Kingdom
within NATO).
20. See generally Robert S. McNamara, The Militay Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and
Misperceptions, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 59 (1983) (asserting that potential destructive power of nuclear
weapons was so great that neither superpower could reasonably consider using them and that
they were thus irrelevant to East-West balance of power).
21. This phenomenon has led at least one commentator to question the continued viability
of the regime to prevent nuclear proliferation. See Rodney W.Jones, Strategic Responses to Nuclear
Proliferation, WASH. Q., Summer 1983, at 89, 92-93 (discussing frictions in "Nonproliferation
Regime," including dissension during second Review Conference of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty).
22. Cf Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signatureJuly 1, 1968,
art. IX, 1 3, 21 U.S.T. 483, 492-93, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 174 ("For the purposes of this Treaty, a
nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."). The five nuclear weapon states were the
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France.
23. See George J. Church, Who Else Will Have the Bomb?, TIME, Dec. 16, 1991, at 42, 42
(noting numerous nations that have built uranium-enrichment facilities and are attempting to
acquire nuclear weapons).
24. See generally BARNABY, supra note 4, at 116-18 (1992) (noting various reasons why non-
superpowers desire nuclear weapons).
25. For a discussion of the political motivations behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons
by Israel, South Africa, and India, see MrTCHELL REISS, WrrIHoUT THE BOMB: THE POLITICS OF
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 255-60 (1988).
26. For example, Israel, China, India, and Pakistan developed nuclear capabilities because
each perceived a regional threat to its security as well as a need to enhance its overall military
stature. See George H. Quester & Victor A. Utgoff, U.S. Arms Reductions and Nuclear Nonprolif-
eration: The Counterproductive Possibilities, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 129, 131, 133.
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weapons for deterrence.27  This spread of nuclear capabilities
weakens technological constraints on proliferation. Moreover,
increasing sources of supply undermine international control efforts
and diminish proliferators' vulnerability to possible consequences.
B. Chemical Weapons and Toxins
At least twenty-five countries have or are developing chemical
weapons.28  Chemical weapons, which typically are nerve agents,'
are the easiest of all catastrophic weapons to produce. Closely related
to nerve agents, toxins are inanimate poisonous substances produced
by living organisms that are effectively identical to chemical-warfare
agents in purpose and effect,"° although most toxins cannot pene-
trate the skin and are not dispersable as a windborne vapor.3 1
While chemical weapons bear the moniker "the poor man's atomic
bomb" because producing them is a comparatively cheap way to
generate terror,12 this designation ignores significant technological
and military distinctions. In contrast to nuclear weapons, chemical
weapons have an extensive history of battlefield use, most notably
during World War I." Despite the revulsion caused by that experi-
27. See George W. Rathjens & Marvin M. Miller, NuclearProliferation After the Cold War, TECH.
REV., Aug. 1991, at 25, 27 ("Iraq's nuclear program was motivated by its desire to end Israel's
nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Had Iraq's nuclear program not been severely damaged
as a result of allied bombing, Iran and Syria and perhaps even Egypt would have had strong
motivations to move ahead themselves.").
28. States suspected of possessing or developing chemical weapons include Bulgaria,
Myanmar, China, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Weapons Prolferation in the New World Order. Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-41 (1992)
(testimony of Robert M. Gates, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) [hereinafter Hearings on
Weapons Proliferation].
29. Maj. Lawrence E. Rouse, The Disposition of the Current Stockpile of Chemical Munitions and
Agents, 121 MIL. L. REv. 17, 19 (1988). The U.S. chemical stockpile contains three nerve agents
(Tabun, Sain, and VX) and four types of mustard gases (known simply as H, HD, HT, and
Lewisite). Id.
30. See Matthew Meselson et al., Verfication of Biological and Toxin Weapons Disarmament
reprinted in Biological Weapons Act of 1989; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration: Hearings on H.RI 237 and H.R. 4314 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 52 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearings on Biological Weapons Act].
31. SeeJonathan B. Tucker, Gene Wars, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1984/85, at 58,65 (discussing
limitations on military effectiveness of toxins).
32. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Long-Term Crackdowm on Iraq Faces Obstacles; Experts See Politica
Economic Problems in Averting Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, WASH. POsr, Sept. 20, 1990, at
A27; Malcolm W. Browne, Confrontation in the Guf; To Baghdad, Poison Gas Is 'Poor Man's A-Bomb',
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A19; Marie Isabelle Cherrier, The Poor Man 's Atom Bomb, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1989, at G19.
33. See generally Edward Corcoran, Assessing the Military Utility of Chemical Weapons, in NEw
TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURrTY AND ARMS CONTROL THREATS AND PROMISE 287, 287-90 (Eric H.
Arnett ed., 1989) (discussing chemical weapons use during World War I).
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ence, chemical weapons subsequently have been used, most recently
by Iraq against the Kurds and in the Iran-Iraq War. 4 A second
distinction is that, unlike nuclear weapons, chemical weapons have
negligible destructive capability and are wholly unable to demolish
hardened military installations or supply sites.35 Indeed, the primary
military utility of chemical weapons lies in their ability to annihilate
unequipped adversary populations without harming roads, buildings,
or physical infrastructure."6 Thus, if the military objective is to
subjugate a nearby rebellious population, chemical weapons have a
sharp advantage over nuclear bombs.
C. Biological Weapons
Biological weapons agents are living organisms that infect attacked
victims, causing disease, incapacitation, and often death.37 Like
chemical weapons, the military utility of biological weapons lies in
their ability to cause mass death without destroying infrastructure. 38
But biological weapons tend to be "slow-acting, unreliable, indiscrimi-
nate, unpredictable in their dispersal and effectiveness, capable of
backfiring on the attacker, and likely to cause more damage to nearby
civilian populations than to enemy forces."39 Still, biological weap-
ons have advantages as small-scale, covert terrorist weapons." Their
34. Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against Its Kurdish Population, in Global Spread of
Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 657, 663-79 (1989) (report by Physicians for Human Rights) (documenting
Iraq's use of chemical weapons).
35. See Graham S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of
Deterrence, WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 145, 146-49 (comparing destructive capabilities of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons).
36. See generally Corcoran, supra note 33, at 287-301. Corcoran notes:
Historical experience makes it clear that chemical weapons have high military utility
in situations where one side is technologically inferior, particularly when one side lacks
protective gear or even an understanding of chemical protection. Between opponents
more equally matched, chemical agents, especially nerve gases, can cause significant
casualties if surprise or high agent concentrations can be achieved. However, because
of the need for carefully coordinated delivery and uncertainties such as target
preparedness and weather, chemical weapons cannot be depended upon to provide
reliable results.
Id. at 300.
37. For an extensive list of biological agents, see Gordon M. Burck, Biologica4 Chemica and
Toxin Warfare Agents, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGIcAL ARMs RAcE 352, 362-66 (Susan Wright ed.,
1990).
38. BAREND TER HAAR, THE FuTuRE OF BIoLOGIcALWEAPoNs xxi (1991). Because biological
agents reproduce themselves, they do not require large quantities of precursors. Whereas the
definition of militarily relevant quantities of chemical warfare agents ranges from 80 to 1000
tons, U.S. experts have concluded that less than one kilogram per square kilometer of biological
agents would be sufficient to cause more than 60% casualties. Id. at 82.
39. Tucker, supra note 31, at 61.
40. See Richard Novick & Seth Shulman, New Forms of Biological Warfare?, in PREVENTING A
BIOLOGICAL ARMs RAcE, supra note 37, at 103, 117 (noting possibility of biological weapons
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:755
slow-acting effects resemble natural maladies, making it difficult for
the victim to attribute damage to an enemy.4'
Developing and producing reliable weapons based on infectious
agents requires commitments of large technical resources and poses
serious performance drawbacks. Bacterial agents decompose rapidly,
and viral agents can be damaged by exposure to sunlight.4" In
addition, biological weapons used in a regional conflict may infect the
attacker or its civilian population.45 Despite these problems, many
nations could produce crude biological weapons with low reliability. 4
A well-equipped microbiological laboratory comparable to those in
many modem hospitals can produce large quantities of agents from
infectious strains of microorganisms.' Gene splicing, which uses
recombinant-DNA technology, might lead to the production of
vaccines that would enable a country to immunize its troops or
population in preparation for a biological offensive.4
D. Ballistic Missiles
Ballistic missiles 47 rapidly deliver immense firepower over long
distances and with little warning. Twenty countries have or are
developing operational ballistic missiles.48  Compared to other
employed for covert or terrorist uses).
41. KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAYWEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY: THE ARMS CONTROL
CHALLENGE OF THE 90's, at 84-85 (1991).
42. See id. at 87-90 (discussing technical problems with development and use of biological
weapons).
43. But see Graham S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Contro" The Web of
Deterrence WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 145, 147. "Although the use of biological weapons in
conflict has not been so unequivocally demonstrated, it is known that in conflicts involving
conventional weapons more casualties result from disease than from the use of conventional
weapons. In addition, past offensive biological programs have demonstrated the utility of such
weapons by all means short of their actual use in war." Id.
44. See Meselson et al., supra note 30, at 51 (stating that "rudimentary but highly dangerous
biological weapons of lower reliability could be produced with much less effort and expense
[than nuclear weapons], using widely available technology").
45. See Tucker, supra note 31, at 66 (noting that facilities can be set up without large-scale
financial investment). Moreover, the necessary scientific expertise is readily accessible through
scientific literature. Id.
46. See Tucker, supra note 31, at 62-63 (noting potential use of recombinant-DNA
technology in conjunction with use of biological weapons).
47. A ballistic missile is technically distinguishable from an unguided artillery rocket by the
ballistic missile's guidance and control system-the most expensive and technologically advanced
subsystem in a ballistic missile. Moreover, guided missiles may be multistaged, enabling them
to attain considerably longer ranges. Azriel Lorber, Tactical Missiles: Anyone Can Play, BULL. OF
ATOM. ScIENTISTS, Mar. 1992, at 38; see also Barbara Starr, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: A Basis for
Contro, 23 INT'L DEF. REv. 265, 266 (1990) (describing missile capabilities of various countries
in Africa, Asia, Middle East, and South America).
48. See BARNABY, supra note 4, at 28 (listing Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, India,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
South Yemen, Syria, Taiwan, and Turkey as countries with active ballistic missile programs); see
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delivery systems, ballistic missiles have distinctive traits that cause great
concern about their proliferation, notably the speed at which they
travel and their ability to elude air defenses. 9 While aircraft can
carry far greater payloads, usually for greater distances, and can be
reused, the cost of even a basic plane exceeds the estimated cost of
a ballistic missile at least twentyfold, not including the possible cost of
losing a trained pilot.5"
A nuclear-tipped ballistic missile presents fearsome possibilities.
Because a nuclear warhead packs extraordinary explosive force, the
missile would not have to be especially accurate to destroy civilian
targets.5' Chemical warheads atop missiles could also devastate
civilian targets. Ten of the states developing a ballistic missile
capability are also developing chemical warfare capabilities. 2 That
fact notwithstanding, a ballistic missile can be a calamitous weapon
even when fitted with a conventional warhead."
To pose a serious ballistic missile threat, a state must have three
distinct technological capabilities: a propulsion system; 4 missile
design, including booster and reentry vehicle; and guidance and
control systems.55 A growing list of developing countries are
developing and testing launch vehicles. 6 To be accurate, "[a]
also Hearing on Prolferation Threats, supra note 3, at 51-56 (testimony of ames Woolsey, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency) (stating that increasing number of nations have operational
ballistic missiles and missile-development programs).
49. See generallyJANNE E. NOLAN, TRAPPINGS OF POWER: BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD
WORLI 64-73 (1991) (comparing and contrasting ballistic missile and manned aircraft delivery
systems).
50. Steven Zaloga, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Scud and Beyond, 21 INT'L DEF. REV.
1423, 1425 (1988). Not all experts, however, are alarmed by the threat of missile proliferation.
See NOLAN, supra note 49, at 64-73 (arguing that ballistic missiles without sophisticated and
highly destructive warheads are no more militarily decisive than manned aircraft).
51. Mark D. Mandeles, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Implications for the U.S. of Third World
Nuclear Weapon and Ballistic Missile Prolferation, 1 SECURITY STUD. 235, 239 (1991).
52. See supra note 48 (identifying countries with operational ballistic missile programs); see
also National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 1990-H.R. 2461 and Oversight of Previously Authorized
Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1989) (statement of Rear Admiral Thomas
A. Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence) (noting various countries developing or possessing
chemical weapons capabilities).
53. With increased missile accuracies, the threat from proliferating conventional munitions,
such as fuel-air explosives or cluster munitions, increases with devastating implications. See
Dennis M. Gormley, Emerging Attack Options in Soviet Theater Strategy, in SWORDS AND SHIELDS:
NATO, THE USSR, AND NEW CHOICES FOR LONG-RANGE OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 87,108-113 (Fred
S. Hoffman et a. eds., 1987). Indeed, during the height of the Cold War, NATO viewed Soviet
theater missiles armed with advanced conventional warheads as a major threat and responded
by developing theater missile defenses during the 1980s. Id.
54. See BAILEY, supra note 41, at 97-101.
55. See BAILEY, supra note 41, at 101-02.
56. See BAKER SPRING, HERITAGE FOUND., SPACE WEAPON SySEMS: A LOOMING PROLIFERA-
TION THREAT 6-7 (1992) (noting that India, Iraq, and Israel have demonstrated launch vehicles,
and that Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Africa, and South Korea are widely
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ballistic missile must be placed very precisely at a given point in space,
angled exactly so as to enter a specific orbit, and travel at a precise
velocity. A tiny error in any of these variables can result in significant
degradation of accuracy." 7 To be practical, missiles must be able to
change velocity or injection angle in order to hit different targets at
various ranges. 8 For this reason, almost all developing countries
that produce missiles for explicit military purposes have imported
guidance systems from suppliers in the industrialized world or
converted inertial navigation systems used in conventional aircraft for
missile use.5 9  In addition, establishing a ballistic missile force
involves an operational capability to deploy missiles in a basing mode,
commanded by a central command network.' Understandably,
therefore, states that are seeking missile capabilities have recently
purchased data from observation satellites.61
Besides ballistic missiles, the proliferation of cruise missiles is a
growing concern. Cruise missiles are far simpler to produce,
especially for nations that have sufficient technological capability to
build small aircraft.62 "Adapting an aircraft navigation system to
make a cruise missile is a much simpler task than converting it for
ballistic missile guidance."63 The major complexity is guiding the
unmanned missile. Cruise missile guidance systems now can use the
Global Positioning System (GPS), a series of satellite markers that
emit signals for navigation, to achieve remarkable accuracy.'
regarded as working on similar capabilities).
57. BAILEY, supra note 41, at 101.
58. See BAILEY, supra note 41, at 101-02. These capabilities require sophisticated
accelerometers and gyroscopes, which make up the inertial navigation system. Fabrication of
these parts is complex, requiring near-perfect construction by state-of-the-art equipment. Id.
59. See NOLAN, supra note 49, at 34 (discussing manner in which developing countries
acquire guidance systems). Concerned about the commercial availability of such dual-use
guidance systems, the United States has imposed controls on the export of inertial navigation
and associated technologies under the Missile Technology Control Regime. See Agreement on
Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related to Missiles, Apr. 26, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 599.
60. See Thomas G. Mahnken, The Arrow and the Shield: U.S. Responses to Ballistic Missile
Proliferation, 14 WASH. Q., 189, 194-95 (1991) (discussing steps required to establish ballistic
missile force beyond development and testing of prototype missiles).
61. See Michael Krepon, Spying from Space, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1989, at 92, 92. Two
enterprises that make satellite images available on global commercial markets are Earth
Observation Satellite Corporation in the United States and SPOT Image Corporation in France.
Id. at 93-94; SPRING, supra note 56, at 12.
62. See generally The Cruise Missile Issue, HERITAGE FOUND. NAT'L SECURrIY REc., Aug. 1, 1988,
at 1.
63. BAILEY, supra note 41, at 103.
64. See generally BAILEY, supra note 41, at 103-04 (describing GPS and discussing relative ease
of GPS utilization to guide cruise missiles to within 100 meters of their projected targets).
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II. THEORIES OF NONPROLIFERATION
There are two approaches to problems of catastrophic weapons
proliferation: realpolitik and legal regulation. These approaches are
not mutually exclusive; indeed, neither can succeed in the total
absence of the other. Yet, the extent to which nonproliferation policy
stresses one approach over the other has profound implications. This
Part argues that while the realpolitik approach has dominated
strategic thinking for most of the postwar era, it has become ensnared
in conflicts between neo-cold warriors and so-called progressives.65
Today, the chief contribution of the realpolitik approach is the
genesis of a new synthesis that is embodied in the regulatory
approach.
The choice of a proliferation policy essentially revolves around
three questions to which the realpolitik and regulatory approaches
give pivotally different answers. First, what is the proliferation
problem that must be addressed-what is the core cause of that
problem and at whom or what, therefore, should policy be directed?
Second, what is the ultimate security goal that nonproliferation policy
should strive to achieve, and through what framework should that
policy seek to achieve its objectives? And third, what standards and
modalities should that policy adopt, especially concerning means of
enforcement and sanctioning proliferators?
In brief, the central concern of the realpolitik approach is to
prevent the use of certain types of weapons; policy thus should be
aimed at acquirors of weapons to deter their use. According to this
approach, the ultimate objective of nonproliferation policy is to
preserve and promote hegemony and security, a goal that is best
accomplished through a web of strategic alliances. These alliances
vary from nation to nation, from time to time, and with regard to
what types of interests may be involved. Consequently, standards of
conduct, the means of their enforcement, and the consequences for
noncompliance are unclear and not preestablished. Instead, political
leaders address these issues on an ad hoc basis.
In contrast, the central concern of the regulatory approach is to
65. See Lewis A. Dunn, Rethinking the Nuclear Equation: The United States and the New Nuclear
Powers, WASH. Q., Winter 1994, at 2. This debate is not new to the Clinton administration.
Indeed, a decade ago, Rodney W. Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
identified the underlying similarities of the approaches taken by the Carter administration and
the initial Reagan administration: "The Reagan team . .. appears to be more inclined to
emphasize the carrot than the stick in the field of international nuclear cooperation, while the
Carter administration was less inhibited about using the stick and also less generous in offering
the carrot." Rodney W.Jones, Strategic Responses to Nuclear Proltferation, WASH. Q., Summer 1983,
at 89, 93.
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deny access to certain types of weapons technologies; policy thus
should aim at suppliers of weapons to control their availability.
According to this approach, nonproliferation policy ultimately should
deflate the international trade in catastrophic weaponry by establish-
ing international regimes. These regimes should remove proliferation
issues from the vagaries of political decisionmaking by specifying strict
standards of conduct and prescribing the means of their enforcement
with clearly stipulated consequences for noncompliance.
The remainder of this Part highlights the differences between the
two approaches and suggests that the regulatory approach is superior
to the realpolitik approach. In the final analysis, advocacy of a
regulatory approach carries with it an obligation to demonstrate its
meaning. The remaining three Parts of this Article attempt to do that
by examining how the regulatory approach would analyze and
respond to catastrophic weapons proliferation in the mid-1990s.
A. Deterring Nations from Using Weapons or Preventing Weapons
Acquisition
1. Realpolitik
The realpolitik approach begins with the assertion that the central
focus of weapons control is to prevent the use of certain types of
weapons.66 What weapons a nation possesses is less determinative
than its government's stability and whether it is a friend or an
adversary; a stable ally may be less likely to use catastrophic weap-
ons." A logical corollary to this approach is that the best way to
achieve security against nations that might use catastrophic weapons
is to deploy sufficient military capability to deter attack.'
66. Seth Cropsey, Ltfe After Proferation; The Only Credible Deterrent, FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 1994,
at 14. See alsoJohn M. Deutch, The New Nuclear Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1992, at 120, 120
("The ultimate objective is to assure that there is no nuclear use."). Some commentators have
argued that because nuclear weapons engendered prudence between the superpowers during
the Cold War, the same logic should hold that the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations
could create peaceful regional nuclear balances. See generally KENNETH WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: MORE MAY BE BETrTER (1981) (arguing that nonproliferation policy is
wrong). But seeJoseph S. Nye, Jr., The Cause for Concern: Is Non-Proiferation Policy Mistaken?, 14
HARV. INT'L REv. 8 (1992) (rejecting logic of regional deterrence and arguing for nonprolifera-
tion).
67. Cf BAKER SPRING, HERITAGE FOUND., FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR CURTAILING THE PROLIFERA-
TION OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMs 1-2 (1991) ("Another problem with arms control
agreements attempting to eliminate biological and chemical weapons is that they treat non-
aggressive and aggressive nations alike. This implies that the arms themselves, and not their
users, threaten the peace. But all nations are not equally aggressors.").
68. Id. at 10. Spring notes:
Deterrence means convincing a potential adversary that the cost of resorting to force
is too high. It also means convincing an enemy that the use of weapons of mass
[Vol. 43:755
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Accordingly, a nonproliferation policy should encourage the forging
of friendships with governments where possible and bolster the
stability of those that exhibit signs of friendship.69 Allies of the
United States should possess the military capability to deter attack
from unfriendly states.70 Conversely, states that are unfriendly to the
United States should be militarily (and perhaps economically)
weakened if possible, and, in extreme cases, their military capabilities
should be destroyed.71 Judgments as to other nations' intentions are
thus decisive in weapons exports determinations.
Unlike the regulatory approach, realpolitik does not focus on
international suppliers of weapons. Rather, international suppliers of
military capability are as commendable or culpable as the customers
with whom they deal. To the extent that these suppliers sell only to
allies, they provide a beneficial service; but if they sell to adversaries,
their efforts are deplored. Arms suppliers thus are merely ancillary
implements to the central task of strengthening allies and weakening
adversaries.
destruction, will bring swift retaliation in kind.... America does not require a massive
chemical weapons arsenal. It does need, however, at least some of these arms to
threaten retaliation. It also needs a strong research and development program to
remain abreast of technological developments.
Id.; see also Walter B. Slocombe, The Continued Need for Extended Deterrenc, WASH. Q., Autumn
1991, at 157, 172. Slocombe writes:
Nuclear weapons will retain their fundamental role for many years, even in an
optimistic scenario, because there will be an overhanging possibility not merely of
transient ups and downs in Soviet progress but of fundamental Soviet relapse, an event
that would again require active nuclear deterrence for world stability and U.S. security.
Id. One author warns that efforts to control the dissemination of knowledge necessary to
construct catastrophic weapons are doomed and suggests that the United States reevaluate its
nonproliferation strategy. Ronald F. Lehman II, Arms Contro" Passingthe Torch as Time Runs Ou4
WASH. Q., Summer 1993, at 37, 42-47.
69. Lehman, supra note 68, at 42. Lehman argues:
In time, efforts to control the spread of technology and materials that would permit
construction of weapons of mass destruction are doomed.... U.S. nonproliferation
strategy must be designed to ensure that [nations capable of establishing catastrophic
weapons programs] do not feel compelled to change their policy. For close U.S. allies
and for many other nations around the world, stability tacked by the confidence that
the United States will continue its strong diplomatic and military leadership is the key
to continued forbearance in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
Id.
70. For example, former National Security Council staff member Richard Haas suggested
that the United States "work with both Pakistan and India to 'enhance their command and
control systems... [and] even selectively enhance nuclear capabilities to strengthen retaliatory
potential and, thus, reinforce mutual deterrence.'" John Glenn, At a Crossroads: An Examination
of U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 14 HARV. INT'L REv. 18, 19 (1992).
71. See SPRING, supra note 67, at 12 ("An effective defense policy for countering biological
and chemical weapons must include the capability to destroy the weapons' production facilities
and stockpiles and the aircraft, artillery, and other systems used to deliver the biological and
chemical agents against American troops.").
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2. Regulation
The regulatory approach takes sharp issue with these realpolitik
arguments, relying instead on the premise that the possession of
weapons, in and of itself, is deplorable for at least three reasons.
First, even an ally that is a responsible member of the world commu-
nity might, in the event of a crisis, be tempted to use its military
capability despite having promised to forbear in less critical times.72
That use, even if against an adversary of the United States, could have
unpredictable and uncontrollable repercussions apt to destabilize
international security." Second, the responsible ally that possesses
catastrophic weapons may experience an abrupt change of govern-
ment, leaving sophisticated weaponry in far less reliable hands. The
experience of arming the Shah of Iran during the 1970s, only to find
those weapons in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeni, demonstrates
the danger of assuming that an ally will remain in power perpetually.
Third and most important, a nation that produces and possesses
catastrophic weapons, even though it has no intent to use them,
heightens anxiety among its neighbors and adversaries, and raises the
probability of violent confrontation for preemptive or other purpos-
es.74 The United States could respond to this dilemma by supplying
its allies with defensive mechanisms, such as anti-tactical ballistic
missile capabilities. Access to such technologies, however, can assist
states in developing offensive missiles. 75
Ultimately, the concept of deterrence contains the elements of its
antithesis: a weapons-development program intended to increase a
72. See generally Barend ter Haar & Peit de Klerk, Verification of Non-Production: Chemical
Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Compared, 8 ARMS CONTROL 197, 197-200 (1987) (noting that policy
prior to World War II was to prevent use of certain weapons, whereas current strategy is to
prevent development and stockpiling).
73. Janne E. Nolan, The Conventional Arms Market After Iraq: Prospects for Control, 14
DISARMAMENT 10, 18 (1991).
74. See RobertJ. Lieber, Existential Realism After the Cold War, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 155,
157. Lieber states:
[I]n an anarchic international environment, states tend to arm themselves for self-
protection. This has the effect of stimulating others to do likewise and thus causing
all states to be potentially threatened.
Even when a state has no desire to attack another, the other state cannot be sure
that its intentions are peaceful, or will remain so; hence each must accumulate power
for defense. Because no state can know that the power accumulation of others is
defensively motivated, each must assume that it might be intended to be offensive.
Consequently, each state matches the other's power increments, and neither winds up
any more secure than when the vicious cycle began; the economic and social costs
incurred in acquiring and maintaining military power punctuate the futility of the arms
race.
Id.
75. Nolan, supra note 73, at 17.
[Vol. 43:755
CATASTROPHIC WEAPONRY
nation's destructive capability necessarily jeopardizes an adversary,
thereby inducing that adversary to increase its capabilities, which in
turn generates the need for a response by the first actor, ad nause-
am.76 The result is the arms race that has characterized international
affairs for decades. At some point, arguably reached long ago, the
logic of deterrence begins to undermine the accomplishment of
deterrence-the accumulation of enormous arsenals of incredible
destructiveness raises the risks of war through accident, terrorism, or
national bankruptcy. The fundamental thesis of military security
through deterrence, while arguably accurate during the Cold War,"
must give way to a new strategic approach.
The regulatory approach's great virtue is its attempt to be nondis-
criminatory. It is also far more objectively enforceable because it
proposes a basis for evaluating a nation's conduct rather than its
intent. Thus, the possession of catastrophic weapons, not the
inclination of a government to use them, is the offensive activity. A
corollary proposition holds that because suppliers of catastrophic
weaponry are, by definition, culpable violators of world order, their
activities must be corralled regardless of who their clients are. Rather
than being ancillary to client governments, weapons suppliers should
be the central focus of policy because they furnish the market that
accelerates the demand for more sophisticated weapons.
B. Hegemony Through Alliances or Disarmament Through Regimes
1. Realpolitik
The realpolitik approach views nonproliferation as one method
among many to advance a wide set of national and international
interests.7" As already stated, its ultimate goal is keeping reliable
allies heading stable governments throughout the world. Reliability
and stability can be fostered through a combination of economic
76. See generally PHILIP BOBBIT, DEMOCRACY AND DETERRENCE (1988) (examining
assumptions and concepts surrounding nuclear deterrence in international relations); ROBERT
JERVIS Er AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE (1989) (noting importance of determining other
side's intentions and underscoring need for states to develop policies that can both deter and
reassure).
77. See Jack Mendelsohn, Dismantling the Arsenals, 10 BROOKINGS REV. 34, 39 (1992)
("Ironically, the problem [with proliferation] is largely the result of the developed world's own
policies during the Cold War, when arming the enemy of one's enemy was considered to be the
height of sophisticated geopolitics.").
78. See Lehman, supra note 68, at 37-38. Nonproliferation is but one of five interrelated
arms control tasks, including sustaining new democracies, easing regional and ethnic conflict,
strengthening international norms against political oppression, and ensuring continuing
international leadership by the United States. Id.
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development and increased democratization.79 If affording access to
militarily critical technologies is necessary to those efforts, on balance
it may be preferable to tolerate a marginal increase in prolifera-
tion.8° This is not to say that nonproliferation is necessarily a low
priority, but rather that, among all the priorities that diplomats must
consider, nonproliferation has no preordained primacy. Every
decision that could implicate nonproliferation must be evaluated
according to a myriad of considerations on an essentially ad hoc
basis.8'
Compounding this view of ad hoc decisionmaking is a strong
commitment to the concept of state sovereignty. Each nation is an
entirely free actor in world affairs, constrained only by the self-
interested realization that its activities may incur the wrath of other
nations to its detriment. The anarchy resulting from the absence of
a central authority to resolve disputes or provide security requires that
each state promote its interests through force (military, economic,
cultural, or otherwise) rather than through the rule of law.8 2 Again,
the exigencies of the moment in the context of shifting local,
regional, and global power allocations demand that even the best
intentioned nonproliferation efforts be evaluated with many other
interests on a case-by-case basis.
In the midst of this anarchic environment, the need for stability is
79. See Lehman, supra note 68, at 50-51. Lehman writes:
[T]he spread of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law remains the most
effective means of implementing arms control. Flexibility and imagination in U.S.
arms-control efforts have already helped promote political reform even as they have
helped manage the risks that are the inevitable result of change even when a shift in
the political winds is welcome.
Arms control alone, however, will not create stability or improved relations. Nor can
it replace solid defense policies and budgets.
Id.
80. See Peter Montgomery, Re-Arm the Worl4 COMMON CAUSE, May/June 1991, at 25, 29
("Arms transfers, judiciously used, can help to deter aggression; strengthen mutual security
relationships; and foster internal and regional stability. Military assistance gives the United
States some influence over how its weapons are used, influence that disappears if the buyer
shops elsewhere.").
81. See generally Ernest Graves, Foreign Assistance After the Cold War, WASH. Q., Summer 1991,
at 47, 56 (stating that military aid and arms sales will remain important in establishing regional
support for U.S. crisis operations, but noting that major regional crises will require collaboration
among Western powers, with regard to both restriction of regional militarization and power
projection).
82. See Lieber, supra note 74, at 152. Lieber writes:
As a consequence of the anarchy problem, states find that they dwell in a kind of self-
help system. They either must be prepared to defend their own interests and those of
other people, or to see means of doing so through alliances. These realities of
existential realism do not yield iron laws, but they do create a series of propensities
shaping state behavior.
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achieved through alliances."3 Alliances have historically served
important strategic purposes by allowing nations to spread the burden
of deterrence for their mutual security.8 4 Alliances are essentially
collective security contracts among sovereigns.8 5 By joining an
alliance, a nation agrees to limits on its absolute freedom of action
but sacrifices none of its sovereign prerogatives. In an alliance, one
nation may have more power than another, but no nation or other
entity has any legal authority over another. Each nation participates
to the extent that its own self-interests dictate; like any contract, it can
be breached at will, albeit with possible consequences imposed by
other parties. Alliances are thus exclusively horizontal, or two-
dimensional, arrangements that facilitate the execution of the myriad
interests that allied states must pursue and in which nonproliferation
efforts are only one ingredient. 6 Indeed, in alliances where arms
sales are the recognized currency of diplomacy and indicate friend-
ship and sustain goodwill, nonproliferation efforts may actually
undermine the relationship's stability.8 7
2. Regulation
The regulatory approach again differs both as to the premise and
the conclusion of the argument. Undeniably, nonproliferation is not
the only or even the supreme interest of international relations, but
83. An alliance maybe defined as "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of
military force, intended for the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific
other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified." Glenn Snyder, Alliance Theory:
A Neorealist First Cu; 44J. INT'L AFF. 103, 104 (1990); see also STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ORIGINS
OF ALLIANCES 17 (RobertJ. Art & Robert Jarvis eds., 1987) (suggesting that when states are
confronted by significant external threats, they either balance, which is defined as "allying with
others against the prevailing threat," or bandwagon, which "refers to alignment with the source
of danger").
84. John Simpson, Trends in the Prolferation of Sophisticated Weapons and Missile Technology and
Their Implications for International and Regional Security, 14 DISARMAMENT 40, 49 (1991) ("An
alliance is a traditional method of increasing the military capabilities of a State, and this
arrangement has become so institutionalized... that any other way of approaching security
appears unthinkable.").
85. See generally ASHTON B. CARTER ET AL, BROOKINGS INST., A NEW CONCEPT OF
COOPERATIVE SECURITY 7 (1992) (suggesting that purpose of cooperative security arrangements
is to prevent war and ensure that organized aggression cannot start on any large scale).
86. See Graves, supra note 81, at 47. Graves states:
In such arrangements the supply of arms and training is aimed at deterring aggression
and enabling the recipients to resist any incursion at least until the other member
states canjoin in engaging the aggressor.... The supply and acceptance of arms are
presumed by the parties to be tangible quid pro quos in their relations that afford each
government some influence with the other.
Id.
87. See Nolan, supra note 73, at 11 (noting that conventional arms transfer restraint has
never proven to be effective for international diplomacy, as compared to regulation of nuclear
or chemical weapons).
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the regulatory approach asserts that nonproliferation should be
pursued as an end in itself rather than as a means to a broader and
less definable pursuit of national security.8 Accordingly, there is
merit in efforts to reduce the quantity and distribution of catastrophic
weapons without regard to whether such reduction strengthens
stability, economic development, or democratization.
The concept of state sovereignty has a more sophisticated meaning
under the regulatory approach than under realpolitik. While each
state clearly has a zone of interests within which it must operate free
from outside interference, the global community also has interests to
which each state must defer, at least if that state chooses to participate
in global trade and politics. According to the regulatory approach,
governments should not be absolutely free to stockpile or trade
catastrophic weaponry any more than they should be free to abuse the
basic human rights of their own citizens or endanger the environ-
ment."9 While nations once may have had ungoverned power to
respond to changing needs and conditions at will, such a notion is
simply out of date at the beginning of the third millennium.
Proliferation should be viewed, therefore, as a problem of the
global commons. One nation's offensive conduct not only affects
itself but threatens other nations and, in fact, has ramifications
throughout significant segments of the international community.
Furthermore, to correct that nation's offensive conduct necessarily
means imposing similar controls on all other nations that might be
tempted to fill a market or strategic void if the target nation alone
were disciplined. Nonproliferation policy should strive to develop
criteria and standards that guide policy across nations and over time
in a consistent and uniform manner.9" Indeed, formulation of
88. For an in-depth presentation of the arguments against viewing nonproliferation as an
end in itself and responses to those arguments, see Glenn, supra note 70, at 18, 21 ("Our goal
should not be limited to keeping the bombs of covert proliferation in the basement, but should
include efforts designed to prevent the acquisition of such weapons in the first place.").
89. See Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Security and Science and the Subcomm. on
International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
199-200 (1989) [hereinafter MTCR Hearing]. Congressman Dante Fascell asserted this point in
the context of ballistic missile control:
Eventually, human rights came out of the arena of private diplomacy and into the
arena of public diplomacy. Human rights became a matter of open and frank
discussion on the platter of every international meeting that ever took place.
Now, I don't see any difference, frankly, with respect to ballistic missile control.
There are no secrets, Mr. Clarke, there is no such thing as working privately with your
friends. There is no covert action.
Id.
90. See Brad Roberts, Arms Control and the End of the Cold War, WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at
39,43. International norms engender multilateral consensus, which in turn fosters international
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consistent and uniform responses to the spread of catastrophic
weaponry independent of the manifold political matters that
characterize realpolitik is the hallmark of the regulatory approach to
nonproliferation.
Where realpolitik focuses on alliances, the regulatory approach
focuses on international legal regimes.9 This is more than a
semantic distinction. An alliance has no standards in advance of the
participants' decision to agree, but a regime propounds standards of
conduct to which state parties must accede. While each nation retains
the option to join a regime, it has little freedom to adapt a regime to
its particular interests and must accept the uniform standards that
apply to every other participant. Most important, a regime establishes
an authority, separate from any of its members, that can apply those
standards objectively. Typically, a regime incorporates an organ to
resolve disputes that has legitimacy separate and distinct from the
power exercised by any single state. A regime is three-dimensional,
involving not only the relationships among the participating states but
also the relationship between each state and the central authority. A
nonproliferation regime differs from a strategic alliance, therefore, in
the singularity of its mission and in its structural capability to pursue
that mission.
C. Ad Hoc Diplomacy or Specification of Standards and Enforcement
Mechanisms
1. Realpolitik
Remarkably little can be said about the standards and modalities of
nonproliferation offered by the realpolitik approach except that each
situation must be evaluated, and responses formulated, on an ad hoc
basis in light of all relevant considerations. Indeed, to the extent that
concepts of standards and modalities suggest a preconceived set of
responses to categories of controversies, such efforts are fundamental-
ly misplaced, according to the realpolitik view, because they restrict
the unfettered flexibility that policyrnakers must have with regard to
stability:.
Those who see the world in realpolitik terms decry the role of norms in politics,
arguing correctly that norms are irrelevant to those determined to act with contempt
for the standards of others. But policy realists too often miss the importance of norms
in generating the political consensus necessary to punish behavior not consistent with
those norms.
Id.
91. For a thorough discussion of regime analysis in the context of international arms
control, see THOMAS BERNAuER, THE CHEMISTRY OF REGIME FORMATION: EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (1993).
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nonproliferation or any other policy.
The corollary to the absence of standards and modalities is the
investiture of power in heads of governments.92 Under realpolitik,
a nation's chief executive must retain unfettered discretion to manage
foreign policies effectively. Nonproliferation is but one interest to be
balanced among many national interests in an anarchic array of
alliances.93 Thus, only the head of each state has the authority
sufficient to decide that nation's appropriate response to the threat
of catastrophic weapons at any particular time or in any particular
situation.94
2. Regulation
As the term "regulation" suggests, the promulgation of specific
standards and modalities is essential to the regulatory approach.
Regulation strives to define the items subject to control, specify the
rules to which those items will be subject, verify compliance with those
rules, and provide penalties in the event of noncompliance. That
nuances of situations may differ does not materially detract from the
need for uniform application of standards in order to promote the
objectives of a coherent nonproliferation strategy. Declaring such
standards in advance will encourage parties to comply with those
92. In the context of discussing who should have final authority to make nonproliferation
policy, the former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has expressed full
support for this approach:
Too often, consideration of ACDA's role is caught up in the rhetorical question of who
is the arms-control or non-proliferation czar. There can be only one answer to that
question: the president. Arms control inevitably involves trades between State
Department concerns over bilateral and multilateral relations, Defense Department
concerns over military forces and programs, intelligence community concerns about
sources, methods, and estimates, Commerce Department concerns about trade, and
even White House concerns about politics. Arms-control and nonproliferation
decisions are inherently interagency and the arms-control perspective is not always the
most important. In the end, the president must make the tough calls.
Lehman, supra note 68, at 51.
93. See MTCR Hearing, supra note 89, at 146-47 (testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs) (noting that nonproliferation is only part of
foreign policy).
94. See MTCR Hearing, supra note 89, at 146-47 (testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs). The State Department fully adheres to this view
in the context of ballistic missile control:
The President must retain the flexibility to determine what actions are best
calculated to produce the results we seek. We have had success with diplomatic
pressure and persuasion that might not have occurred with inflexible sanctions.
Mandatory sanctions would make it impossible to differentiate between serious
violations-in which case the President could impose sanctions under existing
authority-and relatively minor infractions. Missile non-proliferation is only one
element of foreign policy, and the President must have the flexibility to weigh
competing interests.
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standards, thereby precluding many potential problems.
Accordingly, the regulatory approach minimizes the importance of
discretionary diplomacy. Instead of secretly pounding out deals that
trade off nonproliferation concerns with a boundless array of other
national interests, the regulatory approach favors using an open legal
process that can justly allocate accountability for proliferation
activities. Again, the foreknowledge that a government's efforts to
supply or purchase catastrophic weaponry will be subject to interna-
tional scrutiny tends to deter such activities. In addition, by stipulat-
ing mandatory sanctions on those nations found to violate interna-
tional standards of conduct, all members of the world community
would understand the serious consequences and the lack of accept-
able excuses for contributing to or engaging in proliferation. The
declaration of mandatory sanctions sends a clear message that the
pursuit of weapons capabilities will invoke inescapable penalties far
worse than a mere diplomatic rebuke.
III. THE PROLIFERATORS
The abundance of sources for weapons-related materials and
technology, combined with the growth of sophisticated industrial and
engineering capabilities in developing states, has created a perceptible
shift in concerns about proliferation. A cardinal feature of this new
focus is the role played by new suppliers who offer a variety of
materials, equipment, and services that cover a sweeping span of the
weapons-production cycle.
The vast majority of nations that have acquired catastrophic
weapons relied on active support from foreign suppliers.95 A few
nations claim to have developed an entirely indigenous capability to
manufacture and deploy sophisticated weaponry,96 but these pro-
grams would likely have failed without considerable backing from the
industrialized West.9 These pursuits are often aided by foreign
95. See MTCR Hearing, supra note 89, at 49-50 (testimony of Norman A. Wulf, Deputy
Assistant Director, Bureau of Nuclear Weapons Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency) (noting that most developing nations were able to develop ballistic missile technology
only with external assistance).
96. Mandeles, supra note 51, at 237 (observing that India and Israel developed nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities without substantial foreign assistance).
97. See W. SETH CARus, BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WoRLD 64 (1990). Chemical
weapons are a case in point. Although the production of highly toxic chemicals is not unduly
complicated, it is difficult to produce these weapons without considerable risk. It makes sense,
therefore, for a developing nation that is anxious to obtain a weapons capability to safeguard
against such catastrophic accident by employing sophisticated technology that is available in the
international marketplace. Foreign suppliers helped to construct the chemical weapons facilities
of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya and provided precursor chemicals and production equipment.
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materials and expertise from so-called "emerging suppliers" who
themselves are attempting to cover the high costs of their weapons
production by trading internationally.98
This Part discusses the proliferation activities of China, Germany,
Brazil, and the former Soviet Union.' Although the countries
examined here differ in many important respects, at least four
behavioral similarities are worth noting.
First, none of these proliferating countries supplies weapons with
much ideological consistency or with a high priority to maintaining
strategic security. Put simply, most proliferation is done for prof-
it." To the extent that there is a military justification for supplying
catastrophic weaponry, it is to gain sufficient funds to support high
levels of defense spending. 101
Second, in each of these nations, weapons exports apparently are
the indirect result of the absence of rigorous political control over
weapons policy rather than the execution of an overt commitment to
proliferate. None of these nations has had rigorous nonproliferation
laws. Only Germany has taken steps to rectify that situation.
Third, these nations are not international "pariahs." Every nation
examined here, as well as nearly every other major proliferator in the
world, is on friendly terms with the United States and shares open
and mutually beneficial trade relations.
Chemical and Biological Weapons Proiferation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 59 (1989) (statement of Elisa Harris, guest scholar, Brookings Institution).
98. See William C. Potter, The Behavior of the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Sources and Policy
Implications, in INTERNATIONAL NUcLEAR TRADE AND NONPROLIFERATION: THE CHALLENGE OF
EMERGING SUPPLIERS 411, 411 (William C. Potter ed., 1990) (stating that typical emerging
suppliers differ in such areas as level of economic development, technical capability, and
domestic, political, and economic structure).
99. All of the following information concerning the activities of these four nations comes
from unclassified sources; the author has no access to sources not in the public domain. While
considerable effort went to confirm assertions, citation must be to sources reporting on
proliferation, as cited herein, rather than to official governmental sources.
100. At least one observer, while recognizing that suppliers of weapons-critical items pursue
traditional economic incentives, contends that such activities have not as yet produced
substantial economic returns. See William C. Potter, The New Nuclear Suppliers, ORsIs, Spring
1992, at 199, 201 (recognizing that nuclear exports have not in general yielded substantial
economic returns for most emerging suppliers and noting that this marketing difficulty "results
from a combination of factors including the depressed international nuclear market, the
economic ill health of most of the prospective importers in the developing world, constraints
on long-term financing, and the lack of a proven record of reliable and safe exports").
101. BARNABY, supra note 4, at 25-26. Baraby explains:
[T]he major powers can afford to buy appropriate quantities of major weapons for
their own arsenals only if they achieve the economies of scale to be had from long
production-runs. By selling weapons abroad countries reduce the costs of those same
weapons for their own armed forces. Maintaining and increasing arms sales is,
therefore, crucially important for the governments of the major exporters of weapons.
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Finally, each of these nations has responded positively to U.S.
threats to restrict trade as a consequence of their permissive prolifera-
tion policies. While such threats have been sporadic and have not
been coordinated with other trading powers, their beneficial results
suggest that systematic imposition of restrictions could be a powerful
control mechanism.
A. China
With its hundreds of nuclear warheads and a formidable array of
delivery systems, including ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines,
the People's Republic of China (PRC) has extensive experience in
weapons production and boasts a sophisticated set of resource,
engineering, and manufacturing capabilities. China has pursued its
vital interests through weapons exports to nations far and near,
including India and Pakistan, whose own weapons programs directly
affect the PRC's security.
1. General weapons export policies
China's proliferation activities have paralleled and supplemented its
role as a leading supplier of conventional weaponry. During the
1980s, China became a leading arms supplier to the developing world,
signing agreements between 1983 and 1990 worth more than sixteen
billion dollars. 2 During the 1980s, China exported between ten
and twenty percent of its total arms production, 0 3 accounting for
seventy-three percent of arms exports from East Asia and 5.8% of all
sales of major conventional arms to the Asia/Pacific region.10 4
During this period, the PRC ranked fourth among the top fifteen
exporters of major conventional arms to the developing world."0 5
Of the PRC's total export of major conventional weapons during the
period from 1987 to 1991, forty-five percent went to Asian and Pacific
states.' ° The rest, and by far the largest percentage of the growth
102. William C. Triplett II, China's Weapons Mafia: As the "Families" Get Richer, the World Gets
a Lot More Dangerous, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1991, at C3.
103. See KEITH KRAUSE, ARMS AND THE STATE: PATrERNS OF MILITARY PRODUCTION AND
TRADE 164 (1992) (estimating that during 1980s China had total arms production of between
$5 and $10 billion, of which it exported $1 to $1.5 billion).
104. Gerald Segal, Managing New Arms Races in the Asia/Pacific, WASH. Q., Summer 1992, at
83, 92. The rise of East Asian countries as arms exporters is a recent phenomenon. Even today,
only North Korea has joined China among the top 15 exporters of major conventional arms to
the developing world. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 83. In 1991, the Asia/Pacific region accounted for 35% of all imports of major
weapons, more than any other region, including Europe. In 1990, developing countries in the
Asia/Pacific region accounted for 44% of imports of major arms by all developing states, down
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in PRC arms exports in the late 1980s, went to the Middle East.10 7
The primary motivation for China's aggressive arms export policy
is to earn hard currency to finance a rapid buildup of its own military
forces."' During the 1980s, China substantially overhauled its
military by reducing its troop strengths and accelerating development
of high-technology defense capabilities." 9 Increasing arms exports
financed these changes and enabled the military to exercise
decisionmaking autonomy that sometimes infringed on the nation's
foreign policy pursuits.110 Arms exports rose in tandem with the
acquisition of Western high technology1 and, more recently,
weapons from the former Soviet Union.1 In February 1992,
Beijing launched a concentrated effort to improve the technological
base of its defense industries,"3 appropriating 7.6 billion yuan for
the importation of technologies for aircraft, missile, and warship
production, most of which was to be paid for by profits from weapons
exports.1
1 4
Most weapons sales are made through about two dozen govern-
ment-owned or controlled export companies operating under the
direction of either the People's Liberation Army or the defense-
related ministries controlled by the State Council." 5 The Commis-
sion on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
coordinates all of these activities.116 Until recently, the Bank of
from 59% in 1989. Id.
107. Id. at 92. The PRC did particularly well during the Iran-Iraq War, when that war ended,
Chinese arms sales dropped sharply from $1.9 billion in 1988 to $1.1 billion in 1991. Id. at 93.
But as a percentage of the overall market, the PRO's share only fell from 6.3% to 5.1%. Id.
108. See Triplett, supra note 102, at C3 (noting that China sold 50 nuclear-capable CSS-2
ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia at profit of $2 billion).
109. See Nazir Kama, China's Arms Export Policy and Responses to Multilateral Restraints, 14
CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 112, 113 (1992) (stating that arms sales during 1980s resulted from
shifts in China's national priorities away from defense spending under "four modernizations"
program launched by Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s).
110. Id. at 113-14 (indicating that fewer restrictions were placed on Chinese military's arms
export activities in light of hard currency shortages and domestic political considerations).
111. See id. at 114. China had weapons acquisition contracts with American firms worth over
$1 billion, but these were canceled in 1990 when the United States imposed an arms embargo
on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Id.
112. SeeYoseff Bodansky, The People's Republic of China Once Again Seeks Military Options, DEF.
& FOREIGN AFF. STRATEGIC POL'Y, April 1992, at 8; see also Bruce Stokes, Challenging China, 24
NAT'L J. 2106, 2106 (1992) (noting that Beijing has rushed to rearm with advanced Soviet
weaponry that is increasingly available at "bargain-basement prices").
113. SeeBarber B. Conable,Jr. & David M. Lampton, China: The ComingPower, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992, at 133,136 (citing DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN 1991 AND 1992: PRESSURE TO REVISIT REFORM MOUNTS 11 (1992)
(reporting that PRC increased defense spending by 22% from 1988 to 1991)).
114. See Bodansky, supra note 112, at 8.
115. See Michael Brenner, The People's Republic of China, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TRADE
AND PROLIFERATION 247, 247 (1970); Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
116. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
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Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which operated in
Beijing, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, and Hong Kong, was
the bank of choice for arms exporters. 7
Although there is little evidence to suggest that China has prolifer-
ated chemical or biological weapons," 8 the PRC has been a major
supplier of equipment and materials necessary for nuclear bomb and
missile production. China's role in this regard is noteworthy; by
marketing whole systems and supplying comprehensive production
assistance and technology, China has provided recipient nations with
the know-how and capability to operate on their own.119
The PRC has been the center of nuclear proliferation concern since
the early 1980s. China is probably the world's most aggressive
exporter of nuclear technology and materials, with clients in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 2° Of the five declared
nuclear powers, it has been the most reluctant to prevent North
Korea and others from developing a nuclear bomb.' China's
missile sales program, like its efforts to sell dual-use nuclear technolo-
gies, has tended to involve the creation of missile production
capabilities, despite its pledges not to sell medium-range missiles in
the Middle East nor to deliver any militarily significant technology to
the developing world.'22 Indeed, with a notable record of supplying
both sides of various regional disputes, China's weapons exports do
not appear to follow any ideological pattern. 3
117. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3. Of a reported $400 million deposited in BCCI accounts,
several million reportedly belonged to the Ministry of Aerospace Industry, the parent of the
ballistic-missile-producing Chinese Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp. Id.
118. See BARNABY, supra note 4, at 98 (stating that virtually nothing is known about China's
proliferation of biological weapons). But see R. Jeffrey Smith, China May Have Revived Germ
Weapons Program, US. Ofjiials Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1993, at A4 (indicating that recent
reports suggest that China has significantly expanded its biological weapons program, despite
agreeing to eliminate it in 1984).
119. See Tony Walker et al., Middle East: Weapons Deals Hit Prospects for Mideast Stability, FIN.
TIMES, May 11, 1992, at 7 (noting that China has world's most comprehensive program for
providing missile know-how to developing states).
120. See Brenner, supra note 115, at 265 (indicating that China has exported nuclear
technology and materials to Argentina, Pakistan, and South Africa, among others); see also infra
notes 124-63 and accompanying text (providing overview of China's proliferation activities in
various countries).
121. Andrew Higgins, The Bomb-Makers of Asia, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 21, 1991, at 29.
122. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 119-20 (noting that China's drive in mid-1980s to export
arms extended to ballistic missiles and space rockets which, along with technology transfers,
enabled local manufacture by recipient countries).
123. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 115 (stating that China devoted nearly 50% of its arms
sales during 1983-90 period to Iran and Iraq during Iran-Iraq War). In addition, China supplied
resistance groups in both Afghanistan and Cambodia with Chinese weapons. Id. at 119.
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2. Notable proliferation activities
The most egregious expression of China's uninhibited nuclear
export policy involved the assistance China provided to Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s. China provided
technical assistance during the construction of Pakistan's Kahuta
centrifuge enrichment facility, trained Pakistani officials on how to
handle uranium fuels, and, perhaps, gave Pakistan the complete
design of a tested nuclear weapon with a yield of about twenty-five
kilotons.124 United States officials have confirmed that China also
gave Pakistan enough weapons-grade uranium to fuel two nuclear
weapons.'25 With the Chinese design, Pakistan has been able to
make and test nuclear weapon parts and to test the whole design with
a dummy nuclear core.12 6 Most experts believe that Pakistan now
has a workable bomb.'
In addition to receiving nuclear materials, Pakistan has been a
primary recipient of Chinese missiles. In 1991, U.S. intelligence
sources discovered that China was secretly selling Pakistan the M-1 1
missile which can carry a nuclear warhead about 185 miles.'28
Indeed, the Clinton administration recently imposed economic
sanctions against China as punishment for its missile proliferation
activities. 29
Simultaneously, China secretly sold sensitive nuclear material to
India, including at least 130 to 150 tons of "heavy water,"' through
a West German broker, Alfred Hempel.' Chinese heavy water sales
continued until 1987, enabling India to import enough to start at
124. Brenner, supra note 115, at 266-68.
125. Gary Milhollin & Gerald White, A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1991, at C1 [hereinafter Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar].
126. Id. at C4. Chinese scientists were reportedly seen at Pakistan's secret Kahuta complex,
apparently helping Pakistan produce weapons-grade uranium with gas centrifuges. According
to West German officials, China also sold Pakistan tritium, the fuel for the fusion reaction in a
hydrogen bomb. Id.
127. See, e.g., Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at Cl, C4 (indicating
that Pakistan has workable bomb weighing only 400 pounds); SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB,
supra note 13, at 143 (noting that U.S. officials believe that Pakistan began to produce weapons-
grade uranium in 1986, producing enough annually for two or three weapons).
128. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at Cl. The United States
recently blocked the sale of a supercomputer to China and threatened further sanctions over
allegations that China continued to sell M-11 missiles and longer range M-9 missiles to Pakistan.
Michael Chugani, U.S. Acts over China Arms Sales, S. CHIN. MORN. POST, Dec. 6, 1992, at 1.
129. Steven Greenhouse, $1 Billion in Sales of High-Tech Items to China Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1993, atAl (reporting that Clinton administration banned one billion dollars worth of high-
technology exports to China).
130. Heavy water is used as a moderating element in certain types of reactors, including
some capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.
131. See Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at C4.
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least two and possibly three reactors.1 32  Running at full capacity,
these reactors can make enough plutonium for as many as forty
atomic bombs per year."33
During the early 1980s, Hempel also funneled tons of Chinese
heavy water and highly enriched uranium to Argentina. 3 4 Alleged-
ly, both items were also supplied to South Africa, enabling the
Pretoria government to triple its production of weapons-grade
uranium at its Valindaba enrichment plant.'35 In 1984, China
supplied Brazil, Argentina's neighbor and adversary, with enriched
uranium and agreed to provide liquid-fuel technology and missile
guidance in return for solid-fuel rocket technology.S6
Further, China supplied significant nuclear technology to both Iraq
and Iran. China offered Iraq shipments of lithium hydride, a
compound used in the manufacture of hydrogen bombs,3 7 and
samarium cobalt magnets, used to hold enrichment centrifuges in
place.'38 At the same time, it also supplied calutron equipment,
which could be used to enrich uranium, to Iran."9
In 1991, U.S. intelligence revealed that China was secretly building
a heavy water reactor in Algeria. 4 ' With an announced power of
fifteen megawatts, the reactor's sole purpose seems to be to make
enough nuclear weapons material for about two bombs every three
years.'' The Algeria reactor is suspicious because of the absence
of electrical power lines leading from the plant, the possible existence
of a uranium reprocessing installation, its desert location, and the
extraordinary military security measures taken to protect it. 42
China's sales of missiles and missile technology also have raised
considerable concern among Western observers. Not only has it
actively pursued sales to customers in the Middle East and elsewhere
that face imminent hostilities, but China likely sold missile technology
132. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at C4.
133. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at C4.
134. Higgins, supra note 121, at 29. At the time, Argentina had no known use for the
uranium, suggesting that the reason for the sale was to support Argentina's effort to develop
nuclear weapons. Id.
135. Brenner, supra note 115, at 253.
136. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at Cl.
137. Higgins, supra note 121, at 29.
138. SPEcrOR, NUCLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 18, at 23-24.
139. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 123. While China claimed that its sales to Iran were
exclusively for peaceful purposes, Iranian Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani provoked
concern by stating that Muslim states had a right to develop nuclear weapons because Israel had
that capability. Id.
140. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
141. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
142. Elaine Sciolino & Eric Schmitt, Algerian Reactor Camefrom China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1991, at Al, A12.
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to North Korea." Like its nuclear technology exports, China's
missile exports have raised special concern because they seem to be
directed at promoting an indigenous capability. For example, China
transferred technology to improve Iran's missile guidance system and
constructed a missile testing range near Qum.' In addition, the
United States banned the export of high-speed computers and
satellite components to China after concluding that China had
supplied missile guidance components to Pakistan. 145
In July 1988, China apparently agreed to sell Syria the M-9
missile146 and Transporter/Erector/Launcher equipment, a modern,
fully mobile missile system designed to carry a nuclear warhead about
375 miles.147  The deal may be worth $200 million.148  Syria also
has taken delivery of North Korean Scud missiles produced with
Chinese assistance. 49 To help Syria develop an indigenous capabili-
ty, China shipped as much as ninety tons of chemicals used to
produce solid fuel for missiles and sent technicians to establish
production facilities for ballistic missiles at Hama and Aleppo. 5 '
Recent reports that Syria is now negotiating with China to acquire a
nuclear reactor have raised substantial concerns among U.S. offi-
cials.151
While China has supplied the technology for the construction of its
Long March II rockets to Brazil,152 China has sent most of its
missiles to the Middle East. The Chinese sold 1600-mile-range CSS-2
143. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 121 (stating that China has been suspected of assisting
North Korea to modify Soviet Scud-B missile for sale to Iran).
144. Kamal, supra note 109, at 120.
145. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 121 (suggesting that China had been suspected of assisting
Pakistan's missile development since 1989, when Pakistan first test-fired its Hat! II missile).
146. See generally Hua Di, The Arms Trade and Proiferation of Ballistic Missiles in China, in AAAS
SCIENCE AND SECURrIY COLLOQUIUM: ARMS SALES VERSUS NONPROLIFERATION: ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND CONTROL 3 (1991) (observing that China
started M-9 program in 1984, intending it primarily as export product).
147. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3. International pressure may have persuaded China to
defer shipments of the M-9 missile under a 1987 contract with Syria, but there is no sign that
the Chinese have abandoned plans to supply the missile. Walker et al., supra note 119, at 7.
Indeed, reports that China had shipped Syria chemicals suitable for production of solid-fuel
missiles, togetherwith reported sightings of M-9 missile launchers in Syria, prompted speculation
that the M-9 transfer is proceeding despite international pressure. Id.
148. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 118; Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
149. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at C4.
150. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 120.
151. Hearings on Weapons Proliferation, supra note 28, at 36, 40 (testimony of Robert Gates,
former Director, Central Intelligence Agency).
152. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proferation in the Third World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42, 49
(1989) [hereinafter Missile Proliferation Hearings] (statement of W. Seth Carus, Fellow,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy).
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missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988.153 Similarly, the Iranian missile
program appears to rely heavily on Chinese technical expertise. 154
Beijing became Tehran's biggest weapons supplier during the Iran-
Iraq War, selling $4.8 billion in weapons and munitions to Iran, 5'
including Silkworm missiles that were used against merchant shipping
in the Persian Gulf.5 ' Recently, China has adapted secretly ac-
quired Patriot air defense missile technology to develop ballistic
missile reentry vehicles that can foil U.S.-made defensive systems.
57
Iran is the most likely customer for this technology.'
It is noteworthy that sporadic U.S. pressure on China to control
proliferation has had some success, despite China's claims that its
activities already exhibit cautious efforts to secure foreign currency.
China eventually accepted Missile Technology Control Regime
guidelines, which attempt to limit the diffusion of technologies that
can be applied to nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems,159 in
return for the lifting of an embargo on U.S. satellite components and
high-speed computers imposed on China because of its transfers of
missile components to Pakistan."6 This change in policy, however,
immediately preceded a vote in Congress on whether to terminate
China's most-favored-nation status that would have threatened its $19
billion export market. 6' China is apparently willing to accept
further restrictions on arms exports if they are worked out "through
overall and equal consultations among all countries" under U.N.
auspices.'62 Moreover, under heavy international pressure, China
became the last declared nuclear weapons state to accede to the
153. See MTCR Hearing, supra note 89, at 17, 21 (statement ofJim E. Hines, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Negotiations Policy, Department of Defense).
154. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 121 ("China's involvement in Iran's missile development
took place in the wider context of the latter's efforts to enlarge its indigenous defence
production base.").
155. Triplett, supra note 102, at C3.
156. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 116 (noting that Iran fired Silkworm missiles on numerous
merchant ships in Persian Gulf during Iran-Iraq War, including one U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti oil
tanker in October 1987).
157. See David A. Fulghum, China Exploiting U.S. Patriot Secrets, 138 AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECt. 20, 20 (1993).
158. Id.
159. KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 105; see also infra part IV.D (discussing MTCR in detail).
160. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 126 (discussing 1991 U.S. ban on high-tech exports to
China after PRC transferred M-11 missile components to Pakistan).
161. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 127 (noting that U.S. market accounts for 25% of China's
global exports and that China has $13 billion trade surplus with United States).
162. See Kamal, supra note 109, at 12; Hua Di, Ballistic Missile Exports Will Continue, ASIA-PAC.
DEF. REP., Sept. 1991, at 14-15, cited in Nazir Kamal, China's Arms Export Policy and Responses to
Multilateral Restraints, 14 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 112, 127 (1992).
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1992.163
B. Germany
Official exports of major weapons systems by Germany have not
contributed significantly to the international arms race.'6 From
1981 to 1990, West Germany delivered approximately $12.5 billion
worth of arms, of which nearly half went to Argentina, Turkey, and
the Netherlands.165  Less than one-half of one percent of this total
represents exports to Iraq, Iran, and Libya." Including convention-
al arms, Germany accounts for between 2.2% and 3.4% of the
worldwide weapons trade.
167
The real story of Germany's proliferation activities, however,
involves the unofficial sale of dual-use items by private German
companies.16s  German aerospace firms played critical roles in
helping Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Argentina, and Brazil develop medium-
range ballistic missiles.'69 In addition, German companies have
been the key technology suppliers for nuclear programs in India,
Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. 7° Germany's economic
dependence on exports, which account for sixty percent of its gross
domestic product, has led one U.S. official to comment that German
industry has always operated on the "assumption that you can sell
163. SeeKamal, supra note 109, at 130 (noting that after France declared intention to adhere
to NPT in 1991, China was last declared nuclear power not under NPT).
164. SeeDan Petreanu, The Business That BackfiredJERUSALEM POSTJan. 27, 1989, at4 (citing
Dr. Ze'ev Eyton of Jaffee Institute, who explained that because of its sensitivity to its history,
Germany has strong policy of not being main arms supplier for any one country nor of selling
complete major weapons systems).
165. See Herbert Wulf, The Federal Republic of Germany, in ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS 72, 85
tbl. 10.1 (Ian Anthony ed., 1991); see also Rolf Soderlind, Tough Export Laws Hamper German
Defence Industry, REUTER LIB. REP., Feb. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File
(stating that weapons exports accounted for only 0.3% of German exports in 1990).
166. Wulf, supra note 165, at 85.
167. KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 134. Because a high proportion of German production is
conducted jointly with other European partners, however, these figures probably understate
German participation in the export market. Id. at 134-35.
168. Before unification, these companies were, of course, West German. Unification has
extended former West German regulatory laws to former East German activities, but the
immediate post-unification practice of German firms did not manifest an appreciable change
of policy in regard to weapons proliferation. See generally Thomas Kielinger & Max Otte,
Germany: The Pressured Power, FOREIGN PoL'Y, June 22, 1993, at 44.
169. Robert Gillette, 3rd World Missiles Linked to German, Italian Firms, LA. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1989, at 1; see Lally Weymouth, Third-World Nukes: The German Connection, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
1991, at A29 (quoting nuclear proliferation expert Gary Milhollin describing Germany as world's
leading exporter of missile technology and key supplier of parts and know-how to Brazil,
Argentina, Iraq, India, and Libya).
170. Weymouth, supra note 169, at A29; see also SPEcrOR, NucLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 18,
at 10-12 (stating that India received more than 250 metric tons of nuclear materials from West
German brokers).
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anything not specifically prohibited.",7 The German Government
long contended that its laws do not permit interference with private
commercial firms.172 Despite more than five years of protests by the
U.S. Government, Germany opposed efforts to tighten export controls
on the grounds that the government lacks legal authority to interfere
with the export decisions of private German firms. 73
1. Weapons exports to Iraq
Most observers agree that German commercial exports were more
responsible for Iraq's acquisition of chemical weapons and ballistic
missiles than any other nation's official or private efforts. 74 From
1986 to 1990, more than 100 German companies supplied Iraq with
nearly $200 million in dual-use items.175  According to former
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, approximately eighty percent of Iraq's
technology came from Germany' 76  Indeed, a German company
even built Saddam Hussein's personal bunker under the presidential
guest house in Baghdad. 77
German firms contributed to Iraq's nuclear program through front
companies controlled by the Iraqi Secret Service Organization that
dealt directly with German producers.'78 The more noteworthy
supplies included vacuum furnaces, an electronic beam welder, and
centrifuge technology. 9 A half-dozen firms sold uranium enrich-
171. R. Jeffrey Smith & Marc Fisher, Sending Equipment to Iraq: Anatomy of a Dea WASH.
POST, July 23, 1992, at Al, A26.
172. See id. at A26 (citing German authors as stating that German exports are subject to
mandatory licensing only in exceptional cases).
173. Id.
174. See Gary Milhollin, Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at 30, 34.
Milhollin, who directs the University of Wisconsin's Project on Nuclear Arms Control, has
claimed that "Germany supplied more of Iraq's mass destruction weaponry than all other
countries combined." Id.; see also Igor Reichlin & Mark Maremont, Iraq's Silent Allies in Its Quest
for the Bomb, Bus. Wg.,Jan. 14, 1991, at 50,51 ("Saddam owes much of the progress he has made
so far to German Companies.").
175. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at Al. A number of these firms are the pillars of
German industry, including Gildemeister machine tool company, prime contractor for the $1
billion Iraqi weapons research center at Mosul, and aerospace company Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm, which produced helicopters and key components of about 10,000 Iraqi antitank and
antiaircraft missiles. Tyler Marshall, Germany Was Hub of Iraq Arms Network in Europe, LA. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1991, at Al, A16. Siemens, another prominent German firm, supplied two x-ray
diffraction systems capable of analyzing weapons-grade uranium during production. Milhollin,
supra note 174, at 30, 32.
176. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26.
177. Marshall, supra note 175, at A16.
178. See RACHEL SCHMIDT, RAND CORP., GLOBAL ARMS EXPORTS TO IRAQ, 1960-1990, at 37
(1991).
179. Weymouth, supra note 169, at A29. Iraq has obtained classified designs for a centrifuge
and ring magnets; the centrifuge design is similar to one developed by MAN Technologie, and
the magnets, used to stabilize centrifuge rotors, were supplied by Inwako. Reichlin & Maremont,
supra note 174, at 50-51.
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ment equipment including sophisticated lathes and presses."s
Besides nuclear weapons, German firms helped design plants for
producing chemical weapons and provided equipment that enabled
Iraq to fill chemical rockets."' One firm, Karl Kolb GmbH, alleged-
ly delivered six nerve-gas plants to the Samarra complex. 2  Six
other firms supplied equipment for Iraq's biological weapons
program, including devices to grow pathogens in laboratories,
concentrate pathogens, and protect workers from contamination.183
A consortium of German companies helped Iraq put together the
Saad 16 complex, 84 which has enabled Iraq to convert existing
inventories of inaccurate 300-kilometer-range Scud-B missiles into the
650-kilometer-range A-Husayn and 900-kilometer-range Al-Abbas
missiles that landed in Tel Aviv and Riyadh.'85 Consen, a German
company affiliated with German arms giant Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm, organized the Iraqi-sponsored development of the Condor II,
a medium-range missile, while numerous German firms provided
technical assistance. 86 Even after the embargo against Iraq was in
force, over 100 German companies continued to provide Iraq with
military equipment and know-how.187  Sixteen firms supplied
equipment for ballistic missiles; eleven firms earned roughly fifty
million dollars for equipment and advice used to extend the range
and improve the accuracy of Scud missiles.'
180. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26. Specialty metals were supplied by Saarstahl and
exported by Export-Union. Reichlin & Maremont, supra note 174, at 50-51.
181. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26.
182. Marshall, supra note 175, at A16.
183. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26.
184. See generally Marshall, supra note 175, at A16 (describing Saad 16 project at Mosul, 175
miles north of Baghdad, as most ambitious weapons testing and research center in Arab world).
185. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26 (stating that U.N. Documents revealed 11
German companies that earned approximately $50 million for helping Iraq increase range and
accuracy of Scud missiles).
186. Gillette, supra note 169, at 9; see also Milhollin, supra note 174, at 34 (stating that
Condor II missile has range and configuration similar to that of American Pershing).
187. SeeAdministration Report on Participation by German Companies in Arms Supply and
the Export of Technologies Pertaining to Armaments to Iraq, 137 CONG. REC. 81028-29 (daily
ed. Jan. 22, 1991) (reporting that in response to international pressure over role of German
enterprises in arming Hussein, German Government enacted tighter export control laws).
188. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26. A notable example was H&H Metalform, a
toolmaking firm, which sold Iraq materials for chemical weapons and rockets, and lathes to mill
centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment. Id. While H&H has maintained that it did not know
that its equipment would be used for weapons, U.N. inspectors concluded that H&H knew that
Iraq's claim that the equipment would be put to peaceful uses was false. Id. Furthermore, H&H
played a key role in providing technical assistance; indeed, agents of H&H reportedly installed
the equipment. Id. German authorities approved all of H&H's exports to Iraq. Id. As of late
1992, H&H was in liquidation and two managing directors were in jail for export violations.
Mark Hibbs, German Expert Wanted by Authorities for Giving Iraq Carbon Centrifuge Rotors,
NucLEARFuEm, Nov. 9, 1992, at 1, 14.
788
1994] CATASTROPHIC WEAPONRY
While these sales were unofficial, recent reports indicate that they
were accomplished at least through the silent acquiescence of
responsible authorities.'8 ° Iraq's procurement efforts throughout
Europe were headquartered in Iraq's embassy in Bonn, which
forwarded the orders to a network of companies willing to supply
needed technology."9  While U.S. intelligence had suspected
German involvement in Iraqi chemical weapons projects as early as
1984, it was not until 1990, when a Swiss technical consultant
confirmed those suspicions, that Bonn took any corrective action.' 9
2. Other notable proliferation activities
Next to supplying Iraq, the most serious example of German
proliferation was the involvement of the Imhausen Company 92 in
the construction of a plant to produce chemical warfare agents near
Rabta, Libya. 93 The ability of German firms to evade German
export control laws, 94 and thereby foster a strategic threat against
nearby allies, was a profound embarrassment to the Kohl govern-
ment.' 95 According to recent reports, the Rabta plant was capable
of producing tactical missiles, bombs, mortars, grenades, and the
189. See Marshall, supra note 175, at A16 (reporting that senior officials at German Federal
Economic Authority in Eschborn believe some of country's most respected companies knowingly
falsified information on export license applications); see also Reichlin & Maremont, supra note
174, at 51 (stating that Federal Export Office generally sided with German companies in
granting export permits).
190. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26.
191. Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at A26.
192. John Templeman & Dinah Lee, How Qadaffi Built His Deadly Chemical Plan Bus. WK.,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 50 (stating that in addition to Imhausen, as many as 40 German companies,
including Preussag and Dreieich, have been implicated in providing key equipment to Libya).
193. Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need for Remedies: Hearings of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989) (testimony of Hon. William H.
Webster, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) [hereinafter Chemical & Biological Weapons
Threat]. CIA Director Webster stated:
When this site is fully operational, it may be the single largest chemical warfare
agent production plant in the Third World.
It would have been virtually impossible for Libya to harness the technologies
necessary to build and operate such facilities without the assistance of foreign
companies and personnel from several West European and Asian countries.
West German assistance has been extensive at the CW production plant.
Id.
194. See Templeman & Lee, supra note 192, at 50. Apparently, Imhausen established a
dummy company, called Pen-Tsao-Materia-Medica-Center Ltd., based in Hong Kong but
operated out of Hamburg, Germany. It acquired materials from Imhausen's German factories
and purportedly exported them to a Chinese customer via Hong Kong. Rather than going to
China, Imhausen equipment was shipped from Hong Kong to Singapore and finally to Libya.
Id.
195. See Petreanu, supra note 164, at 4.
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nerve gas sarin.' 96 Compounding the problem were revelations that
a German company, Intec, helped Libya develop the capacity to
extend the range of its aircraft in order to target Israel. 97 Despite
being damaged by fire in March 1990, the Rabta plant is still
considered by U.S. officials to be the largest chemical weapons
complex in the developing world. 98
Under international political pressure, Germany enacted new laws
to control exports. 199 Companies now need government approval
to export dual-use items,2" although how exacting the approval
process is may be questioned.2"' Despite the enactment of these
196. Nick Rufford et al., Gadaffi Builds Huge Poison Gas Arsenal at Rabta Plant, SUNDAY TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1992, at 1, 26.
197. See Petreanu, supra note 164, at 4.
198. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Says That Lilya Is Building a 2d Plant to Make Poison Gas, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1993, at A7. Allegedly, Libya has stockpiled as much as 100 tons of chemical agents at
the Rabta facility. Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order Hearings Before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1992) (statement of Robert Gates, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency).
199. A German initiative to improve their export control laws was first announced on January
10, 1989. See Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat, supra note 193, at 224-26 (statement of Dr.
Wolfgang Schfuble, Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of Federal Chancellery).
Previously, the law required proof of intentional violation of the export license requirement or
an intentional falsification of destination or end use in export documents. David Goodhart, W.
Germany Tightens Rein on Its Exporters, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1989, at 3. If the government brought
charges against individuals suspected of violations, and those charges were disproved, then the
government officials bringing the action and halting shipments could be liable for personal
damages, even if they had taken the action in good faith. Global Spread of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs and the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1992) (testimony of Richard Perle, Resident Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute, and Paul Freedenberg, Trade Consultant, Baker & Botts).
The Zollkriminalamt (Customs Criminological Institute or ZKI), a unit of the Federal Ministry
of Finance (MOF), is in charge of investigating and prosecuting violations of export laws, such
as the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat, supra note 193,
at 218. In order to use the criminal provisions of the Act, the ZKI had to have uncontestable
legal proof of illegal action (the existence of "initial suspicion, founded on concrete facts"). Id.
at 223.
New export controls passed in 1992 empower the ZKI to use wiretaps and open the mail of
individuals suspected of violating export laws. See Mark Hibbs, Germany's New Export Law Isn't
Tough Enough, Watchdogs Say, NUcCLEARFUEL, Feb. 3, 1992, at 5. Any action taken requires a legal
justification, but is based on a case-by-case approach. Id. In the event of a conviction, profits
from illegal arms sales can be confiscated. Soderlind, supra note 165. In addition,jail terms and
heavy fines can be imposed on firms that illegally export to sensitive regions like the Middle
East. Id.
200. See Hibbs, supra note 199, at 5. All exports of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
specifically listed in the Foreign Trade and Payments Act of 1961 must first be approved through
the Office of Economics, which decides whether the case is routine. Wulf, supra note 165, at
79. Only the export of listed items must be licensed. Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat,
supra note 193, at 218. Any non-routine case, i.e., one not having precedent, must be sent for
approval to other ministries, such as the Ministries of Defense or Foreign Affairs. Wulf, supra
note 165, at 79.
201. Only six German corporate officials have received prison sentences for helping Libya
build the Rabta plant; as of the beginning of 1993, four of those convictions were on appeal.
Former German Executive Gets 15 Months'Jail for Libyan Poison-Gas Plant, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Jan. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. For an incisive discussion of how
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new laws, and U.S. intelligence estimates warning that Iran is pursuing
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, the German Government
has approved more than two hundred applications to deliver sensitive
dual-use technology to Iran. °2 And most recently, a number of
German companies have allegedly helped Libya build another
underground chemical weapons plant near Tarhunah, east of
Rabta 3  While German spokesmen have once again claimed that
the companies in question did not know the purpose of the facility,
U.S. intelligence officials claim that technicians visiting the site should
have known how the equipment was being used. 4
C. Brazil
Brazil's export of catastrophic weaponry is a by-product of its efforts
to expand its industrial base.20" Because Brazil spends less than one
percent of its gross domestic product on its military, its weapons
producers depend on the export market.2' The logical concomi-
tant of the limited local demand for arms and the pressure to expand
production is that Brazil has exported up to seventy percent of its
weapons production. 7 Between 1981 and 1990, Brazil ranked
eleventh among exporters of major conventional weapons. 8
Of the world's major weapons suppliers, Brazil is probably the most
dependent on the participation of foreign firms to provide key
technologies. Brazil has exhibited little concern for the destination
of the weapons it produces. 2' This combination has made Brazil
a willing participant in many of the last decade's joint proliferation
strict export control laws may have had a perverse effect in stimulating German arms exports,
see KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 146-47.
202. Steve Coil, German Exports Helping Iran Rebuild, Rearm, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,1992, atA33,
A37.
203. Jehl, supra note 198, at A7.
204. Bill Gertz, Europeans Suspected ofAiding Libya's ChemicalArms Program, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1993, at A3.
205. Etel Solingen, Brazib Technology, Countertrade, and Nuclear Exports, in INTERNATIONAL
NUCLEAR TRADE AND NONPROLIFERATION, supra note 98, at 111, 114-15. Brazil is a large exporter
in general. In 1988, it had a trade surplus of $19 billion, the world's third largest. Id. Trade
balances out Brazil's need for foreign currency to pay a foreign debt that was $117 billion in
1988, the highest in the developing world. Id.
206. Agnes C. Allebeck, Brazi4 in ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS, supra note 165, at 37.
207. KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 169.
208. Allebeck, supra note 206, at 37. Weapons exports totaled $2.6 billion for this period,
with the largest recipients being Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. Id. at 42. Iraq alone received almost
$1 billion in major weapons from Brazil. See id.
209. SeeAllebeck, supra note 206, at 41 (reporting that Brazil avoids trade alliances and offers
its products to world market without catering to political interests of superpowers).
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efforts with China, Germany, and others. °
Brazil probably has not proliferated chemical or biological weapons.
Indeed, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have declared a chemical and
biological weapons-free zone among themselves. 21 1 Despite the fact
that it has recently agreed to submit to International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards,2 1 2 Brazil's contribution to proliferation has
involved nuclear materials and, most significant, ballistic missile
technologies.
Brazil possesses the fifth-largest uranium reserve in the world,
comprising eight percent of world reserves, enough to produce 3600
tons of uranium concentrate, known as yellowcake, per year; it also
has the world's largest thorium and niobium reserves.213  As a
nonsignatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Brazil has been
able to sell yellowcake to many countries, including Turkey, Britain,
France, China, and Libya, without incurring an obligation to
report.214 It was Brazil's Hugo Piva, a retired air force general, who
in 1981 supervised shipment of yellowcake uranium to Iraq's nuclear
program at Osirak.215 In addition, Brazil has actively promoted
enrichment technologies as well as the design of nuclear facilities.2 16
Brazil's most pronounced role as a proliferator has been to supply
critical equipment and materials for ballistic missiles. Brazil is widely
regarded as among the most advanced developing nations in military
210. See Solingen, supra note 205, at 130-31. With major assistance and agreements from
Germany, particularly the firm Kraftwerk Union, Brazil has set up nuclear power plant
production, which is linked to its export of yellowcake uranium and other nuclear materials.
Id. at 112; see also SPECTOR, NUCLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 18, at 19-20 (discussing 1975 Brazil-
West German nuclear trade agreement). Besides Germany, Brazil has been involved in extensive
joint ventures with China, Nigeria, Algeria, and Venezuela. Solingen, supra note 205, at 137.
See generally Strengthening the Export Licensing System, Report of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, H.R. REP. No. 137, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-30 (1991).
211. Patricia B. McFate, Where Do We Go fiom Here? Verifying Future Arms-Control Agreements,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 75, 83.
212. See id. at 83 (reporting that Brazil and Argentina signed agreement in December 1991
placing all nuclear sites under IAEA safeguards); see also Eugene Robinson, S. America Steps Back
from Atomic Brink, WASH. POSTJan. 26,1992, atA24 (stating that under recent agreement signed
by Brazil and Argentina, both nations would abandon nuclear weapons programs and open each
other's facilities to inspection, despite fact that Brazil remains nonsignatory to Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty). See generally JOHN R. REDICK, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST., ARGENTINA AND
BRAzIL'S NEW ARRANGEMENT FOR MUTUAL INSPECTIONS AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS (1992).
213. Solingen, supra note 205, at 122. Thorium has been used as fuel for "fast breeder"
nuclear reactors. See id. Niobium is a superconductor mineral that is used to transmit nuclear
energy. Id. at 122 n.34.
214. Solingen, supra note 205, at 122.
215. Mark Hibbs, Gulf War Will Shift JARA Safeguards Priorities-By How Much, NUCLEONICS
WK., Feb. 20, 1992, at 12. Iraq purchased 27 tons of yellowcake. Id.
216. See Solingen, supra note 205, at 123-24. Heavy equipment for the nuclear process is also
high on Brazil's export capabilities, with manufacturers such as Confab, Cobrasma, Bardella, and
Jaguare contributing. Id.; see also id. at 125, thl. 7.2 (listing firms, discussing their technical
capabilities, and explaining from where they obtain assistance).
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applications of satellite technology and communications systems.217
Brazil developed its first three space rockets, the Sonda I, II, and III,
into surface-to-surface missiles and sold them directly to Iraq, Libya,
and Saudi Arabia.218 Libya agreed to pay Brazil as much as three
billion dollars over a five-year period to develop a new family of
ballistic missiles beginning with a range of 100 to 150 kilometers but
increasing to as much as 1000 kilometers. 9 In conjunction with
China, with whom it has an extensive space cooperation arrangement
that includes sharing satellite technology, Brazil is planning to build
its first strategic missile, projected to have a 2000-mile range.2
Brazil was the fourth-largest supplier of weapons to Iraq in the
1980s, behind the Soviet Union, Germany, and China.2 21 Leading
Brazilian concerns transferred propulsion and guidance systems and
uranium-enrichment technology to Iraq through a well-developed
network of Latin American arms traffickers.22 Brazil exported
Astros II battlefield missiles for use in the Iran-Iraq War and shared
ballistic missile technology with Iraq in exchange for Iraqi oil as well
as financing for several of Brazil's missile programs.223 The firm
Avibras, which, together with three other firms, accounted for over
ninety-five percent of Brazilian arms exports between 1980 and
1985,224 secretly helped Iraq extend the range of its Soviet Scud
missiles to enable them to hit Teheran.2 In another supporting
effort that may have been directly linked to the Brazilian Government,
a team of two dozen aerospace engineers was in Iraq from 1989 to
1990, led by Major Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira Piva, who had been in
charge of converting Brazil's Sonda IV space rocket into a nuclear
missile and who may also have been involved in efforts to enrich
uranium for nuclear bombs.226
It is noteworthy that while Brazil's export control laws are in some
217. SPRING, supra note 56, at 6-7.
218. Gary Milhollin & Gerard White, ExplosiveDisunion: The Trade in Soviet NudearKno-How,
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991. at C4 [hereinafter Milhollin & White, Explosive Disunion].
219. CARUS, supra note 97, at 18.
220. Milhollin & White, Beijing's Atomic Bazaar, supra note 125, at Cl.
221. See generally ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS, supra note 165.
222. SeeEric Ehrmann & Christopher Barton, Who HelpedArm Saddam?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.,
Jan. 29, 1991, at 18. This network also included the Chilean weapons manufacturer Carlos
Cardoen, who sold cluster bombs to Iraq for nearly a decade and helped Iraq develop fuel-air
explosives. Id.
223. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 210, at 28.
224. See SCHMIDT, supra note 178, at 18. With the failure of the Iraqi Government to pay for
some of the sales as well as the precipitous decline in new orders, Avibras filed for bankruptcy
in 1990. Id.
225. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 210, at 28.
226. See Thomas Kamm, Brazilian Arms Expert Said to Upgrade fraqs Missiles, WALL ST.J., Aug.
30, 1990, at AS.
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ways lenient-for example, exporters of nuclear materials need not
prove that the recipients agree not to retransfer such material to a
third country-they are quite comprehensive.2 7 Accordingly, the
proliferation activities of Brazilian firms were most likely conducted
with the knowledge and approval of the Brazilian Government. All
applications for nonnuclear exports are forwarded to the Ministry of
the Army, which seeks the advice of the Secretariat for National
Defense. 228  Nuclear exports are regulated by the Nuclear Energy
Commission with the advice of the Secretariat for National De-
fense.2 29
D. Former Soviet Union
For obvious historical reasons, the proliferation threat posed by the
republics of the former Soviet Union differs somewhat from that
posed by China, Germany, or Brazil. Even with its superpower
strength greatly diminished, Russia and its confederated republics still
retain more weapons, militarily critical equipment and technology,
and human expertise than any country other than the United
States. 2 0  The traditional concerns about proliferation pale in
comparison to the possible spread of unaccounted-for Soviet weapons,
tons of fissionable materials, and thousands of highly skilled techni-
cians.231
The former Soviet Union's record as a proliferator was mixed at
best. The U.S.S.R_ protected its nuclear and chemical weapons,3 2
but, with the exception of Israel and NATO members, every nation
227. See generally Allebeck, supra note 206, at 39-40 (discussing scope of Brazil's export laws).
228. See Allebeck, supra note 206, at 39-40. If the export is approved, the CACEX (Foreign
Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil, which controls financial aspects of each transaction)
scrutinizes the authorization. Id. at 40.
229. Solingen, supra note 205, at 128.
230. See generally Igor Levin, Where HaveAll the Weapons Gone? The Commonwealth of Independent
States' Struggle to Stop the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the New Role of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 957 (1992) (stating that former Soviet Union
possessed estimated 30,000 nuclear warheads at time of breakup).
231. For thorough discussions of the proliferation threat posed by the breakup of the Soviet
Union, see William C. Potter, Exodus: Containing the Spread of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities, 14 HARV.
INT'L REV. 26 (1992), and William Walker, Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics, 68
INT'L AF. 255 (1992).
232. Paul Freedenberg & Igor Khripunov, Arms Control Is Global Mission, DEF. NEws, Jan. 27,
1992, at 28, 28. Freedenberg and Khripunov write:
Although in the past the Soviets exported a vast arsenal of military hardware
worldwide for ideological reasons, recent surveys indicate that weapons of mass
destruction were never traded or shared. While Scud missiles were sold to a number
of countries, there has been no substantiated claim that tied the former Soviet Union
in the spread of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, even during the worst period
of the Cold War.
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that has or is developing ballistic missiles has received Soviet
assistance.3  In the quarter century prior to its dissolution, the
U.S.S.R. was the preeminent proliferator of ballistic missiles to the
states whose programs are now causing great concern, especially those
in South Asia and Africa.2' The Soviet Union sold chemical- and
nuclear-capable missiles to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, South Yemen, and Syria.235 During the 1980s, North Korea,
a leading candidate for next entrant into the nuclear club, purchased
nearly three billion dollars worth of arms from the Soviet Union.236
The disintegration of the Soviet Union has substantially diminished
its superpower capabilities, but the threat of proliferation has grown
in inverse proportion. As of 1990, the Soviet Union possessed more
than 26,000 nuclear warheads, located in four republics.237  In
addition, chemical weapons,238 missiles, biological agents, 239 and,
233. CARUS, supra note 97, at 14-16.
234. John McCain, Controlling Arms Sales to the Third World, WASH. Q., Spring 1991, at 79, 80-
82. Including conventional arms, the Soviet Union was the largest weapons seller during the
1980s. From 1982 to 1989, it exported $129 billion worth of arms, representing over 20% of its
total exports. Id. Major recipients of Soviet arms included Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam,
Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Libya. Id. See generally KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 112-24 (1992)
(discussing evolution of Soviet arms transfers).
235. Milhollin & White, Explosive Disunion, supra note 218, at C4. The FROG-7, SS-21, and
SCUD-B were the most potent missiles sold to these countries. HarveyJ. McGeorge, Bugs, Gas
and Missiles, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1990, at 14, 14. Afghanistan received 500 SCUD-B
missiles. Id. Egypt and Algeria have several Soviet FROG-7s; Kuwait did as well until the Gulf
War. Id. The Soviets supplied Iraq with FROG-7s and SCUD-Bs in the early 1970s, and SS-21s
during the war with Iran. Id. Libya, South Yemen, and Syria still have large numbers of FROG-
7s, SCUD-Bs, and SS-21s in their arsenals.
236. McCain, supra note 234, at 81.
237. John M. Broder & Stanley Meisler, Terifying Quest for A-Arms, L. TIMES,Jan. 19, 1992,
at Al, A18. The following table sets forth the distribution of nuclear weapons in the former
Soviet Union:
TYPE Russia Ukraine Khazakstan Belarus TOTAL
Strategic 9650 1300 1150 100 12,200
Tactical 9350 2700 650 1150 13,850
TOTAL 19,000 4000 1800 1250 26,050
Id.
238. HarveyJ. McGeorge, ChemicalfAddiction, DEF. & FOREIGN AF., Apr. 1989, at 16, 16. At
the time it dissolved, the Soviet Union was reported to have the world's largest and most
modern chemical warfare capability, with 10 production facilities and nearly 40 storage sites.
Id. Whether this stockpile was produced after former President Gorbachev claimed in 1987 that
the Soviet Union had ceased manufacturing chemical weapons, or was merely the remnants of
earlier production is the subject of considerable dispute. See generally BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, 'Izvestiya' Publishes Documents on Soviet Ignorance of CW Proliferation, Nov. 23, 1992,
at C2/1 (reporting that top-secret memoranda from then-President Gorbachev and then-Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in 1989 indicate that even highest levels of Soviet Government
did not know extent of country's production of chemical weapons).
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of course, all of the precursors and equipment necessary to make
such weapons, remain in the former Soviet republics in huge
quantities. To date, no documented evidence indicates either that
any of the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons have been stolen
or lost or that any weapons-grade uranium or plutonium has entered
foreign hands.24 ° Yet, the threat posed by the possible loss of
control of the 500 to 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium remaining
in over three thousand warheads left after the START II Treaty has
extremely serious ramifications.241
The possibility that only slightly less critical nuclear materials and
technologies may be exported still raises substantial concern. 2
This concern is amplified by the fact that the Soviet Union's former
weapons customers in Eastern Europe now have little demand for
sophisticated weapons, and that nations aligned with the West prefer
the sophisticated technology of Western weapons and the reliability
of European or American suppliers. Thus, the market for Russian
and Ukrainian weapons has tended to concentrate among states,
notably Brazil, Syria, India, and Iran, that are closed to alternative
supply sources.243 In addition to the concern over Soviet hardware,
the potential emigration of missile engineers threatens a spread of
dangerous capabilities. 244
239. SeeJoseph Fitchett, Russia Germ-Weapon Pledge INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 15, 1992, at 8
(stating that in early 1992, President Yeltsin acknowledged Russian violations of Biological
Weapons Convention). See also, e.g., John Barry, Planning a Plague, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1993, at
40, 40-41 (stating that Russian official from Leningrad's Institute of Especially Pure
Biopreparations who had defected to United States during summer of 1992 claimed that
biological weapons production continued inside Bioprepat system even after President Yeltsin's
edict banning germ-warfare testing in April of that same year); Steve Connor, How the Russians
Poisoned Their Own, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 29, 1993, at 17 (reporting that Russian and American
scientists have uncovered evidence that outbreak of anthrax 900 miles east of Moscow in 1972
was caused by accident at biological weapons plant); Sergei Leskov, Plague and the Bomb, IZVESTIA,
June 26,1993, at 15 (charging that military bacteriological programs in Russia and United States
are currently being developed utilizing diseases of "high combat efficiency" including tularemia,
Venezuelan encephalomielite, and anthrax).
240. William C. Potter, Nuclear Exports From the Former Soviet Union: What's New, What's True,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 3, 3. See generally David C. Morrison, To Arms, NAT'L
J.,Jan. 2, 1993, at 14, 15 (reporting that while transfers of ex-Soviet arms continue throughout
world, they consist primarily of light armored vehicles and small arms).
241. See Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 137, 139 (1993) (testimony of Maj. Gen. William F. Bums,
U.S. Delegation on Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, Department of State).
242. See Bill Gertz, Sensitive Technology Leaks Blamed on Soviet Breakup, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1993, at A5 (noting that CIA Director R. James Woolsey has reported that sensitive technology
has been transferred out of former Soviet Union).
243. See Morrison, supra note 240, at 14 (stating that Moscow has been forced to sell arms
to nations, like Iran, which cannot buy from West). See also Steven Erlanger, Moscow Insists It
Must Sell the Instruments of War to Pay the Costs of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at A6.
244. See Erlanger, supra note 243, at A6 (reporting that group of 64 missile engineers was
detained at Moscow airport in late 1992 while en route to North Korea).
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At the same time, the motivation for exporting weapons has also
changed. During the Cold War, the Soviets provided armaments to
client states primarily for political and strategic reasons.24 The fall
of communism, however, has left the pursuit of foreign currency as
the primary justification for weapons sales.246  The entire Russian
aerospace industry has become more export- and market-oriented
with the formation of the missile-production consortium
Spetztekhnika, which is overtly marketing sophisticated missile
weaponry.247  The motivation to promote advanced weapons sales
is primarily to maintain employment levels in what remains of the
former Soviet weapons industry.2 48
Until recently, India received nearly seventy-five percent of its arms,
including technology to make weapons-grade plutonium, from the
Soviet Union.249 During the 1980s, the Soviet Union sold India at
least eighty tons of heavy water, enough to produce about six bombs
per year.' Of great concern has been the recent agreement to sell
advanced rocket engines involving third-stage liquid-fueled cryogenic
rocket engine technology to India." Russian officials claim that
they developed the rocket for putting civilian satellites into geostation-
ary orbit, and that it cannot be used for military purposes, and that
Russia would not provide any production equipment for the manufac-
ture of the rocket. 1 2  American officials claim, however, that the
technology could help India develop long-range ballistic missiles. 53
Under the threat of U.S. economic sanctions, Russia has recently
agreed to halt these sales.S4
245. See, e.g., MARTIN SIcKER, THE STRATEGY OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM: EXPANSION IN EURASIA
126-28 (1988) (explaining that Soviet Union tightened its relationship with Syria in early 1980s
by providing "large quantities of top-of-the-line" military equipment in effort to secure foothold
in Persian Gulf).
246. Erlanger, supra note 243, at A6 (stating that Russian arms sales are currently based on
generating hard currency and preserving jobs, not on ideology).
247. David R. Markov, The Fire Sale on Russian Missiles, A.F. MAc., Dec. 1992, at 60, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazines File.
248. See Morrison, supra note 240, at 14. In Russia, 25% of the industrial work force, about
5.4 million people, works in arms-relatedjobs. Id. In Ukraine, 17% of industrial workers work
in weapons plants. Id. By some estimates, nearly 400,000 Russians were laid off from defense
industries in 1992 and 1993, with another 300,000 transferred to civilian jobs. Jim Mann, Russia
Boosting China's Arsena4 L.. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at Al, A9.
249. McCain, supra note 234, at 85.
250. Milhollin & White, Explosive Disunion, supra note 218, at C4.
251. See Sergei Strokan, Space Contract Comes Under Prssurefrom Washington, Moscow NEWS,
Apr. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. If a proposed plant to mass produce
missiles in India is in fact built, India could supply missiles to other countries. Milhollin &
White, Explosive Disunion, supra note 218, at C4.
252. Strokan, supra note 251.
253. Sanjoy Hazarika, Despite U.S., Yeltsin Backs Rocket Deal with India, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1993, at A2.
254. Elaine Sciolino, Russia Is HaltingAms-Linke4 Sal N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1993, at A4.
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With the fall of the Soviet regime, China made concerted attempts
to acquire Soviet materials and technology with which to build
catastrophic weapons. In early 1992, the PRC officially approached
Ukraine with an offer to purchase the Kuznetsov-class nuclear aircraft
carrier Varyag.2 5  Recently, China negotiated the purchase of
Russian S-300 missiles which are similar to the U.S. Patriot missile.256
Of potentially greatest concern is the transfer of expert personnel and
technology that could greatly enhance China's ability to make
weapons-grade nuclear fuel but would not bring either Russia or
China into violation of proliferation-control treaties.257
The former Soviet parliament never regulated arms exports through
legislation." The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, in
consultation with the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry,
orchestrated the export of military equipment during the Soviet
era.259  Recently, each of the republics with access to catastrophic
weapons has begun to establish a materials control and accountability
system and to tighten its export controls.Y Only the Russian system
currently meets the standards established by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty,261 and recent reports indicate that even that
system has fallen victim to the disorder that pervades Russian
regulation.262 Most ominously, Russian officials fear the develop-
ment of an organized criminal effort to export critical materials.263
In an effort to demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation, the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly the KGB) recently
released a comprehensive document detailing the spread of nuclear,
255. Gary Klintworth, China's NavalAmbitions Stir Up Fears in Region, THE STRAITS TIMEs, Aug.
1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newspapers File.
256. Nicholas D. Kristof, China Builds Its Militay Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous, N.Y.
TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at Al, A8.
257. Mann, supra note 248, at Al, A9.
258. Herbert Wulf, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS, supra
note 165, at 165, 167.
259. Id. at 170.
260. See Orlov, The World Is About to Take Another Step into the Nuclear Proliferation Void,
Moscow NEWS, May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (reporting that
Ukraine and Kazakhstan were only beginning to establish control over strategic and nuclear
materials and that other republics had not seriously faced task).
261. See generally BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Decree on Nuclear Material Export Controls,
Feb. 12, 1993.
262. Steve Coll, Nuclear Goods Trade in Post-Soviet Bazaar, Export Controls Lacking on Russia's
Rim, WASH. POST, May 15, 1993, at Al ("'Formerly, there was a rigid system of export control.
... In a period of a year and a half, the system has disappeared.'") (quoting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Michael Newlin).
263. Orlov, supra note 260 (quoting Gennady Yevstafyev, Director of Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service: "Attempts are being made to smuggle out not components of nuclear
ammunition but slightly enriched materials used for industrial purposes. All such attempts seem
amateurish but the Intelligence has already registered a tendency towards organization of
reliable channels for such exports.").
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chemical, and biological weapons.2" The report confirms the
possession of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and Israel, the
possession of biological agents by Egypt and North Korea, and
widespread stockpiling of chemical agents and ballistic missiles."
It does not, however, analyze the extent of Soviet responsibility for
such proliferation.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION
Why, in light of the obvious dangers of catastrophic weapons
proliferation, has this vast market been permitted to swell to such
proportions? The end of the Cold War's balance of terror has
brought new leaders to both Russia and the United States. Why,
then, is more not being done to bridle the masters of war?
This Part offers an answer to these questions. The four separate
"arrangements" to control the four categories of catastrophic
weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),2" the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),267 the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) ,2 and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) ,2 are well-intentioned, but inevitably they provide only a
patchwork quilt of controls. Unlike the "regime" described in Part V,
each of these arrangements is fragmentary.
Even a casual review of the arrangements to control catastrophic
weapons reveals startling omissions. For example, the arrangements
to control biological weapons and ballistic missiles utterly lack
verification mechanisms to detect violations. Most important, each
lacks stipulated penalties for violators. Reflecting the realpolitik
approach, each of these arrangements relies on the implicit threat of
undefined diplomatic censure to coerce compliance, counting on the
good faith of state parties to comply with their terms.
The fact that four separate arrangements with different member-
ships, organizational structures, objectives, and standards monitor the
264. Patrick Cockburn, KGB LiftsLid on the World'sDirly Weapons, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 28, 1993,
at 12.
265. Id.
266. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signatureJuly 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
267. The Convention on the Prohibition, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons, openedfor signature Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/47/27/Appendix 1 (1992) [hereinafter CWC].
268. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, openedfor signature
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BWC].
269. Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related to
Missiles, Apr. 26, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 599 (1987) [hereinafter MTCR Guidelines].
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four categories of catastrophic weapons suggests a fundamental
weakness. The arrangements regulate the supply of questionable
materials only according to each treaty's specific application.
Nowhere on Earth does an institution or office possess overarching
authority to regulate the entire market for materials and equipment
that could destroy civilizations. There is not even a pretense of
formal cooperation among the four arrangements, nor do the state
parties to them share a concerted nonproliferation strategy.
At a minimum, multilateral cooperation among these arrangements
would allow suspicious activity regarding one weapon system to
provoke investigatory efforts regarding other weapons. For example,
the fact that a nation is aggressively developing a ballistic missile
capability may, on that evidence alone, make that country a question-
able customer of chemicals that can be made into a warhead. The
organization of controls that concentrates on a single weapons system
reflects a Cold War preoccupation with parity of forces, but a supplier
of one class of dangerous technologies may also supply different
weapons technologies, enabling it to become a primary contributor
to another nation's overall weapons capability.
Despite their many limitations, these arrangements seek to prevent
nations that lack a weapon from acquiring one, while simultaneously
facilitating access to peaceful commercial technologies.27° All four
classes of catastrophic weapons consist of materials and technologies
that have innocent commercial applications. Except perhaps at the
final stage of assembly, when components are combined into an
unmistakably deadly unit, distinguishing weapons production from
legitimate industrial activity is difficult. Each arrangement squarely
confronts this problem of dual-use technology,"' although their
solutions vary considerably. Undeniably, these arrangements have
slowed proliferation. The world is clearly safer than it might have
been in their absence.
270. Sergei B. Batsanov, Proliferation of Weapons Systems and Disarmament Issues with Particular
Reference to Prohibition of Biological Chemical and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, 14 DISARMAMENT
1, 6 (1991). Batsanov states:
The problem of non-proliferation is always a problem of the relationship between
peaceful and military applications of relevant technologies. If, in establishing a regime
to prevent the proliferation of this or that type of weapon, we also limit the peaceful
economic and technological development of States, we will create a regime that can
hardly endure.
Id.
271. See Smith & Fisher, supra note 171, at Al (defining "dual-use" items as having both
theoretical civilian and military uses).
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A. Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons27 2 is the
basis of the oldest and most important international arrangement
outlawing the transfer or acquisition of catastrophic weaponry.2
73
The NPT has had considerable success, attracting over 160 adherents
with no withdrawals. 274  Prior to discovery of the Iraqi and North
Korean nuclear programs,275 no material breaches of the NPT had
been recorded.2 76 The NPT's ultimate goal of total nuclear disarma-
ment, however, remains a distant hope.
1. Treaty objectives and proscribed behavior
The NPT is designed to prevent the declared nuclear weapon states
from assisting nonnuclear weapon states in developing a nuclear
weapons program.277  The treaty is also designed to promote both
nuclear disarmament 78 and the peaceful use of nuclear technolo-
gies and materials.279 Pursuit of these goals is premised on the fact
that the vast majority of nations do not possess nuclear weapons
272. See NPT, supra note 266.
273. D.M. Edwards, International Legal Aspects of Safeguards and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (1984). The nonproliferation arrangement also includes
ancillary agreements among supplier states to restrict their nuclear exports, NIT, supra note 266,
art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165, regional nuclear weapons-free zones, id. art. InI, 21
U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165, and, most important, verification arrangements applied by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Id. art. VII, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169.
274. See generally Testimony of Norman A. Wulf, Acting Assistant Director Nonproliferation
and Regional Arms Control, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Before the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
In addition, regional agreements supplement the NPT. For example, the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281, establishes a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region. Id. at 330. Parties to the
treaty agree not to manufacture, test, or acquire nuclear weapons or to accept other countries'
deployment ofweapons on their territory. Id. To verify these pledges, members agree to accept
IAEA safeguards and inspection measures. Id. at 340-42. Moreover, the treaty establishes the
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which may
undertake special inspections at the request of members who have reason to believe that
another party is engaging in prohibited activity. Id. at 334.
275. See Hearing on Proliferation Threats, supra note 3, at 57 (reporting that NPT has not
prevented Iraq and North Korea, both signatories to NPT, from engaging in efforts to create
nuclear weapons).
276. See Goldblat, The Non-Proltferation Treaty: Status of Implementation and the Threatening
Developments, in NucLEAR NoN-PRoLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 2 (M.P. Fry
et a. eds., 1990) (noting that this record of compliance is unprecedented for arms control
agreement).
277. See NPT, supra note 266, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166 (obligating
nuclear-weapon states party to treaty to refrain from providing any supplies that could be used
for nonpeaceful purposes to nonnuclear states).
278. See NPT, supra note 266, art. VI, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 168 (requiring treaty
signatories to pursue agreements to end arms race and to disarm nuclear weapons).
279. See NPT, supra note 266, art. V, 21 U.S.T. at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 168 (noting that
parties agree to share all technology regarding beneficial uses of nuclear materials for peaceful
means).
THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW
technology and that indigenous development of such technology
would be extremely difficult. 8° Accordingly, the NPT divides
nations into two groups: the five declared nuclear weapon states,
each of which had tested a nuclear device prior to 1967,281 and all
others.
The difficulty inherent in producing nuclear weapons is the key to
proliferation control. Each party to the NPT must obey limits on the
spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
82
Nevertheless, the treaty encourages the distribution of the materials,
technology, and industrial base essential to a commercial nuclear
energy program, but which could indirectly increase a state's capacity
to produce nuclear bombs.283  The essential nonproliferation task
is to assist, or even encourage, the development of nuclear energy
capabilities while severely restricting access to the unique technologies
necessary to bomb-making capability.
2. Verification of compliance
The centerpiece of nonproliferation verification is the accounting
of nuclear material produced at each declared facility to detect and
prevent any diversion of such materials to illegitimate weapons
programs.2 84  Article III of the NPT requires each signatory nation,
or state party, to negotiate safeguard agreements2 5 with the Interna-
280. See generally NPT, supra note 266, arts. I, II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165
(declaring that cessation of nuclear arms race will be promoted by prohibiting nuclear weapons
states from exporting or assisting in nuclear weapons development and nonnuclear-weapons
states from receiving weapons or technology intended to be used for offensive purposes).
281. See NPT, supra note 266, art. IX, 21 U.S.T. at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171 (creating
distinction between nuclear-weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, defining former as
those which had manufactured and exploded nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967).
282. SeeNPT, supra note 266, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165 (prohibiting parties
to agreement from exporting nuclear weapons).
283. SeeJoseph Pilat, The Major Suppliers, in INTERNATIONAL NUcLEAR TRADE AND NONPROUF-
ERATION, supra note 98, at 39, 40 (noting that notwithstanding its commitment to limit further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, NPT allows for distribution of materials that could have
indirect effect).
284. See Deutch, supra note 66, at 122 (establishing that sole aim of verification inspections
is to account for amounts and whereabouts of nuclear material produced at individual facilities).
285. NPT, supra note 266, art. M, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166. As ofJanuary 1989,
168 safeguards agreements were in force among 101 states. MichaelJ. Wilmshurst, The Adequacy
of lAEA Safeguards for the 1990s, in NUcLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY, supra note 276, at 13, 13. Voluntary-offer safeguards agreements were in force among
all five of the nuclear weapons states. In total, 923 installations in 57 states were under
safeguards or contained safeguarded material. Id. The approximate amount of nuclear material
under IAEA safeguards included 10.8 tons of separated plutonium outside reactor cores, one-
half ton of recycled plutonium in fuel elements in reactor cores, 254.4 tons of plutonium
contained in irradiated fuel, 13.1 tons of highly enriched uranium, 31,704 tons of low-enriched
uranium. Id. In addition, safeguards apply to 1454 tons of heavywater in those countries where
safeguards apply to nonnuclear as well as nuclear material. Id.
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tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that will apply to all of that
nation's peaceful nuclear activities.286 The safeguards that each
nonnuclear state party to the NPT must accept are not specified by
the NPT itself, but are left to be worked out between each state party
and the IAEA.287 While the NPT does not require that safeguards
be applied to any activities in the nuclear weapon states, 288 all five
have offered voluntarily to place certain nuclear activities under IAEA
safeguards.289
Safeguards' enable the IAEA to detect diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufac-
ture of nuclear explosive devices; the likelihood of timely detection
thus deters diversion.29' The safeguards also engender confidence
as to the nature of each state's nuclear activity and expedite interna-
tional cooperation concerning nuclear energy development.29 2
Safeguards on materials within a country consist of three basic
elements: (1) a system of material accountancy to record every
transfer into or out of a "material balance area" (MBA) 293 so that
the state and the IAEA should be aware, at any given moment, of the
286. NPT, supra note 266, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166; Statute of the
International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), openedforsignatureOctober 26, 1956,8 U.S.T. 1093,
276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute]. Article II of the IAEA statute establishes the general
principles on safeguards. Id., 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 5. Subsequent to the creation
of IAEA, "safeguards documents" were adopted in 1961. SeeAgencys Safeguards System, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (Sept. 16, 1968) and IAF-A Doc. GC(V)INF/39 (Aug. 28, 1961) (incorporat-
ing safeguards documents into "Agency's Safeguards System" to establish compliance with
statutory obligations).
287. See NPT, supra note 266, art. m, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166. Article III was
supplemented by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, I.A.E.A Doc.
INFCIRC/274/Rev. I (May 1980) (later implemented by United States at 18 U.S.C. § 831
(1988)), which obligates parties to protect nuclear material during international transport across
their territory or on ships or aircraft within their jurisdiction.
288. See NPT, supra note 266, art. 1I, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166 (mandating that
nonnuclear weapon states accept safeguards without requiring acceptance by nuclear weapon
states); see also Edwards, supra note 273, at 12-13 (noting that although they are under no
obligation to do so because they are all nuclear weapon states, United States, United Kingdom,
and France have negotiated safeguard agreements).
289. See Wilmshurst, supra note 285, at 13 (explaining that by 1989, safeguards agreements
were in force with four of five nuclear weapon states and concluded with fifth).
290. Safeguards may be divided into two basic types: those applicable to all nuclear material
in a country, and those applicable to specific nuclear equipment or nuclear material in
international trade. Wilmshurst, supra note 285, at 14.
291. Edwards, supra note 273, at 10. For an extensive discussion of LAEA/NPT safeguards,
see Paul C. Szasz, InternationalAtomicEnergyAgeny Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73 (Mason Willrich ed., 1973).
292. Lawrence Scheinman, Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proqferation in a Changing World Order,
23 SEcuRry DIALOGUE 37, 37-38 (1992).
293. A "material balance area" is a referral to the away-from-facility location where fissile
material is held under safeguards. Mark Hibbs, Gulf War Will Shift IAEA Safeguards Priorities-By
How Much?, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Feb. 20, 1992, at 12, 15.
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quantity, location, and movement of nuclear materials; 94  (2)
installation of containment and surveillance devices in MBA's,
including locks, cameras, and seals to prevent covert diversion; 2 5
and (3) monitoring of relevant facilities by both human and instru-
mental observation.
2 96
The safeguards system presumes that states will declare all their
nuclear material at designated sites. Because the purpose of
safeguards is to account for the nuclear material in a facility, the
frequency of inspections increases with the size of the material
inventory to be verified.297  The advanced industrial states with vast
nuclear programs consume a large percentage of IAEA inspection
efforts. 298  The IAEA is not authorized to judge the credibility of a
state's nonproliferation commitment or to increase its inspection
activity because it suspects noncompliance. 29  As both Iraq and
North Korea have demonstrated, the NPT verification system is not
explicitly designed to detect undeclared or clandestine nuclear
facilities so long as declared nuclear material is properly accounted
for."°  Consequently, these two nations have nearly acquired a
294. 1 NUCLEAR ENERGYAGENCY, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR TRADE 53 (1988) [hereinafter REGULATION OF NUCLEAR
TRADE].
295. Id. at 54. In 1989, the IAEA installed 278 electronic and photographic surveillance
systems to expand its physical plant inspections. Eric Wemple, Preventing the Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, EXPORT CONTROL NEws, Mar. 26, 1991, at 1, 3. In addition, inspectors place
special seals on nuclear materials to confirm their use for peaceful purposes. Id.
296. See REGULATION OF NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 294, at 54 (noting use of trained
inspectors in addition to surveillance equipment). According to the LAEA 1989 Annual Report,
agency staff completed 2196 inspections of 922 facilities in the 101 countries that have signed
safeguard agreements. TheAnnual Reportfor 1989, IAEA Doc. GOV/2440 (Apr. 27, 1990); see also
Wemple, supra note 295, at 3. Although most IAEA inspections focus on the activities of
nonnuclear weapons states, the agency also carries out routine checks on facilities in nuclear
weapons states. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
297. Scheinman, supra note 292, at 41. "[T]he safeguards system is 'facility oriented.' The
system assesses each plant (specifically, each 'material balance area' or MBA) rather than the
total nuclear picture of a state. It is the amount in each MBA that determines the frequency
of inspection, and this can produce anomalies." David AV. Fischer, The International Atomic
Energy Agency and Nuclear Safeguards, in DARRYL HOWLET & JOHN SIMPSON, NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 37, 39 (1992).
298. See Fischer, supra note 297, at 39 ("Seventy per cent of the IAEA's safeguards budget
is now absorbed in applying safeguards in three states, Canada, Germany and Japan, and
another sizable share in states that have relatively large nuclear programmes, such as Belgium,
Sweden and Spain.").
299. See Scheinman, supra note 292, at 40 (stating that refraining from political judgments
about state's commitment to nonproliferation is key principle underlying inspection scheme).
Scheinman notes that "IAEA safeguards are not an intelligence or policing mechanism. Agency
inspectors cannot roam the countryside of states in search of undeclared nuclear material or
facilities. ... [T]he capability to do so would have been seen by key interested parties as
controverting the objective of minimizing intrusiveness." Id. at 41.
300. William Schneider, Jr., The Emerging Pattern of Arms Export Controls Affecting Advanced
Technology, 14 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 47, 53 (1992) ("The IAEA's inspections supporting the
NPT have proved to be almost wholly ineffective in their current form to detect covert nuclear
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nuclear weapons capability without timely detection.
The IAEA is empowered to conduct "special inspections" 1 if an
inspected state reports a loss of nuclear material." 2 This power has
been limited to expanding the scope of an inspection within a
declared facility. 03 In response to fears of an Iraqi nuclear pro-
gram, the 1990 NPT Review Conference recommended that the LAEA
conduct special inspections at additional undeclared facilities, and
that information from other sources, including national intelligence
information, be used by the IAEA in deciding whether to conduct
these inspections. °4  Nonetheless, the NPT contains no formal
mechanism to provide the IAEA with systematic intelligence concern-
ing the operation of clandestine nuclear facilities. Furthermore,
neither the NPT nor the IAEA statute provides any penalties for
noncompliance. In the event that a violation is discovered, the IAEA
must report the noncompliance to the United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly. 5 The Security Council, however,
does not generally enforce treaties, and it is not likely to respond to
allegations of noncompliance short of a threat to international peace
and security.30o
3. Regulation of nuclear trade
The nuclear weapon states may not transfer "to any recipient
whatsoever" nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices nor
"assist, encourage, or induce" any nonnuclear weapon state to
manufacture or acquire such weapons.30 7 Nonnuclear weapon states
may not receive, manufacture, or receive assistance in the manufac-
ture of nuclear explosives.0" Yet, the treaty does not restrict trade
weapons programmes.").
301. See The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153, 1 73 (1983)
[hereinafter Agreement Between Agency and States] (empowering IAEA to make special inspections
to verify information in state reports).
302. See NPT, supra note 266, art. I (providing that state parties will accept safeguards
arrived at by International Atomic Energy Agency).
303. See Agreement Between Agency and States, supra note 301, INFCIRC/153, 1 71 (noting ad
hoc inspections may only be conducted at facilities under Agreement).
304. See Scheinman, supra note 292, at 43 (discussing NPT Review Conference's recommen-
dation that IAEA take full advantage of inspection rights).
305. IAEA Statute, supra note 286, art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1107, 276 U.N.T.S. at 17.
306. See Harald Muller, The Future of the NPT Modifications to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Regime, 14 HARV. INT'L REv. 10, 12 (1992) (suggesting that in future, United Nations
should respond to threats to peace even from non-NPT states); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 39
("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
307. NPT, supra note 266, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165.
308. NPTl, supra note 266, art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 165.
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promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Considerable tension
arises from these policies to facilitate access to nuclear technology
while preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices. 3 W
Article 111(2) of the NPT regulates the international trade of
nuclear materials by applying IAEA safeguards to exports of nuclear
materials.3 10  Accordingly, no state party may provide to a
nonnuclear weapon state, including nonparties to the treaty,311 any
special fissionable material or equipment or material specially
designed for processing or producing special fissionable material,
unless that material or equipment is subject to IAEA safeguards. 12
These restrictions require exporters of nuclear material or equipment
to confirm that their exports do not abet weapons activities. s3
Exporters, however, are not obliged to report the transfer of dual-use
nuclear equipment.3 14
Soon after the NPT entered into force, supplier states became
concerned that, without criteria, the burden of complying with Article
111(2) might disadvantage the nuclear industries of certain states.315
Accordingly, in 1971, ten governments informed the IAEA of their
intentions to require safeguards on a uniform set of nuclear ex-
ports. 16 This group, known as the Zangger Committee,317 created
a "trigger list" of materials and items of equipment that could be
309. SeeWemple, supra note 295, at 3 (noting that conflicting interests between nuclear and
nonnuclear states creates difficulty for export controls).
310. See NPT, supra note 266, art. m, 21 U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166 (prescribing
Treaty safeguards for all nuclear exports to nonnuclear weapons states).
311. States that have not entered the NPT may receive nuclear materials if they have
concluded a safeguard agreement with the LAEA governing specific projects or facilities, but not
their entire program. Muller, supra note 306, at 11; see also The Agency's Safeguards System, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (Sept. 16, 1968) (outlining circumstances under which nuclear
materials become subject to safeguards). This provision potentially discriminates in favor of
nonmember states because nonnuclear weapon state parties must accept safeguards on all of
their peaceful nuclear activities. Muller, supra note 306, at 12 (observing that to avoid sanctions,
proliferator could terminate its membership or not join in first place and thereby not have to
be concerned with having acceptable program).
312. IAEA Statute, supra note 286, art. I1, 2, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 17.
313. See IAEA Statute, supra note 286, art. III, 1 2, 8 U.S.T. at 1095, 276 U.N.T.S. at 17
(noting that safeguards require exporters to confirm that material be used solely for peaceful
purposes).
314. See Muller, supra note 306, at 11 (pointing out that major weakness in lists is failure to
include equipment that can be used for both nuclear and nonnuclear activities).
315. See Harald Muller, The Nuclear Trade Regime: A Case for Strengthening the Rules, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NoN-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note 274, at 19, 21
(recognizing allegations that nonproliferation is means of denying technology to nonnuclear or
developing states).
316. The ten nations included Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, West Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Subsequently, Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Ireland,Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, and
Sweden sent similar memoranda.
317. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
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exported only under such safeguards."' This "trigger list" includes
only components, equipment, and materials necessary for the nuclear
fuel cycle, but does not ban the transfer of sensitive technologies such
as enrichment and reprocessing. 3 9  The shipment of any item on
the list to a nonnuclear weapons state "triggers" the requirement of
IAEA safeguards.32 °
In order to export nuclear material or equipment to nonnuclear
weapon states that are not parties to the NPT, supplier states must
certify that trigger-list items will not be diverted to nuclear weapons
production and that the recipient state has negotiated a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA.3 2' Furthermore, suppliers must seek
assurances from recipient states that no trigger-list items will be
reexported to a third state unless safeguards are effectively applied in
that state.3 22
For fear of discrediting the NPT, the Zangger countries cannot
target strict nuclear controls toward certain nations with questionable
proliferation credentials. The NPT binds them to assist nonnuclear
weapon states with peaceful atomic energy projects.3 23 Until recent-
ly, the Zangger Committee was weakened by the absence of France
and China. To rectify these shortcomings, it was thought necessary
to establish another organization, nominally separate from the NPT,
that would allow member states a degree of flexibility and latitude in
controlling items to nonnuclear weapon states but also enlist the
cooperation of all supplier states. 24
This new organization, called the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG
or London Club), was formed in the 1970s to draw up a list of
materials, equipment, and technology more comprehensive than the
Zangger Committee's trigger list 3  Under this new list, a nation
would trigger IAEA safeguards when it exported listed items to
318. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/209 (Sept. 1974). See generally Frans Berkhout, The NPT and
Nuclear Export Controls, in HowLETr & SIMPSON, supra note 297, at 45.
319. See Pilat, supra note 283, at 41 (observing that list does not provide prohibition on
exporting nuclear technologies). In recent years, the Zangger Committee has completed talks
on trigger list equipment and supplies for gas centrifuge enrichment, gaseous diffusion
enrichment, and reprocessing. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3. The State Department reports
that the United States is leading an effort among supplier states to specifically include other
questionable technologies on the list. Id.
320. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
321. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
322. See Goldblat, supra note 274, at 5 (pointing out IAEA safeguards must be in place when
trigger list items are retransferred).
323. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
324. Wemple, supra note 295, at 3.
325. Pilat, supra note 283, at 40-41 (noting that NSG "trigger list" includes fissionable
material, nuclear reactors, and certain nonnuclear materials needed to support reactors, and
enrichment and reprocessing equipment).
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nonnuclear weapon states not party to the NPT.3 26 The NSG's
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers 2 7 require the recipients of the
trigger-list items to provide effective physical protection for these
items and to pledge not to use them for the manufacture of nuclear
explosives. 2 In the event of the diversion of materials or a viola-
tion of the supplier/recipient understandings, NSG members would
consult promptly on possible common action. 29 Recently, NSG
members agreed to a broader list of dual-use technologies and
materials having "legitimate non-nuclear uses, but if diverted, could
make a major contribution to nuclear explosive and unsafeguarded
nuclear fuel-cycle activities."330
Despite criticism that it has served to retain oligopolistic control
over nuclear technology among a small group of highly industrialized
states while denying technology to developing countries,331 the
nuclear trade restriction system has been a qualified success.33 2 By
itself, the trade restriction system does not establish a discriminatory
policy as much as it carries that policy into the area of export
controls. It is important to note in this context that only
nonsignatories to the NPT have been denied access to technology,
most prominently Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel. No faithful and
credible NPT adherent has been denied access to nuclear technolo-
gy.333
326. Pilat, supra note 283, at 41.
327. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254 (Feb. 1978).
328. See Pilat, supra note 283, at 41 (pointing out that recipients must also comply with LAEA
safeguard agreements). See generally Berkhout, supra note 318, at 46 (noting that one of two
conditions attached to export of nuclear items was that physical protection of these materials
would be agreed on between governments).
329. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254 (Feb. 1978).
330. Berkhout, supra note 318, at 45, 46.
331. See Pilat, supra note 283, at 39 (observing that since mid-1970s nuclear "have-nots" have
opposed trade restrictions they argue allow nuclear "haves" to monopolize power).
332. See Muller, supra note 315, at 19-20 (discussing situations in which trade restrictions
presented exportation of listed items). There are five well-known cases of transfer restrictions
imposed on developing countries party to the NPT. The United States dissuaded France from
supplying reprocessing technology to South Korea in the mid-1970s. Id. France canceled the
sale only after seeing evidence that South Korea was seriously considering a military nuclear
option. Id. at 20. The United States dissuaded reprocessing in Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s
due to the projects' unambiguously military nature. Id. The United States denied Iran fuel for
a research reactor, and West Germany refused to allow Kraftwerk Union to complete the
Bushehr reactor, a construction site that was left uncompleted in 1979 and bombed by Iraq in
1987, as long as the Iran/Iraq War continued. Id. Iraq was unable to obtain an exact
replication of the Osiraq nuclear reactor that was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 1981. Id.
Libya did not get power reactors or other basic nuclear support from either the Soviets or
Western countries. Id.
333. See Muller, supra note 315, at 19-20 (observing that denial of technology to faithful NPT
adherent has yet to happen).
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B. Chemical Weapons Control Under the Chemical Weapons Convention
Efforts to control the proliferation of chemical weapons differ from
the NPT's approach to nuclear proliferation. First, chemical weapons
typically are comprised of substances that can be acquired from
legitimate commercial facilities."M Whereas efforts to control
nuclear proliferation are based on a tight accounting of the world's
fissile materials, chemical weapons control cannot successfully adopt
a similar strategy because the chemical industry is too vast.3
5
Second, while nuclear weapons control has been balanced with efforts
to promote the development of peaceful nuclear energy, 36 the
effort to control chemical weapons is not paired with novel incentives
for the spread of peaceful chemical capabilities so long as legitimate
chemical activities are not unduly impeded. Third, and especially
important from the perspective of control efforts, protecting against
a chemical military capability requires only the detection of large
stockpiles. 37 The goal of the new treaty is not to catch all violations
but to make it more difficult and costly for countries to pursue a
surreptitious weapons program.38
1. Treaty objectives and proscribed behavior
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 3' banned wartime use of poison gas
334. SeeJay Brin, Ending the Scourge of Chemical Weapons, TECH. REV., Apr. 1993, at 32, 35
(noting that chemicals and equipment with legitimate industrial applications are same as those
used to make toxic warfare agents).
335. See id. at 35 (observing that nuclear weapon treaties only require inspections of
government-owned facilities). Each year, the estimated 25,000 commercial facilities that make
up the global chemical industry produce, process, or consume some 70,000 assorted chemicals
comprising billions of tons of material. Id. at 32.
336. See NPT, supra note 266, art. IV, 21 U.S.T. at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 167 (providing that
benefits of nuclear technology should be made available to all parties for peaceful purposes).
337. See Brin, supra note 334, at 35 (noting that only stockpiles containing hundreds of tons
of chemicals are large enough to have military impact).
338. Brin, supra note 334, at 40. It is in this regard that objection must be taken with the
argument made by Kathleen Baily in her recent article. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems With a
Chemical Weapons Ban, ORBIS, Spring 1992, at 239, 241, 251 ("A cheater can carefully plan its
activities so as to obscure the production of chemical agents.... Given that proliferation is
easy, inexpensive, and virtually undetectable, any multilateral action is unlikely to halt it."). The
empirical evidence Bailey cites to support her position is open to question. See Barbara H.
Rosenberg, A New Approachfor Limiting Chemical Weapons?, ORsis, Fall 1992, at 604, 605 (arguing
that Bailey overlooks deterrent effect of inspections and difficulties of conducting clandestine
operations). Her argument also misconstrues the purpose of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and ignores the difficulties that the treaty's extensive verification measures present
to any state party that seeks to attain a militarily significant stockpile of chemical weapons
without detection.
339. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
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and biological weapons, but not their manufacture and storage. 0
Recognizing the inadequacy of this prohibition in light of the recent
proliferation of chemical weapons, the United Nations authorized the
Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a multilateral convention
that would completely and effectively prohibit the development,
production, stockpiling, and transfer of these weapons.3 4' The
Chemical Weapons Convention 42 has been signed by over 150
nations;3 43 it will enter into force 180 days after the sixty-fifth state
deposits an instrument of ratification but not earlier than January
1995.44
Unlike the NPT, which distinguishes among nuclear weapon states
and nonnuclear weapon states with regard to obligations and rights,
the CWC's prohibitions against producing or retaining chemical
weapon stockpiles and its verification procedures will apply to all state
parties. 45 All state parties currently possessing chemical weapons
must declare and destroy them along with their production facili-
ties.34' Destruction of chemical weapons must begin within two
years and must be completed not later than ten years after the CWC
takes effect. 47 Subject to environmental, health, and safety restric-
tions,348 each state party may destroy its weapons and facilities
however it chooses, so long as the destruction can be verified. 49
In addition to destroying chemical weapons stockpiles, the CWC
seeks to deter states from resuming chemical weapons production and
storage.50 Any country with a relatively sophisticated chemical
industry has the capability to produce basic chemical weapons.
340. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 339, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (failing to
impose any restrictions aside from those involving use of biological and poisonous weapons).
341. G.A. Res. 43/74, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. CD/952 (1989).
342. GWC, supra note 267; see also GA Res. 39, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 54-
55, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992) (opening convention for signature).
343. As of November 24, 1993, the date on which President Clinton submitted the CWC to
the U.S. Senate for ratification, 154 nations had signed the CWC. White House Submits Chemical
Weapons Treaty to Congress, UPI, Nov. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
344. Brin, supra note 334, at 34.
345. See CWC, supra note 267, art. I, 1 1.
346. CWC, supra note 267, art. 1, 11 2-4. For a concise yet highly informative overview of the
CWC's obligations regarding destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, see Brin, supra note
335, at 32.
347. CWC, supra note 267, art. IV, 1 6. Destruction of chemical weapons production
facilities must begin within one year and be completed within 10 years after the CWC takes
effect. Id. art. V, 1 8, at 121.
348. See GWC, supra note 267, art. LIV, 10; id. art.V, 1 11.
349. See generally CWC, supra note 267, Annex on Implementation and Verification
[hereinafter Verification Annex] (delineating standards and procedures applicable to
destruction and verification of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles).
350. See CWC, supra note 267, art. IV, 1 7-8 (requiring destruction of chemical weapons
facilities and inspections to verify compliance).
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Indeed, chemical weapons agents are closely related to pesticides; a
facility designed to produce agricultural chemicals could in a short
time be converted to the production of lethal agents.351 Most
precursor chemicals and production equipment are applicable to
commercial uses. 52 Consequently, the CWC creates a powerful new
international regime-the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-that will govern the production
capabilities of state parties and engender mutual assurance that the
objectives of the CWC are being met.3 53
The CWC vests the OPCW with extensive legislative, investigative,
and judicial responsibilities. 54 To meet them, the OPCW will
comprise three bodies. The Conference of the State Parties will have
jurisdiction to enact rules of procedure, evaluate compliance, and
resolve issues as to the scope of the CWC. 55 The Executive Council
will oversee day-to-day activities, including supervising verification. 56
The Technical Secretariat will have primary responsibility for
monitoring and inspecting facilities that could become involved in
illegal chemical weapons production. 57 Taken as a whole, the CWC
signifies a systematic introduction of international law enforcement
into chemical weapons control.58
2. Verification of continued nonproduction
Verifying nonproduction of chemical weapons is the core of the
CWC. Even state parties with no chemical weapons must comply with
the verification measures. 59 While each state party has the right to
produce and use toxic chemicals for legitimate commercial purposes,
such production and use carries the concomitant obligation to ensure
that these chemicals are not used for purposes prohibited by the
CWC.31 Verification of activities not prohibited by the CWC entails
351. Brin, supra note 334, at 36.
352. See Brin, supra note 334, at 38 (pointing out that thiodiglycol, for example, which is
immediate precursor of sulfur mustard, is used by 100 companies worldwide for numerous
commercial uses including making ink for ballpoint pens).
353. CWC, supra note 267, art. VIII.A, 11.
354. See CWC, supra note 267, art. VIII.A, 1 1 (defining responsibilities of organization,
including implementing CWC provisions, ensuring compliance, and creating legislation when
necessary).
355. CWC, supra note 267, art. VIII.B, 9-21.
356. CWC, supra note 267, art. VIII.C, 23-36.
357. CWC, supra note 267, art. VIII.C, 37-47.
358. For a full elaboration of the legal issues attendant to CWC implementation, see BARRY
KELLMAN ET AL., MANUAL FOR NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION (1993).
359. See CWC, supra note 267, art. VI (requiring that each state party comply with all
verification procedures).
360. CWC, supra note 267, art. VI, 1 1.
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an elaborate mechanism for monitoring all production and acquisi-
tion of various chemicals by signatory nations. 61
While verification of compliance with a chemical weapons treaty is
abstractly similar to verifying nuclear nonproliferation, the larger size
of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and the diversity of
chemical weapons precursors complicate the effort to prohibit
clandestine weapons production. The existence of dynamic and
diversified global industries, whose production may be easily convert-
ed to lethal agents, requires that CWC verification procedures be
more extensive and intrusive than those for nuclear weapons. 62
Accordingly, the CWC introduces two innovations not found in the
NPT: first, dual-use substances are tracked on a series of schedules
corresponding to various levels of regulation;363 second, the OPCW
may conduct challenge inspections, with some limitations, at any
facility, provided that there exist reasonable doubts as to the facility's
compliance with the CWC.3"
In order to facilitate verification, the CWC categorizes chemical
families and individual chemicals into three schedules based on their
suitability for use in weaponry and their legitimate commercial
value.6 Schedule 1 contains a list of supertoxic lethal chemi-
cals 366 that: (1) are actual warfare agents, (2) pose a high risk of
potential use as chemical weapons, (3) are key precursors with
chemical structures closely related to chemical weapons, (4) pose a
high risk of conversion into chemical weapons, or (5) have little use
for purposes other than chemical weapons. 6  Schedule 2 lists
chemicals that have some legitimate commercial uses,3 8 but are also
key precursors to warfare agents or are supertoxic lethal chemicals not
listed in Schedule 1, and which therefore pose a significant threat to
361. CWC, supra note 267, art. VI, 11 2-8.
362. See TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 85 (stating that challenge inspection regime for CWC
is most radical and intrusive verification regime ever proposed, and that sensitive military
installations were not excluded from verification). Whereas IAEA verification of nuclear
nonproliferation applies to 900 facilities in more than 50 nations, CWC inspections are estimated
to apply to an estimated 25,000 facilities. Compare Hans Blix, Verfication of Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion: The Lesson of Iraq, WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 57, 57 (stating that IAEA verification applies
to 900 facilities in more than 50 countries) with Brin, supra note 334, at 35 (observing that CWC
applies to approximately 25,000 commercial chemical facilities worldwide).
363. See infra notes 365-72 and accompanying text (discussing chemical schedules).
364. See infra notes 383-89 and accompanying text (discussing challenge inspections).
365. CWC, supra note 267, Annex on Chemicals [hereinafter Annex on Chemicals].
366. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365. Two types of facilities may retain limited
quantities of Schedule I chemicals for specified protective, research, medical, or pharmaceutical
purposes. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VI, (C) (8)-(12).
367. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365, pt. A.
368. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365.
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the objectives of the Convention. 69 Schedule 3 lists chemicals that
are several steps removed from warfare agents,37  but which are
either dual-purpose substances with properties similar to chemicals
used in weapons or important precursors to Schedule 1 or Schedule
2 chemicals. 71 State parties must provide extensive information
about production facilities and make initial and annual declarations
of the total amounts of each scheduled chemical produced, con-
sumed, imported, or exported, and the purposes for which these
chemicals are obtained or processed.3 2
The Technical Secretariat, which is authorized to monitor the
production of declared chemicals by each state party, 73 may install
continuous monitoring systems, instruments, and seals at any declared
facility.374 Each state party has the right to inspect and test any
equipment installed in its territory.3' Each state must, however,
provide the necessary preparation and support for installing and
operating the monitoring system376 and must report to the Techni-
cal Secretariat any event that may affect the monitoring system. 77
The principal methods of verification are two types of inspections:
routine onsite inspections, 78 and challenge inspections.3 7 9  Essen-
tially, inspections serve three purposes.38  First, for countries
currently possessing chemical weapons, inspections will verify that
stockpiles and production facilities have been destroyed. Second,
inspections of civilian chemical facilities will verify that their opera-
tions conform to national declarations and that they are not produc-
ing chemical weapons. Third, challenge inspections will verify the
absence of militarily significant hidden stockpiles or production
facilities.
369. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365.
370. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365.
371. Annex on Chemicals, supra note 365.
372. State parties must declare annually the locations, inventories, and past and future
activities of Schedule 1 facilities. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VI, (D) (13)-(20). They
must also declare annually various national data regarding Schedule 2 chemicals, as well as the
locations of Schedule 2 facilities, the types, quantities and destinations of Schedule 2 chemicals,
and the owners, capacities, purposes and plans of its Schedule 2 facilities. Id. pt. VII, (A) (1)-
(11). Declaration requirements for Schedule 3 facilities are similar to those for Schedule 2
facilities, but do not include information as to destinations of chemical production if not
produced for chemical weapons purposes. Id. pt. VIII, (A) (1)-(11).
373. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. III, (A) (2).
374. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. III, (B) (10).
375. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. III, (B) (11).
376. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. M, (B) (12).
377. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. III, (B) (14).
378. See CWC, supra note 267, art. VI, 113 -6.
379. See CWC, supra note 267, art. IX, 1 8-25.
380. See generally KELLMAN ET AL, supra note 358, at 44-62.
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Routine inspections permit the Technical Secretariat to verify the
accuracy of annual declarations regarding each Schedule 1 or 2
facility."1  Routine inspections serve the dual roles of deterring
violations without hampering the economic or technological
development of state parties, and compiling sufficiently accurate
information to permit a high degree of accord among the parties as
to what specific conduct constitutes a violation. Facilities holding
Schedule 3 chemicals, while obligated to make annual declarations of
their activities, will not be subject to routine onsite inspections. 2
Challenge inspections serve a complementary function. If a state
party suspects noncompliance by another, that party may request an
inspection of any "facility or location.""' Challenge inspections,
which are relatively unconstrained, attempt to clarify "questions
concerning possible non-compliance." 4  On the request of any
state party to conduct a challenge inspection, the inspected state has
the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its
compliance."' If suspicions remain, an inspection team will arrive
after twelve hours' notice," 6 and the inspected state must transport
the team to the challenged facility within twenty-four hours .38  The
team then has seventy-two hours to negotiate the terms of its
inspection with the inspected state party, including the extent to
which the team will be permitted to examine the facility, and whether
the facility's owner may protect certain areas and equipment from
inspection.88 Once the inspection begins, it must be completed
within eighty-four hours, unless the inspected state party agrees to an
extension.8 o
Both routine and challenge inspections share the common goal of
verifying the nonproduction of chemical weapons without interfering
with the legal rights of state parties or their citizens. There is an
inherent tension in making inspections sufficiently intrusive to enable
detection of violations withoutjeopardizing efforts to protect national
security or commercial secrets or contravening the privacy rights of
381. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VI, (E)(21), (28); id. pt. VII, (B)(15).
382. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VIII, (B) (12) (stating that onsite inspections will
only occur at Schedule 3 sites that produced during previous year, or are anticipated to produce
in next year, over 230 tons of Schedule 3 chemicals).
383. CWC, supra note 267, art. IX, 1 8.
384. GWC, supra note 267, art. IX, 1 8.
385. CWC, supra note 267, art. IX, 1 11. For a fuller discussion of the process of requesting
a challenge inspection, see Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. X, (B) (3)-(9).
386. CWC, supra note 267, art. IX, 15.
387. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. X, (B) (15) (b).
388. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. X, (B) (16)-(21).
389. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. X, (C) (57).
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inspected persons. The CWC provides that confidential information
acquired through verification activities will not be released except in
very limited circumstances. 9 ° The CWC's guiding principle is to
conduct onsite inspections in a manner that avoids undue intrusion
into chemical activities engaged in for peaceful purposes.3 9'
The CWC authorizes the Conference of the State Parties to address
any concerns over noncompliance and to request a state to redress
violations.392 Although the Conference may take necessary measures
to rectify a breach, such as requesting action by the U.N. Security
Council,9 3 the treaty does not fully state the extent of these remedi-
al measures.
394
3. Regulation of the international chemicals trade
The CWC imposes varying degrees of restraint on chemical
shipments to nonparties. Transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals to
nonparties are prohibited except for limited purposes.3 95 After the
treaty has been in force for three years, it will prohibit transfers of
Schedule 2 chemicals to nonparties; until then, state parties may
export these chemicals to nonparties only under end-use certifica-
tion!" Schedule 3 chemicals may be traded or transferred freely,
except that nonparty importers must state the purposes for which the
chemicals will be used and certify that they will not retransfer
390. See CWC, supra note 267, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information
[hereinafter Confidential Information Annex]. No information obtained by the OPCW will be
published or released, except general information on the implementation of CWC, information
released with the express consent of the inspected state party, or confidential information
released pursuant to agreed procedures in strict conformity with the needs of the Convention.
Id. (A) (2) (c) (i)-(iii). The level of sensitivity of the confidential information or data will be
established based on uniform criteria to be developed by the Technical Secretariat. Id.
(A) (2) (d). See generally Kellman et al., Disarmanent & Disclosure-How Arms Control Verification
Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. (forthcoming
1995).
391. CWC, supra note 267, art. VI, 1 10.
392. CWC, supra note 267, art. XII.
393. CWC, supra note 267, art. XII, 1 4.
394. See Brin, supra note 334, at 40. Brin writes:
Unfortunately, the CWC does not impose specific sanctions. Parties may restrict or
suspect a violator's rights and privileges under the treaty-such as access to trade in
dual-use chemicals-or recommend 'collective measures' conforming with international
law, such as a trade embargo or, in extreme cases, military intervention. But the CWC
does not make any of these actions an automatic consequence of misbehavior, leaving
the decision to discipline a treaty violator to the discretion of the other participating
countries.
Id.
395. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VI, (B) (3) (limiting Schedule 1 chemical
transfers to research, medical, pharmaceutical, or protective purposes).
396. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VII, (C)(31)-(32).
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them.9 7 In addition, the treaty enjoins state parties from consider-
ing whether further measures are needed for five years.39
8
The treaty does not explicitly restrict transfers of dual-use plants or
equipment. While a state party may place national controls on the
import or export of dual-use technology and chemicals as part of its
general undertaking to implement the treaty's prohibitions, no state
party can restrict or impede trade in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or
pesticides for peaceful purposes in a manner incompatible with its
treaty obligations.'a Accordingly, each state party must review its
existing trade laws to make them consistent with the CWC.4°
C. Biological Weapons Control
1. The Biological Weapons Convention in general
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons
also extended "to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.""1
Yet, research on biological weapons has proceeded continuously since
then .1 2 During World War II, Great Britain, Japan, and the United
States developed biological weapons, 3 and the United States was
alleged to have used them during the Korean conflict." 4 The
United States, which stockpiled biological weapons until 1969, °
destroyed its stock during the 1970s." 6
397. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VIII, (C) (26).
398. Verification Annex, supra note 349, pt. VIII, (C) (27).
399. GWC, supra note 267, art. XI, I 2(c).
400. See generally CWc, supra note 267, art. XI, 1 2(e).
401. Geneva Protocol, supra note 339, 26 U.S.T. 571, 575, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 69; see TER HAAR,
supra note 38, at 3 (stating that because term "bacteriological" does not include all types of
biological warfare agents, broader term "biological" more appropriately describes modem class
of organisms that may be used as weapons).
402. See generally TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 1-53 (chronicling history of biological weapons
proliferation from 1925 to 1990). For an analysis of Soviet and Russian activity, seeJohn Barry,
Planning a Plague?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1993, at 40, 41.
403. Meselson et al., supra note 30, at 50.
404. TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 4.
405. Meselson et al., supra note 30, at 54. The U.S. stockpile included Francisella tularenis,
the bacterium responsible for tularemia, Coxiella burneti4 the rickettsial organism responsible for
Q fever, and VEE, the virus that causes Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis. In addition, there
were stocks of biological agents intended for use against food crops: Pyricularia oryzae and
Puccinia graminis, the fungi responsible for rice blast and wheat rust, respectively. Examples of
other infectious anti-personnel agents that have been studied for use in weapons or have been
actually stockpiled are the viruses that cause Chikungunya fever, eastern equine encephalomyeli-
tis, and yellow fever;, the bacteria that cause brucellosis, cholera, and glanders; and the
rickettsiae responsible for Rocky Mountain spotted fever and epidemic typhus. Id.
406. See TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 12-13 (stating that in 1969, United States renounced
biological warfare and ceased research in that area except for defensive measures and, in 1970,
extended declaration to toxins); Meselson et al., supra note 30, at 54 (stating that in 1969,
President Nixon renounced biological weapons and three months later renounced toxic
weapons).
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The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (BWC) 1 7 went much
further than the Geneva Protocol and prohibited, under any
circumstances, the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition,
or retention of lethal biological agents,' ° as well as the develop-
ment or transfer of biological munitions or delivery systems.' The
BWC only permits exceptions for small quantities of biological agents
that are needed for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes."410 More than 100 countries have ratified the BWC. n
As originally drafted, the BWC does not prohibit research on
biological weapons, nor does it provide for verification measures,
except that the Security Council might initiate an investigation in the
event that doubts arise as to a party's compliance.412 In contrast to
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC's verification provisions
are limited to obligations among states to consult and cooperate with
any investigation that the U.N. Security Council may undertake in
response to a complaint.413 This apparent omission resulted from
the general belief that it is impossible to monitor the activities of
medical laboratories or to prohibit experimentation with infectious
agents.41 4 Thus, the BWC contains no system for mandatory inspec-
tions. Since 1975, three Review Conferences have been held to assess
the BWC and to consider proposals to improve its effectiveness.45
407. BWC, supra note 268.
408. BWC, supra note 268, art. I, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166.
409. BWC, supra note 268, art. III, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167.
410. BWC, supra note 268, art. I, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166.
411. SeeTucker, supra note 31, at 59.
412. BWC, supra note 268, art. VI, 26 U.S.T. at 588, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167. During the
Second Review Conference, Article 5 was strengthened to provide for a consultative meeting to
clarify unresolved matters and initiate appropriate international procedures.
413. BWC, supra note 268, art. VI, 26 U.S.T. at 588, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167; see also Michael
Moodie, Remarks at the Foreign Press Center Briefing Regarding the Third Biological Weapons
Convention Review (Aug. 28, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. Moodie
states: "To verify the convention is [an] extremely difficult, if not impossible thing to do, which
is why the convention ... does not have a verification regime the way other multilateral arms
control agreements do.... [T]here is no mandated regime for inspections under the terms
of the convention." Moodie, supra.
414. See Moodie, supra note 413. Moodie states:
A country with a reasonably developed pharmaceutical capability can produce
biological weapons. There is the whole issue of those states who are interested in
biotechnology and research into infectious diseases-BW has a lot of similarities to the
problems of infectious diseases, and if you're doing research into infectious diseases,
many of the things you have to do or might want to do are not dissimilar from things
that you might want to do to develop biological weapons.
Id.
415. The First Review Conference was held in 1980. 1980 U.N.Y.B. 1391, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.I.1. The Second Review Conference was held in 1986. 1986 U.N.Y.B. 64-65, U.N. Sales No.
90.1.1. The Third Review Conference was held in 1991. 1991 U.N.Y.B. 52-53, U.N. Sales No.
92.1.1.
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2. Confidence-building measures
Confidence-building measures gained substantial strength during
the Second and Third Review Conferences." 6 The measures that
emerged from the conferences can be divided into two categories.
First, the parties instituted annual reporting obligations and agreed
to exchange data concerning laboratories and outbreaks of contagious
infection.417 This data exchange applies only to laboratories that
handle biological materials posing a high risk,418 to labs that are
specialized in activities directly related to the Convention,4 9 and to
outbreaks of infection that deviate from normal patterns.42
Second, the parties agreed to open access to biological research by
encouraging scientific publication and communication.421 Unfortu-
nately, disclosure of biological research risks infringing on both
legitimate national security interests and commercial secrets, while
basic research that does not pose such risks may be irrelevant to the
Convention. To balance these concerns, the Third Review Confer-
ence sought to increase publication of research carried out in
declared laboratories or that pertained to reported outbreaks of
infection.422 Contacts among scientists are encouraged because
joint activities will reduce suspicions concerning their research. 42 3
Finally, the Third Review Conference expanded the exchange of data
on research centers to include information on national biological
defense research and development programs.424
Recently, fifty-three countries meeting in Geneva under the auspices
of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts (VEREX) identified twenty-one
potential verification measures. Arranged into four groups of offsite
416. See generally STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING MEASURES (Erhard Geissler ed., 1990) (discussing activities at Second Review
Conference); Third Review Conference Focuses on Verfication Confideace Building, U.N. CHRON., Dec.
1991, at 54 (discussing Third Review Conference).
417. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T FOR DISARmAmENT AFFAIRS, THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, FACT SHEET NO. 50, at 16-18 (1986). During the
Second Review Conference, Article V was strengthened to provide for a consultative meeting to
clarify unresolved matters and initiate appropriate international procedures. Id.
418. Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Production, Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1991 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 290, 303-04, U.N. Sales No.
E.92.IX.1 [hereinafter Third Review Conference].
419. Id.
420. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 417, art. V, 7, at 17-18.
Background information from the World Health Organization may be used to determine normal
patterns of infection. TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 41.
421. BWC, supra note 268, art. V, 11 7-8, at 17-18.
422. Third Review Conference, supra note 418, at 303-04.
423. TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 45.
424. Third Review Conference, supra note 418, at 304-06.
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verification measures" and three groups of onsite verification
measures,426 these measures could involve very sophisticated technol-
ogy and be significantly intrusive.427 Similar measures have success-
frilly revealed the existence of a biological weapons research program
in Iraq428 and perhaps deterred others from pursuing clandestine
biological weapons initiatives.
3. Regulation of international trade
Successful production and delivery of biological agents generally
requires the acquisition of infectious strains of microorganisms,
equipment and materials for large-scale reproduction of the organ-
isms, equipment for handling hazardous materials, and equipment for
conserving and disseminating the finished product.429 Efforts to
stop the proliferation of biological weapons are severely hindered by
the fact that these technologies are similar to those used for peaceful
purposes, such as the production of vaccines43 and immunological
research.43'
The contrast between Articles 3 and 10 of the BWC highlights this
quandary. Article 3 prohibits parties from transferring biological
weapons to any recipient or encouraging a state to manufacture or
otherwise acquire such weapons.432 Yet Article 10 acknowledges the
right of parties to exchange equipment, materials, and scientific
425. See Graham S. Pearson, Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of
Deterrence WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 145, 156-57. These measures include:
(1) information monitoring, including publication surveillance, legislation surveillance,
data on transfers, and transfer requests and multilateral information sharing, (2) data
exchange, including declarations and notifications; (3) remote sensing, whether from
satellites, aircraft, or ground-based off-site; and (4) inspection activities to be carried
out off-site including sampling and identification, observation, and auditing.
Id.
426. Id. at 157. These measures include: "(1) exchange visits, which may be made under
bilateral or multilateral arrangements; (2) inspections, including interviewing, visual inspection,
identification ofkey equipment, auditing, sampling and identification, and medical examination;
and (3) continuous monitoring on-site by instruments and/or personnel." Id.
427. Dr. Edward J. Lacey, The Biological Weapons Convention Verification Challenge, Address to
the Fall Meeting of the Biological and Biotechnology Section of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (Sept. 29, 1992) (on file with the American University Law Review).
Several methods are currently being contemplated: interviewing staff at a facility, reviewing
safety quality control and manufacturing records; sampling a facility's process streams, waste
streams, or the surface of work areas; or biomedical sampling from facility personnel. Id.
Continuous monitoring could include automated sampling of a variety of process parameters
(such as concentrations of dissolved oxygen), video surveillance, or human inspectors. Id.
428. Pearson, supra note 35, at 157.
429. TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 51.
430. TER HAAR, supra note 38, at 51.
431. See Moodie, supra note 413 (stating that research into infectious diseases and
development of biological weapons involve many similar steps).
432. BWC, supra note 268, art. mII, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167.
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information regarding biological agents, and requires that parties "in
a position to do so" cooperate in contributing to the development
and application of biotechnology for peaceful purposes.433 The
Second Review Conference emphasized the importance of Article 10
and stated that measures to prevent the proliferation of biological
weapons should not restrict the transfer of biological agents for
peaceful purposes.434 Therefore, no effective regime exists to
restrict the trade in materials necessary to develop a biological
weapons capability. Furthermore, verification of the trade in such
materials is not contemplated by the BWC, even if such a regime
could be devised.
D. The Missile Technology Control Regime
1. In general
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), formally
announced in April 1987,"35 is an agreement among the United
States and six allied countries.43 6 Since its inception, eleven more
industrial countries have joined,3 7 and another seven have pledged
to honor its export guidelines.' 3 The MTCR is not a treaty; rather,
it is a voluntary set of guidelines49 intended to limit the risks of
nuclear proliferation by controlling technology transfers that could
facilitate delivery of nuclear weapons by unmanned vehicles. 4 '
The MTCR regulates the development of rocket systems or
unmanned air vehicles with a range of 300 kilometers or more and a
payload of 500 kilograms or more." 1 It addresses eighteen types of
advanced technologies, including rocket engines and guidance
systems, structural materials, and avionics.' It prohibits transfer of
433. BWC, supra note 268, art. X, 26 U.S.T. at 590, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 168.
434. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 417, art. X, at 20-22.
435. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 599 n.*.
436. These six countries are Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and the
Federal Republic of Germany. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, at 599. The MTCR originated
in 1982 when President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive NSDD-70, initiating
an investigation of ways to control ballistic missile proliferation. Ian Anthony, The Missile
Technology Control Regime, in ARMS EXPORT REGULATIONS, supra note 165, at 219, 219.
437. The eleven nations are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.
438. It is not absolutely clear what is meant by "membership" in the MTCR because there
is no organization to join or treaty to ratify. To comply requires only that national export
licensing conforms to the MTCR guidelines. Anthony, supra note 436, at 219.
439. Anthony, supra note 436, at 221.
440. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600.
441. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 604.
442. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 601-02; see alsoJames Hackett, Market of
Mass Destruction, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 27, 1991, at 5A (describing MTCR and assessing its role
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complete systems, components that could produce a complete system,
or the technology required to produce those components and
systems."' While the technology needed to build a commercial
launch vehicle, including rocket engines and advanced materials, is
virtually identical to that needed to produce a military ballistic
missile,' 4 the MTCR is not intended to impede national space
programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as
they do not contribute to weapons delivery systems." 5
The MTCR has had some success. The Condor missile program
sponsored by Egypt, Argentina, and other nations collapsed as the
financial burden of continuing the program escalated, severe
technical difficulties remained unresolved, and the diplomatic costs
soared.4 The Condor depended heavily on technical support
provided by West European companies, but that assistance vanished
under pressure from MTCR nations. West European companies that
once had supported programs such as the Condor recognized that
their activity endangered far more lucrative contracts with the United
States." '7 In addition, the regime is credited with discouraging
Chinese sales of the M-9 missile and forcing the German Government
to sanction private firms engaged in missile development efforts in
both Libya and Iraq."8
The MTCR is less effective against nations that possess independent
technological capability to produce missiles, such as Israel and India.
in arms control).
443. See generally MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.LM. at 603-13 (delineating controls
on transfer of equipment, technology, intellectual property, and technical assistance).
444. For example, India's Prithvi and Agni ballistic missile programs were based on civilian
rocket technology. See Nuclear and Missile Proliferation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989) (statement of Hon. William Webster,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency). Another anecdote drives this point home: when asked
the difference between the Atlas rocket that putJohn Glenn into orbit and one armed with a
nuclear warhead, President Kennedy replied, "Attitude." Proliferation and Regional Security in the
1990's: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990)
(statement of Henry D. Sokoloski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, International Security Aftairs, U.S. Department of Defense).
445. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600 ("The Guidelines are not designed
to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs . .. ").
Indeed, the principle that all countries are entitled to access to space is embodied in the 1967
United Nations Treaty on Outer Space: "The exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind." Treaty on Outer Space,Jan. 27, 1967, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412, 610
U.N.T.S. 205, 207.
446. CARUS, supra note 97, at 63-64 ("It has been estimated that it will cost $3.2 billion to
develop and produce 400 Condor missiles, or about $8 million per missile. Development costs
alone may exceed $1 billion.").
447. CARUS, supra note 97, at 63.
448. See Nolan, supra note 73, at 10.
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All that can be done in such cases is to diplomatically discourage
these countries from transferring their missile-building capabilities to
other countries, with emphasis on restricting transfers to countries of
concern.
2. Verification measures
The MTCR is essentially a multilateral coordination of unilateral
export controls. It has no formal verification or enforcement
capabilities. While all countries involved impose civil and criminal
penalties for violations, the severity of these penalties varies." 9 The
MTCR also offers no incentive not to proliferate.
3. Regulation of international trade
The MTCR guidelines do not prohibit exports, but require states to
determine that specified items meet a series of criteria before
approving export.410 Each state agrees to transfer items that would
contribute to a nuclear weapons delivery system only if the recipient
state assures that the items will be used only for their stated purpose
and will not be modified or replicated without the transferring state's
consent, and that neither the items nor replicas or derivatives of them
will be retransferred without the consent of the transferring govern-
ment.
451
The MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex lists the items that
the regime controls.452 The Annex consists of two categories of
equipment and technology.453 Category I items, complete missile
systems, are of the greatest concern.454 There is a strong presump-
449. See MTCR Hearing, supra note 89, at 144-47 (statement of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs) (warning that varying severity of penalties among
MTCR partners may hamper cooperation in nonproliferation efforts).
450. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600-01. The Guidelines provide:
In the evaluation of transfer applications for Annex items, the following factors will
be taken into account:
A. Nuclear proliferation concerns;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient
state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of nuclear
weapons delivery systems other than manned aircraft;
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including relevant assurances of
the recipient states... ;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
Id.
451. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600-01.
452. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 601.
453. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 601-02.
454. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600.
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tion of denial for transfers of Category I items. 455  Where the
transfer could contribute to a nuclear weapons delivery system, the
recipient government must avow that the items will be used only for
their stated purpose, and that such items will not be modified or
replicated without the prior consent of the transferring nation.456
Retransfers of the items or replicas thereof are also subject to prior
approval.45 The transfer of Category I production facilities is
prohibited. 58 In the United States, Category I items are controlled
by the State Department Office of Munitions Control pursuant to the
Arms Export Control Act.459 These transfers are authorized only
upon receipt of binding bilateral assurances that the items to be
transferred will be put to their stated end use, and that no apparent
risk of diversion exists. 6
Category II is composed of items that are the separate components
of Category I items, including propellants and propulsion systems,
avionics equipment, launch equipment, and related computers and
production equipment. 46 These technologies are treated on a case-
by-case basis and are generally authorized for export only upon the
recipients' assurances of strict end-use controls. 2 A major short-
coming of the MTCR is that a nation can assemble the completed
missile systems of Category I from Category II items that are easier to
obtain. Moreover, a nation can skirt the regulations by obtaining
quantities of equipment that are slightly below the export control
guidelines, and then assemble them into items that otherwise would
be more strictly controlled. The smaller the item, the less easily it can
be controlled.
V. FORGING A COMPREHENSIVE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
International security now demands regulation of supplies of
militarily critical technology. The Hans Brinkerish efforts of the four
existing control arrangements have failed to plug proliferation. This
Part does not advocate abandoning the systems already in place;
instead, it recommends drawing from principles of industrial and
trade regulation the essential requisites of a comprehensive interna-
455. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600.
456. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600.
457. See supra note 452 and accompanying text (describing MTCR requirement that replicas
not be retransferred without consent of transferring government).
458. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 600.
459. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988).
460. 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1988).
461. See MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 602 (summarizing category II items).
462. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 269, 26 I.L.M. at 599-601.
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tional legal regime that could enforce what diplomats can currently
only discuss.
A modem nonproliferation policy should establish institutionalized
mechanisms that limit the availability of key technologies through
detailed licensing requirements objectively promulgated and verified,
and restrain the dissemination of potentially offensive weapons by
establishing enforcement mechanisms that specify consequences for
weapons proliferators. Achieving these goals requires the establish-
ment of a uniform regulatory system that focuses on whether a given
material or technology contributes to a weapons-making capability,
not on the political standing of the recipient state.
The singular term regime, used for convenience, is not meant to
suggest any particular structure. Indeed, establishing a single
institution is not central to this argument." The essential inquiries
that occupy the balance of this discussion concern the regulatory
initiatives to be pursued and the powers an international body should
possess to carry out those initiatives.
A nonproliferation regime should consist of four integrated
functions. The first two are more or less within the scope of the
existing international arrangements. The last two proposals are, in
the context of weapons control, far more radical. Their integration
would provide sufficient legal power to fortify the regime. Aggregated
within a common framework, these suggested reforms could empower
the international regime to close the enforcement gaps that character-
ize the current situation.
The first function of the proposed regime is to formulate standards
that uniformly restrict the production or trade of critical items. The
standards proposed here are primarily, although not exclusively,
technology-based. Second, the regime should promulgate an
elaborate system to verify compliance with those standards and to
assure member states that burdens are uniformly allocated. Third,
the regime should prescribe modalities for transnational law enforce-
ment that each state party could use to investigate suspicions of
clandestine proliferation. Finally, the regime should be empowered
to impose penalties, including trade sanctions, on nations, economic
entities, and individuals who proliferate.
463. For an excellent discussion of the merits of unifying nonproliferation arrangements, see
Gary K. Bertach & Richard T. Cupitt, Nonprolferation in the 1990's: Enhancing International
Cooperation in Export Controls, WASH. Q., Autumn 1993, at 53.
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A. Technology Controls
A nonproliferation regime should begin by creating lists of
controlled technologies and materials. These lists should contain only
those technologies and materials that are critical to a weapons
capability but have little or no civilian application. Specificity is a
prime virtue in this regard because overly broad lists complicate
effective enforcement and necessarily intrude on the prerogatives of
legitimate commercial activity.
Controlled dual-use items have both military and commercial
applications. 4 Consequently, the regime should establish a gradu-
ated series of schedules that correspond directly to graduated
regulatory safeguards. The fact that different controls attach to
different schedules provides the basis for the entire regime's
regulation of vast and disparate segments of industrial production.
The extent of regulatory oversight, monitoring, and inspections, as
well as the severity of sanctions for breach, should depend on the
schedule on which the item in question is found.
Placing materials, equipment, or technologies on separate schedules
requires a cost-benefit analysis that would first measure necessity of
production 465 and exclusivity of use,4c6 and then balance these two
measurements against the costs of monitoring and containment. To
the extent that an item has a legitimate commercial use, subjecting
that item to regulation adds a burden on commercial users that must
be balanced against the decreased likelihood that that item will
contribute to a weapons capability. Furthermore, to the extent that
an item is already widely disseminated, efforts to restrict its availability
are not likely to have a real impact.
467
1. Restrictions on production of essential military technologies
The first schedule includes items that are absolutely essential to a
weapons capability and have little or no commercial applications.
These items should be the focus of the most intense, intrusive
464. See Gerald T. Nowak, Above All Do No Harm: The Application of the Exon-Rorio Amendment
toDual-Use Technologies, 13 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1002,1004-05 (1992) (defining dual-use technologies
and explaining potential damage to domestic industry from strict protection of dual-use, as
opposed to military technologies).
465. "Necessity of production" refers to an item's importance in establishing a weapons-
making capability, accounting for the existence of substitutes that can accomplish the same
purpose.
466. "Exclusivity of use" refers to the likelihood that production of a given item will be for
a weapons-related purpose.
467. SeeJohn D. Steinbruner, The Consequences of the Gulf War, 9 BROOKINGS REv. 6, 12 (1991)
(arguing that self-restraint is only practical means of controlling weapons of mass destruction,
where widely disseminated technology makes denial of access impossible).
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regulation, and their production should be prohibited except under
the most closely monitored conditions. Simply put, if a technology or
material has no use except as an indispensable component of a
catastrophic weapon, its production should be illegal.
Significantly, restrictions on production should not attach exclusive-
ly to completed weapons systems or entire technological units.
Rather, the restrictions should attempt to eliminate the vital building
blocks of those systems. While this Article cannot possibly undertake
the scientific analysis necessary to generate schedules for each of the
four catastrophic weapons systems, the following discussion suggests
technologies and materials whose production should be curtailed.
Severe production restrictions should apply to weapons-grade
uranium and plutonium.4" Vast stockpiles of nuclear materials
threaten a breakout capability and a rapid deployment of war-
heads.469 If production of these materials were banned, trade in
them would provide unambiguous evidence of illegal nuclear weapons
proliferation.47 Furthermore, there is no need for the production
of such materials.471 All of the nuclear powers have sufficient
weapons-grade material to maintain current force levels and, in fact,
the United States and the former Soviet Union no longer produce
any such material. 72 The nonnuclear states have no reason to
468. The U.S. Government is currently preparing a new arms-control plan that proposes a
worldwide ban on the production of materials used to make nuclear weapons. See Michael R.
Gordon, U.S. Hopes to Curb A-Arms by Restricting Fuel Output N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at A2.
469. See Glenn, supra note 70, at 21. Glenn states:
I continue to doubt that it serves our national interests or the interests of the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime to encourage, directly or indirectly, large-scale
commercial uses of plutonium and HEU. I do not believe that it will ever be possible
to safeguard adequately such activities against illicit diversions or thefts of bomb-sized
quantities of such materials. ... With a little leadership and political will, a
moratorium would surely be more successful in restricting access to bomb materials
than would a policy condoning large-scale commercial uses while attempting to
monitor military use.
Id.
470. Paul L. Leventhal, Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bother?, ORBIS,
Spring 1992, at 167, 178. Leventhal states:
If there were an international consensus that there is no longer a legitimate place for
bomb-grade materials in civil nuclear programs, there then would be a solid technical
foundation for devising effective national and international political controls to bar
commerce in these materials and the industrial equipment for producing them.
Id.
471. Approximately 1000 metric tons of plutonium and 1500 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium now exist. DAVID ALBRIGHT Er AL, WORLD INVENTORY OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY
ENRICHED URANIUM, 1992, at 210 (1993). In addition, by 2010, currently existing reprocessing
plants will separate over 500 metric tons of plutonium, mostly in Britain and France. Id. at 113-
15.
472. See generally FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, ENDING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE
MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS: VERIFYING THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS 13-26 (1991)
(discussing logistics of fissile production cutoff agreement).
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produce weapons-grade material except to attain a weapons capability.
Cheap uranium that is not suitable for weapons, but that can fuel
nuclear power or research reactors, is in ample supply.
47 3
Most ballistics technology would be inappropriate for a production
ban because of the legitimate commercial interest in launching
communications and weather satellites. Nevertheless, the regime
should seriously consider prohibiting transfers of technology that
could contribute to a MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable
Reentry Vehicle) capability.4 74 Such a prohibition could be feasible
because, unlike ballistic missiles, satellites and other commercial
objects put into space do not require sophisticated terminal guidance
technology capable of directing numerous warheads to separate
targets. 475
Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention lists chemicals
that are almost exclusively weapons related, allowing only small-scale
production under the tightest of the CWC's verification measures.476
By contrast, most items related to the production of biological
weapons should not be banned because all biological agents may be
relevant to biomedical research.477 The usefulness of certain items
to biomedical research, however, is certainly a question that biochem-
ists, geneticists, and other experts could address.
2. Export restrictions on critical dual-use technologies
Many other items, also necessary to produce weapons, are distin-
guishable by their alternative uses. These dual-use items have
legitimate commercial applications and are therefore inappropriate
targets for severe production restrictions. Instead, their transnational
distribution should be restricted uniformly to all states.
Export restrictions should not reflect any interest or purpose other
than to reduce access to catastrophic weapons. As previously
indicated, such restrictions should be based on the inherent charac-
teristics and uses of the item in question, not on the military
intentions of the likely recipient. Restrictions should not impede or
473. Paul Levanthal & Sharon Tanzer, Plutonium: Time for a Global Ban, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 15, 1992, at 6; see also Cline Cookson & Bronwen Maddox, Wonder Fuels to Burning Question:
World Stockpiles of Plutonium Are Growing FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 9, 1994, at 19.
474. See Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control
Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & P. 73, 108 (1985)
(explaining how ICBMs fitted with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs)
increase destruction capability by increasing number of warheads each ICBM can deliver).
475. See generally DavidJ. Lynch, The ICBM Era Ends, A.F. MAG.,June, 1992, at 50 (discussing
relationship between ballistic missiles and rocket launchers).
476. See Verification Annex, supra note 349, at 229.
477. Lacey, supra note 427, at 3.
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aid another nation's economy, retaliate for trade disputes, level
balances of trade, nor enforce international concerns such as
environmental or human fights protection. A nation's decision to
restrict exports to selected other nations for those reasons raises a
host of questions that, regardless of their merits, should neither
interfere with nor complicate nonproliferation efforts.
Like technology controls in general, export restrictions should be
organized into graduated schedules with varying degrees of limita-
tion." To be effective, export restrictions should apply to a small
number of items. Because the objective of export controls is
exclusively to prevent foreign powers from acquiring catastrophic
weapons through external means, it follows that only a few enabling
technologies that make significant contributions to military capability
should be withheld. A new regime would erect "higher fences around
fewer goods."479
Of the four currently existing arrangements, the NPT has the most
elaborate system of export controls. The MTCR seeks to control
exports by its members on the basis of consensus,480 but these
controls are ad hoc and tend not to be uniform.48 1  The CWC's
regulation of sensitive exports is, at this point, undeveloped. 482 The
BWC provides no export controls at all. A new nonproliferation
regime would promulgate mandatory controls on exports of critical
technologies in a manner that would clarify the ambiguities of these
existing regimes and fill in the enforcement gaps. The following
subparts discuss a number of characteristics of such an effort.
a. Uniform export licensing criteria and evaluation
Enumerating schedules of critical technologies and materials would,
by itself, define exportable items, and would tend to harmonize
export policies among nations. Nonetheless, substantial ambiguities
attend the process of export licensing, resulting in loopholes. The
478. For instance, the CWC distinguishes between immediate and less immediate weapons
precursors. SeeAnnex on Chemicals, supra note 865 (listing specific, highly toxic precursors in
Schedule 2 and less immediate precursors in Schedule 3).
479. The term "higher fences around fewer goods" was widely used to describe the basis for
sweeping changes in Western export control policy by the Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) following the collapse of communism inJune 1990. See
generally COCOM Agrees to Rewrite Export Rules from Scratch,' U.S. Officals Repor4 International
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 24, at 835 (1990); see also MICHAEL MOODIE, THE DREADFUL FURY:
ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 80 (1989), quoted in NOLAN,
supra note 49, at 139.
480. NOLAN, supra note 49, at 28.
481. NOLAN, supra note 49, at 147-49.
482. See McFate, supra note 211, at 75, 80.
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regime will be optimally effective if it can develop uniform export
control procedures and standards to address these potential loopholes
and assist national export control officials to satisfy their obliga-
tions.483
Two additional problems deserve special attention. First, there are
numerous items that are slightly below agreed specifications but that
could be used, with an acceptable loss of efficiency, for military
purposes. The regime will have to determine, therefore, how to
evaluate such questionable technology so that the strictures of its
schedules are not easily avoided. Second, a major problem for the
existing export control regimes is how to deal with new technologies
that have not yet been restricted. The regime must have some
mechanism or procedure to constantly update its lists in response to
such new developments.
b. Special standards to discriminate among end-users
While the purpose and operational focus of the proposed weapons
export control regime would be to uniformly regulate critically
dangerous technology, the regime cannot wholly ignore the destina-
tions of such exports. Again, many questionable items can serve a
variety of purposes, and detailed information would be needed to
decide whether regulatory action is appropriate in any given instance.
To address this need, the regime should require that a final transferee
disclose the end use for the item, and should attach conditions or
guarantees that would reasonably assure verification of the disclosed
application and that the critical item is not reexported." 4
The regime could categorically deny certain states access to critical
items. Instead of each state separately restricting exports to foreign
states, the regime would uniformly identify suspect recipients on the
basis of consistent criteria concerning their weapons capabilities. For
instance, access to critical materials and technologies should be
denied to a state that is not a member of the nonproliferation regime
or a member state found to be in material noncompliance.8 5 Even
where a categorical denial would be inappropriate, the regime could
attach conditions on exports to a given state where the desired item
makes no sense in the context of that nation's industrial develop-
483. See generally Muller, supra note 315, at 19 (arguing for stronger nuclear trade
restrictions).
484. Steinbruner, supra note 467, at 6, 13.
485. See Muller, supra note 315, at 19, 20.
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ment.486
In this way, observance of the regime's regulations would objectively
demonstrate a state's qualification for access to sensitive items-a far
preferable situation to the current disparate and gap-filled diplomatic
determinations of sundry suppliers, each with its own set of export
controls.47 Additionally, because nonmembership would constitute
prima facie grounds for denial of access to critical items, developing
states that do not aspire to a catastrophic weapons capability would
have an incentive to join the regime.
B. Verification: Reporting Requirements, Monitoring, Intrusive
Inspections, and Confidence-Building
The nonproliferation regime must assure states that other states are
complying with the agreement's terms.' Accordingly, the steps
taken to verify compliance should be commensurate with the need for
assurance in a particular strategic context. Put more simply,
verification measures should enable a state to detect another state's
actions that go beyond the limits of the regime in a militarily
4819significant way.
The substantial need for elaborate and perhaps even highly
intrusive measures to appraise each nation's capability to produce
critical items should not be confused with the need for verification in
the context of bilateral arms control that was so hotly debated during
the last decade of the'Cold War.4' ° During the Cold War, verifica-
tion that both the United States and the Soviet Union complied with
nuclear arms control agreements focused on force structure and
destructive capability.4 1 Because those concerns were at the very
core of arms control, verification rose to the pinnacle of concerns in
486. See Muller, supra note 315, at 22. Muller writes:
It makes no sense to supply reprocessing technology to somebody who does not even
operate a single light water reactor; it is likewise imprudent to deliver huge amounts
of highly enriched uranium to a country which operates a medium-sized research
reactor and asks for a large fuel stockpile. In both cases, the request may be innocent
and due to inept planning-but who knows?
Id.
487. See Bertach & Cupitt, supra note 463, at 53.
488. David Hafemeister et al., The Veification of Compliance with Arms-Control Agreements, Scl.
AM., Mar. 1985, at 39, 39.
489. See McFate, supra note 211, at 77.
490. See generally Michael Krepon, Arms-Treaty Verification: A Political Problem, TECH. REV.,
May/June 1986, at 34 (arguing that success of present and future arms control agreements
requires resolution of verification and compliance problems).
491. For a clear (but dated) discussion of superpower arms control verification, see
Hafemeister et al., supra note 488, at 39.
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the START and INF negotiations.492
In the context of the Cold War, verification could thus be said to
have served two essential purposes: one military and one political.
Militarily, the strategy to avoid World War III was premised on parity
between the superpowers; accordingly, neither superpower could
pursue aggression without risking complete destruction.493 Any
breakout or perceived advantage by one party could destabilize the
balance of terror with horrific planetary consequences. Politically, the
superpowers' relationship was based in large part on the negotiation
and enforcement of complex arms agreements, any deviation from
which, regardless of its actual significance, would signal a breach of
the assurance that each party would stand by its word.
In contrast, verification in the nonproliferation context differs from
superpower arms control verification in at least three important
respects. First, the object of verification is not deployed force
structure but rather the industrial capability to produce prohibited
weapons. Verification, therefore, must take place earlier in the
process of making and deploying weaponry. While this conclusion
may suggest that verification measures- must be more intrusive as to
private commercial enterprises than was the case during the Cold
War, it also suggests that a single breakout effort will not radically
change the global strategic balance. Second, at least as to chemical
and biological weapons, it is impossible to verify absolute nonproduc-
tion because anyone with moderate expertise and a rudimentary
laboratory can make a deadly device. The purpose of nonprolifera-
tion verification, however, is to assure that no nation is building an
arsenal to pursue widescale or systematic aggression. While verifica-
tion measures cannot claim to be absolutely effective, a multilayered
scheme can be designed to detect a national effort to achieve a
catastrophic weapons capability. Third, verification in the nonprolif-
eration context is not the foundation for stabilizing an otherwise
hostile relationship. The political role that verification served during
the Cold War is significantly less important in the modem multilateral
context. Accordingly, verification efforts would not need to detect
trivial discrepancies unless they pointed to a broader scheme to
492. See McFate, supra note 211, at 77; see also John D. Morrocco, Arms Control Verification:
How Much Is Enough?, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 6, 1990, at 44, 44 (noting that
agreement on particular means of verification was biggest obstacle to START negotiations).
493. See genera!ly AGATHA S.Y. WONG-FRASER, THE POLITICAL UTILrIY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
EXPECTATIONS AND EXPEIUENCE 60-63 (1980) (discussing strategy of mutual assured destruction).
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undermine the regime's goals.494
1. Appraisal of production capabilities and output
On first reflection, appraisal of production capabilities is unrelated
to the task of preventing international proliferation because the
important information is what weapons capabilities are acquired and
to what use they are put, not what commercial products are initially
made. More considered inquiry, however, reveals the necessity for
accurate information concerning the production and availability of
critical materials and technology.
First, verification of exports will require extensive data on industrial
activity so that export activity can be systematically charted from a
known baseline.495 Without accurate estimates of the availability of
a militarily critical item, regulators can never be confident that their
efforts to trace those items' uses are comprehensive. Appraisal of
production capabilities, therefore, can prevent the illicit diversion of
items before those items become subject to export controls.
Second, to the extent that concerns about proliferation center on
indigenous production, as opposed to acquisition of critical items
from the international marketplace, appraisal of production capabili-
ties may raise confidence that nations are not pursuing a prohibited
weapons capability. At least as to items subject to a virtual ban on
production, appraisal of production can confirm that a nation is
upholding its obligation.
Third, one of the regime's objectives is to identify, in a timely
manner, the development of new technological means to achieve
catastrophic ends. Appraisal of productive capabilities offers a
method for tracking developments at facilities in critical or suspect
industries.
Devising a scheme to appraise production capabilities is not
difficult. The Chemical Weapons Convention, with its extensive
494. See McFate, supra note 211, at 84. McFate notes:
The heavy emphasis that has been placed on compliance with actions required in
elaborate verification regimes needs rethinking. In a cold war environment, missed
notifications, incorrect data, and delayed access for on-site inspectors would be judged
harshly as violations; in a cooperative environment, they would be viewed as mistakes.
... In a cooperative environment, the emphasis on "verification to detect noncompli-
ance" should be replaced by the concept of "confirmation of compliance."
Id.
495. See 2 Arms Trade and Nonproliferation in the Middle East: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1992)
(statement of William C. Potter, Director, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and
Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies) [hereinafter Hearings on Arms Trade and
Nonproliferation] (advocating use of empirical data on potential proliferators to circumvent future
proliferation).
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measures to verify production and use of chemicals, offers a model
for all future nonproliferation regimes. Simply put, a new regime
should apply the CWC's verification procedures to other critical
industrial sectors, including the processing of nuclear materials,
biological substances, and missile guidance technologies.
Initially, each nation must declare all facilities within its jurisdiction
that produce an item subject to controls. Those facilities should be
obligated to prepare detailed reports concerning their production
activities and to submit a summary of their production of critical items
and the intended uses for those items. Facilities producing sensitive
items may be obligated to permit the installation of onsite monitoring
devices that could serve as a primary mechanism to verify the accuracy
of their declarations. A system of regular onsite inspections would be
far more expensive and intrusive but arguably necessary to verify
declarations concerning highly critical items.496 The NPT and the
CWC already contemplate both onsite monitoring and routine
inspections of declared facilities,49 7 and current BWC negotiations
contemplate the adoption of similar confidence-building tech-
niques. 98 Extension of these efforts to facilities that produce
critical technologies for ballistic missiles is a logical step.
The most important and most controversial verification technique
is challenge or suspicion-based inspections. As discussed, the CWC
provides for challenge inspections virtually anywhere a chemical
weapon could be covertly produced or stored.4" Whether the IAEA
currently has the power to conduct challenge inspections is hotly
debated."° That debate should be resolved by explicitly authorizing
496. For a discussion of the strengths and limitations of onsite inspections, see DEREK
LEEBAERT, HERITAGE FOUND., THE VERIFICATION ISSUE: KEY TO A U.S.-SOvIET ARMS AccORD
(1987).
497. NPT, supra note 266, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172; Verification
Annex, supra note 349, at 829; see also INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENEROYAGENCY, A SHORT HISTORY
OF NON-PROLIFERATION 19-22 (1976) (discussing inspection process).
498. See McFate, supra note 211, at 75, 76.
499. Verification Annex, supra note 349, at pt. IV(A), (D) (45); see KELLMAN ET AL., supra note
358, at 52-56.
500. See Leventhal, supra note 471, at 177. Leventhal argues:
The [IAEA] board has never authorized short-notice, challenge inspections of
safeguarded facilities to check for possible activities related to weapons development;
of unsafeguarded facilities to determine whether undeclared nuclear materials are in
production or storage; or of natural uranium to ensure against diversions for secret
production of bomb-grade uranium or plutonium. The IAEA's model safeguards
agreement with NFT members authorizes such inspections, but some members of the
Board of Governors have opposed them as being too extensive and intrusive.
Id.; see also Fischer, supra note 297, at 41 (discussing process by which IAEA may conduct special
inspections); Blix, supra note 362, at 57-58 (noting that situation in Iraq prompted debate over
authority and effectiveness of IAEA's safeguard system).
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challenge inspections." 1
The prospect of international inspectors entering facilities and
questioning personnel raises potential conflicts with legal protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Many nations, including
the United States, uphold rights to privacy and require judicial
permission for a lawful search.0 2 In addition, the possibility that
inspections might require persons to testify about illegal activities,
thereby risking subsequent prosecution, raises issues of due process
and self-incrimination. Finally, verification activities may lead to the
loss of confidential business information because foreign inspectors
will have access to sensitive areas during inspections. 0  As to each
of these issues, verification measures must be carefully integrated into
the state parties' legal systems in a manner that respects protected
rights.504
2. Verification of exports: manifests and tagging
For items that are permitted for export, the most important control
mechanism would be a system of manifests that provide a traceable
paper trail from the exporter to the final destination. Many of the
items likely to be subject to export controls become weapons-capable
only when combined with other items that could be exported
separately. A manifest system would enable a central repository of
such information to follow the movement of separate items. 05 Such
manifests would be analogous to the efforts recently promulgated by
the United Nations to lend transparency to conventional arms
trades.506
501. See generally IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS, STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND
EFFICIENCY OF THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ON SAGSI's RE-
EXAMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION (1993).
502. See generally BARRY KELLMAN Er AL., DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS (1993).
503. See Kellman et al., supra note 390. See also Bryan L. Sutter, The Nonproliferation Treaty and
the "New Work Order", 26 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 195 (1993) (noting concern over loss of
industrial secrets through intrusive inspections).
504. For a full discussion of the legal issues attendant to onsite verification measures in the
context of the Chemical Weapons Convention, see KELLMAN ET AL., supra note 358; EDWARD A.
TANZMAN & BARRY KELLMAN, HARMONIZING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION WITH THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Defense Nuclear Agency Technical Report No. DNA-TR-91-216,
1992); David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on Treaty Verification in
the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229 (1988).
505. See Amy Sands, Emerging Nuclear Supplies: Where's the Bee?, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
TRADE AND NONPROLIFERATION, supra note 98, at 25, 33 (arguing that loosely monitored
diffusion of technical capabilities may undermine nonproliferation regime).
506. General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in Armaments Report on the Register of
Conventional Arms, Report of the Secretary-Genera U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 8-19, U.N. Doc.
A/47/342 (1992). See generally Edward J. Laurance, The UN Register of Conventional Arms:
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Electronic tags could track critical items through a satellite link."7
While the efficacy of current tagging technology is debatable," 8 a
focused program involving only the most critical technologies might
increase confidence that purchasers do not resell such technology.
Tags could monitor movements of technology and materials and
thereby provide a means to verify the manifest system so long as three
conditions are met. First, regulators could equip items with tamper
indicators that signal improper use or configure the tags so as to
disable critical equipment if they are removed. Second, to avoid
concerns that regulators or other nations could use the tags for
industrial or political espionage, the tags should only transmit
information on location and evidence of tampering. Third, the tags
would be only as effective as the satellite communications system to
which they are connected; accordingly, regulators must have access to
secure methods of transmission and data authentication. 5°9
C. International Investigations and Implementing
Cooperation of Legal Authorities
Every effort to limit the proliferation of catastrophic weapons has
suffered grievously from the lack of well-developed law enforcement
modalities. Without rigorous law enforcement, weapons sellers could
pursue short-term financial gains by trading in an environment in
which everyone presumed that others were doing the same. As this
Article has demonstrated, that presumption has considerable merit.
The most important single step that can be taken to control
weapons proliferation would be to treat it as a penal, rather than
diplomatic, matter. If proliferation is a crime, then it would no
longer be diplomatically acceptable to sell weapons, regardless of
whether the recipient is a friend or enemy, stable member of the
world community, or pariah. Furthermore, once the international
Rationales and Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness, WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 163, 165
(discussing U.N. transparency approach as alternative to arms export controls).
507. See Breck W. Henderson, Arms Control Pacts May Outpace Advances in Verification
Technology, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 6, 1990, at 51, 52 (discussing electronic tag
technology).
508. Seegenerally Hugh De Santis, Commercial Observation Satellites and TheirMilitary Implications:
A Speculative Assessment, WASH. Q., Summer 1989, at 185, 186, 198-99 (noting adverse effects
observation satellite technology may have on international stability); David A. Fulghum, Advanced
Arms Spread Defies Remote Detection, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1992, at 20, 22
(suggesting that answer to accelerated proliferation of advanced weapons systems is neither
export controls nor intelligence technology, but encouragement not to proliferate).
509. See generally Harold V. Argo, Satellite Verification of Arms Control Agreements, in ARMS
CONTROL VERIFICATION: THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE IT POSSIBLE 290, 291-93 (David W.
Hafemeister et al. eds., 1986) (discussing development of satellite detection of nuclear
detonation).
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community criminalizes proliferation, a variety of powerful modalities
may be employed to detect noncompliance. The criminalization of
proliferation would transform the current environment, in which a
primary justification for proliferation is the suspicion that everyone
else is doing it, to an environment in which a primary justification for
nonproliferation is the assurance that intense international scrutiny
would uncover and punish any attempt at clandestine weapons
trading.
1. International mutual legal assistance
Proliferators do not respect national borders. It is reasonable to
expect that as export regulations tighten for dual-use items, the small
portion of the market that is intended for weapons production will
subvert verification efforts. A serious problem therefore attends the
possibility of weapons segmentation or parcelization. Instead of
producing weapons at one facility where inspections could reveal
them, operations may be split among numerous facilities in various
countries, making detection more complicated.51 ° In this regard,
the verification efforts discussed above will be less effective in
detecting illegitimate weapons activities than in providing assurances
that commercial activity is legitimate.
Efforts to detect covert weapons activities will be limited if the
international regime cannot compel states to carry out enforcement
duties.5 ' Furthermore, national courts and other legal authorities
traditionally have jurisdiction only within their national territory. 12
In the event that law enforcement officials in one state are concerned
about activities that involve another state, but which do not rise to a
level sufficient to request a challenge inspection, the concerned
officials must rely on letters rogatory and subpoenas in order to
obtain information."'
These time-worn diplomatic channels are inadequate to cope with
modern weapons proliferation. Such mechanisms are generally slow
510. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Accuses India on Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992,
at Al, A2 (citing example of India's shipment of chemical weapons precursors to Syria).
511. See Robert L. Pisani & Robert Fogelnest, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 233, 233-37 (Ved. P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1987) (discussing reasons
for development of mutual assistance treaties).
512. Id.
513. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18
DENV.J. INT'L L. & POLIY 339, 351-52 (1990) (discussing why mutual legal assistance treaties are
more effective than letters rogatory and subpoenas, emphasizing that mutual legal assistance
treaties are less expensive and more efficient because requests move directly from one law
enforcement agency to another).
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and expensive because they entail passing a letter through the courts,
embassies, and foreign and justice ministries of both countries. These
mechanisms rely on comity, and they impose no obligation to provide
information or assistance.M Furthermore, it is uncertain whether
such requests will be respected, at least by courts of the United States,
as incident to pre-indictment investigations rather than post-indict-
ment criminal proceedings."5 Moreover, diplomatic channels are
bilateral." 6 In the context of uniformly addressing a global prolifer-
ation problem for nearly 200 nations, it is obvious that countries have
dissimilar legal capabilities to process such requests and to receive and
act upon them.517
The regime should develop formal modalities to expedite effective
international legal cooperation through an agreement to provide
mutual legal assistance. In addition to rectifying the problems of
letters rogatory, a formal mutual legal assistance agreement would
offer the important advantage of specifying obligations among state
parties instead of functioning merely as a matter of comity.-" If
incorporated into a broader nonproliferation agreement, a provision
for mutual legal assistance could specify the procedures to be followed
in making and executing such requests that would both preserve the
obligations of states already party to a mutual legal assistance treaty
as well as include all other states that are not party to a separate
assistance treaty.519
A state party should be obligated to provide information relating to
facially noncriminal but suspect activities of persons or entities within
its jurisdiction, including disclosing information it possesses, conduct-
514. Id. at 352.
515. Compare In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 1988) (granting request for subpoena for documents
in criminal investigation and holding that proceeding does not have to be pending to grant
request), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989) with Fonseca v. Blumenthal, 620 F.2d 322, 324 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (reversing grant of subpoena for suitcase in a pre-indictment
investigation).
516. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Critical Reflections on International and National Control of Drugs,
18 DENV.J. INT'L L & POL'Y311, 332 (1990) (discussing problems of bilateral systems, including
inability to understand intricacies of all other legal systems and inadequate number of
administrative and technical personnel generally provided to complete necessary functions).
517. See id. at 332 ("In effect, there is a very primitive system of bilateral and, in some cases,
regional cooperation involving small staffs in the various ministries ofjustice that deal with all
these various modalities as well as they can.").
518. See generally Ethan A. Nadelmann, Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 467 (1985) (discussing background of mutual-assistance treaties).
519. SeeDavid P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The U.N. Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 399 (1990)
(discussing Article 7 of U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and its use of mutual legal assistance treaty to specify procedures for
acquiring evidence by both party and non-party states).
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ing searches, examining sites or objects, taking evidence or statements
from persons, effecting service of judicial papers, and providing
relevant documents such as financial or business records. 20 A
strong addition found in the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances51
requires a state to comply with a request for legal assistance without
regard to domestic bank secrecy laws that may shield the tremendous
profits of trafficking in contraband and facilitate money launder-
ing.5 22 As was mentioned above in regard to verification activities,
the regime will have to include mechanisms to ensure that protected
rights of privacy and due process receive as much respect as would be
accorded by the domestic law of the requested state.523
Implementation of the technology standards and verification
measures discussed above would establish the basic elements of such
law enforcement modalities. The regime would have an organization-
al hub that would serve as a central source of information and data
and would collect and analyze reports filed by state parties. Each state
party would have a governmental organ responsible for gathering
such information and for monitoring dual-use exports. A provision
in the convention obligating each state party to provide legal
assistance to any requesting state party is all that would be needed to
effectuate mutual legal assistance.
In addition, the regime could improve enforcement by establishing
the relevant procedures that export control officials must employ.
Currently, each country's export control procedures vary dramatically;
even if substantive obligations were made uniform, their application
from one nation to the next may be uncoordinated and thus subject
to evasion.5 24 The regime could achieve procedural uniformity by
establishing techniques for monitoring transfers, maintaining
appropriate manifests, and selectively inspecting appropriate items.
Once these procedures are in place, reporting critical information to
the regime and to other state parties will be a simple matter.
520. Zagaris, supra note 513, at 346.
521. Convention Against nlicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opmned
for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493.
522. Id. at 509 (providing "a party shall not decline to render mutual assistance ... on the
ground of bank secrecy").
523. Zagaris, supra note 513, at 346 (elaborating that while due process and domestic rights
of privacy may bar answering certain requests, party states are strongly urged to grant party
state's requests).
524. See SPECroR, NUCLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 18, at 7 (explaining that emerging nuclear
states either exploit system or comply with it).
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2. Establishing national authorities
Each state party would have to establish a special enforcement
authority to implement and coordinate the regime's obligations. This
authority would undertake four primary tasks. First, the authority
should carry out the regime's reporting obligations by gathering
appropriate information from regulated entities, analyzing that
information, and providing it to the regime's central organization.
Second, the authority should license all dual-use exports that are
regulated by the regime's technology standards. Third, the authority
should expedite onsite monitoring and verification activities carried
out within that nation's jurisdiction. Fourth, the authority should
have primary law enforcement responsibilities concerning nonprolifer-
ation and should work in conjunction with its counterparts in all
other state parties.
While establishing a national authority would seem to be a
straightforward methfod of fulfilling the regime's obligations, internal
bureaucratic divisions inherent in most countries' administrative and
law enforcement systems may undermine such efforts.5" The
realpolitik approach to nonproliferation may exacerbate these
intrinsic divisions. In this connection, bureaucratic conflict inevitably
means that only senior political officials, up to and including the head
of state, can make important decisions. Again, from the perspective
of realpolitik, the head of state is exactly who should make such
decisions.
The U.S. nonproliferation effort is the quintessential model of the
realpolitik approach. The major effort to monitor global proliferation
is based in the Central Intelligence Agency, which has no regulatory
authority. Implementation of the onsite verification measures of arms
control treaties generally is the responsibility of the On-Site Inspection
Agency within the Department of Defense.52 6 While the national
authority to oversee compliance with the new Chemical Weapons
Convention has not yet been named, a new interagency task force
525. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Report Presented to the Seventh United Nations Congress on Oime
Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders at 40-43, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.121/NGO 1 (1986). National
criminal justice systems consist of different subsystems, such as law enforcement, prosecution,
judiciary, and corrections. Each subsystem may have its own separate bureaucratic and
administrative units. Often, these subsystems are self-contained entities with their own peculiar
bureaucratic and administrative exigencies. Thus, each subsystem protects its own interests,
methods, goals, and purpose. This confrontation makes integration difficult, and, ultimately,
leads to the whole criminal justice system's fragmentation.
526. See 22 U.S.C. § 2595 (1988) (defining and setting out duties of On-Site Inspection
Agency).
1994]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSHIY LAW REVIEW
with a rotating chairmanship among the Departments of State,
Defense, and Commerce will likely assume the responsibility.
Moreover, over a dozen other agencies and several interagency
groups are involved in export licensing. During the review process,
the agencies assess the end user's reliability. 27  Each agency's
treatment of an application for an export license varies, however,
because each agency uses different criteria to review applications and
has different standards for judging the desirability of approving
certain types of licenses. 28 The foremost controversy tends to be
between the Department of Defense, which zealously blocks dual-use
exports out of concern for national security, and the Department of
Commerce, which zealously promotes exports out of concern for the
U.S. trade deficit.5 29
The multiplicity of agencies involved in regulating exports with
potential military applications from the United States can be
categorized into three groups. First, the export of defense articles
and services listed in the U.S. Munitions List~o is controlled by the
Office of Defense Trade Controls within the Department of State
(DOS) under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act.53'
When DOS receives an export license application, the licensing officer
checks a manual to determine whether restrictions apply to the
recipient country; if not, a license may issue without further ac-
5132tion.
Second, exports of dual-use items are regulated by the Office of
Export Licensing of the Department of Commerce 533 under the
authority of section 5 of the Export Administration Act. 5 Com-
merce has specific authority to decide on licenses destined for a
specific missile project of concern. 53 5  Items that are subject to
national security controls are reviewed continuously by the Office of
527. The review tends to consist of three kinds of technical evaluations: (1) the specific
product's potential military significance, (2) the end user's potential for diversion, and (3) the
appropriateness of the product's stated end use.
528. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 210, at 14 (noting that most differences in treatment have
to do with different evaluations of recipient country).
529. Matthew W. Sawchak, Note, The Department of Defense's Role in Frme-World Export Licensing
Under the Export Administration Act, 1988 DUKE L.J. 785, 804-06 (1988).
530. 22 C.F.R § 121.1 (1993).
531. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
532. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ARMS CONTROL: U.S. EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE
TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 4 (1990).
533. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.1 (1993) (setting forth export licensing general policy and stating
that exports of dual-use items are regulated by Office of Export Licensing of Department of
Commerce).
534. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1991).
535. Id. § 2405(e)(3).
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Technology and Policy Analysis, which recommends denial or
approval of a license, with or without assurances.3 6 If assurances
are necessary, they are requested by the DOS from the recipient
government on behalf of Commerce.537 In addition, the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) reviews some applications for export
licenses." s  In the event of a disagreement between Defense and
Commerce, the application is referred first to the interagency Policy
Coordinating Committee on Technology Transfers, and then, if
necessary, to the President.53 9
Finally, export regulation of items related to nuclear technologies
is divided. Commerce, in consultation with the Department of Energy
(DOE), licenses dual-use items.5" The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion licenses items that are solely nuclear-energy related under the
authority of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.54 In the event of
a disagreement among Commerce, DOE, or DOS, the matter is
referred to the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Non-
Proliferation, and from there, if necessary, to the President.542
The involvement of many government agencies in the licensing
process has produced a system that has been described as inherently
inefficient, incapable of implementing a revised export control
regime, and lacking accountability.54 As stated, this decentralized
system of responsibility forces nonproliferation policies to be
formulated and executed on an ad hoc basis and in a manner that
536. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.1(b) (1993) (setting forth Office of Export Licensing's screening
procedures).
537. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, supra note 532, at 5.
538. See 15 C.F.R. § 770.13(f) (1993) (setting forth procedures used by Department of
Defense when reviewing proposed exports to countries to which exports are controlled for
national security purposes).
539. See 15 C.F.1L § 770.13(f)(2)(iii).
540. Exec. Order No. 12,058,43 Fed. Reg. 20,947 (1978), repinted in 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1988)
(setting out duties of various departments and procedures for interactions among them).
541. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1988).
542. Exec. Order No. 12,058, 43 Fed. Reg. at 20,947, rprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1988).
543. See H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 210, at 7. The House Report states:
Because different agencies license exports that involve munitions, dual-use, and nuclear
items, confusion results over what type of license certain sales require and which
agency is the proper licensing authority. In addition, fragmented licensing authority
has spawned an elaborate and cumbersome referral process, and a time-consuming
interagency dispute resolution process. Both of these processes are rendered chaotic
by constant interagency bickering over specific cases. The underlying cause of this
bickering is agencies' different perspectives on export control policy, which are
themselves a reflection of agencies' different constituencies and conflicting missions.
Perhaps the most dangerous consequences of this "interagency gridlock" in the 1980s
was a series of potentially disastrous licensing mistakes, notably the licensing of goods
and technologies to Iraq that probably contributed to that nation's development of
ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
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exemplifies the realpolitik approach.
By contrast, implementing an international regime with the
obligations that have been set out above would require a unification
of efforts. The establishment of a sole authority to administer the
entire export licensing system for munitions would provide far greater
predictability for U.S. exporters and the international community. As
the undisputed leader in addressing the global problem of catastroph-
ic weapons proliferation, the United States should assert the primacy
of the role of law by organizing its own nonproliferation efforts to
embody an accountable regulatory system that could serve as a model
for other nations to follow.
D. Enforcement: Incentives and Penalties
The absence of any formal statement of consequences for proliferat-
ing is the most serious weakness of current control efforts. According-
ly, the single most important step that a new nonproliferation regime
could take would be to promulgate specific diplomatic and trade
penalties for states and private entities that disobey the regime's
technology restrictions. Penalties do not involve the violence and
destruction of armed force, yet they enable the world community to
take steps more decisive than diplomatic protests. In addition,
penalties can be proportionate-the commission of a minor violation
should not lead to draconian consequences, and the commission of
a horrific violation should lead to more than a mere slap on the
wrists.
Because the primary motivation for proliferation is pecuniary, not
ideological, the most effective penalties would impose adverse
economic consequences. If pursuit of profits from selling weapons-
critical items carried penalties that vastly outweighed the gains, the
motivation to participate in that market would be substantially
diminished. Combined with stringent efforts to detect clandestine
activity, stipulating penalties would render proliferation a bad business
risk.
Economic penalties for proliferation have achieved some suc-
cess,5 despite the fact that penalties have been inconsistently
imposed on an ad hoc basis by only a few nations.545 Unfortunately,
544. See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1174 (1987) (providing examples of successful impositions of
economic sanctions to prevent proliferation).
545. See generally Patrick Clawson, Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further
Action, 7 ETHics & INT'L AFF. 17 (1993) (focusing on general trade sanctions of 1990s).
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the use of such sanctions has not always been successful.5 6 If many
nations formulated and enforced a consistent penalties policy, the
deterrent power of such penalties would rise substantially.
Broadly put, economic penalties for violating international norms
fall into three categories of severity: diplomatic measures, withdrawal
of economic assistance, and import restrictions. The least coercive
measures are denial or suspension of diplomatic prerogatives,
including expulsion of diplomatic personnel, lodging a formal
diplomatic protest, suspension of cultural exchanges, and termination
of landing rights.54 These diplomatic sanctions could be relevant
to nonproliferation enforcement if applied consistently by all state
parties. A more coercive measure would be to link developmental
assistance to compliance with nonproliferation policies. Such a
measure could include both multilateral assistance from the World
Bank and unilateral assistance from wealthy nations such as the
United States. Accordingly, states that accept and respect limitations
on weapons-critical items would have access to aid and commercial
grants. 548 Most coercive, and most important, would be multilateral
imposition of restrictions on imports from a country or private entity
found to be in noncompliance with nonproliferation efforts.
Restrictions should be graduated to apply to increasingly larger
segments of trade as the proliferating conduct becomes more
egregious. It would be both logical and effective to threaten to close
off access to profitable markets for those who continue to proliferate.
As has been discussed at length, proliferation has flourished as
weapons sellers have taken advantage of open access to markets to
gain available profits. At the same time, the major proliferators,
including the four nations discussed in Part III, rely heavily on exports
to sustain their economies. Certainly, denial of access to the lucrative
U.S. market could generate economic losses to offset profits from
weapons sales. An international regime would require that all
546. See Carter, supra note 544, at 1174 (discussing ineffective attempts to use economic
sanctions to coerce South Africa, India, Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan into accepting
multilateral IAEA safeguards).
547. See generally WARREN CHRISTOPHER, DIPLoMAcY: THE NEGLECTED IMPERATIVE 1, 22-36
(1981) (discussing generally role of diplomacy in arms control context, with emphasis on Iran).
548. See David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Canying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral
Disarmament and Development Assistance 91 COLUM. L. REv. 993, 1026-42 (1991). For this linkage
to be effective, the development funds must be reliable, the linkage must be explicit and overt,
the tradeoff must be proportional, the aid must be specific and useful for economic
development, the substance of the development programs should be linked to the substance of
the disarmament programs, an obligation to participation in verification and enforcement
systems should be included, and an equitable, acceptable mechanism for collecting and
distributing financial aid should be designed.
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complying nations deny access to proliferators, thereby multiplying
the deterrent effect.
From the perspective of the imposing nation, import restrictions
have the advantage of eliminating competition from a class of
imports.549 While the sanctioning nation might have to endure
substitutes that are inexact or available on less favorable terms,
fungible replacements for most products are readily available from
alternative, often domestic, sources. In contrast to export controls
that can inflict lost sales and lost jobs on a few domestic citizens, the
effects of import controls are broadly distributed and resulting losses
are marginal.550
To be effective, all three of the penalties discussed above must
satisfy at least two criteria. First, all state parties must impose
penalties consistently. Second, the regime must delineate penalties
before an allegation of a violation arises so that all parties have notice
of the consequences of selling weapons.
1. Necessity of consistent multilateral enforcement
Underlying the urgency for uniform technology controls is a
recognition of the "free rider" problem that applies to international
weapons sales. If a nation ceases weapons sales to its international
allies and clients only to have another seller step into the vacuum, the
only real effect is an economic loss for the abstaining nation and a
concomitant loss of diplomatic leverage over the weapons recipient.
It is often claimed, therefore, that if we stop selling catastrophic
weapons, someone worse will take our place.551 Regardless of the
morality of this claim, there is some truth to the concern that
unilateral nonproliferation initiatives are unlikely to succeed. Put
affirmatively, the likelihood of nonproliferation success would be
substantially augmented by a system that assures every restricted
supplier that its forbearance would be a mutually shared obligation.
No one nation, even with perfect export controls, can dampen the
vibrant market for catastrophic weapons. Furthermore, the unilateral
imposition of penalties means that the imposing nation must bear the
entire burden of the loss of trade as well as the concomitant political
consequences, while the proliferator is free to turn to a wide array of
549. See Carter, supra note 544, at 1200 (discussing desire of imposing nation to protect
domestic industries and jobs).
550. SeeCarter, supra note 544, at 1181-82 (discussing procedures and costs for implementing
import controls).
551. SeejOHN LECARRE, THE SECRET PILGRIM 333-35 (1990) (demonstrating unintended
adverse effects of realpolitik approach).
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alternative sources for its supply. Enhancing international security
thus requires strict limitations on access to key weapons items, which
in turn requires international law enforcement that regulates the
traffic in militarily critical technologies and provides penalties for
conduct that contributes to proliferation.
2. Necessity of certain and advance delineation of mandatory penalties
It is imperative that the international regime declare mandatory
penalties for specified misconduct. Such a declaration would
distinguish law enforcement, which penalizes violations of its stated
policies, from diplomacy, which permits varying responses to similar
conduct by different parties. At least two arguments favor law
enforcement.
First, sanctions are reactive measures that can influence a state's
conduct only after a problem has been identified. But the threat of
sanctions is a proactive measure that can deter countries and foreign
citizens from exporting militarily critical technology. This deterrence
is effective only to the extent that nations and private entities believe
that the international community will actually enforce sanctions. If
the vagaries of shortsighted diplomatic efforts spawn doubts about the
enforcement of sanctions, there may be more of a temptation to
pursue the economic rewards of supplying weapons technology.
Second, the enactment of mandatory sanctions sends a message to
countries and companies that may be weighing the costs and benefits
of new weapons development. The refusal to impose sanctions
against Iraq and its suppliers in the past decade sent a strong message
to the rest of the world community that the use of chemical weapons,
even against a nation's own people, would not bring serious conse-
quences. Thus, nations other than Iraq may be tempted to acquire
catastrophic weapons with the expectation that such acquisition would
give rise to at worst a diplomatic rebuke. By contrast, mandatory
sanctions would convey the impression that they are inevitable,
thereby strengthening the effectiveness of the nonproliferation policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article's conclusions can be presented at two distinct levels of
abstraction. First, and most specific, this Article has urged the
following seven reforms:
1. Production of items that are both militarily essential and
commercially irrelevant should be virtually prohibited. Such items
include the chemicals listed on Schedule 1 of the CWC, weapons-
grade fissile materials, and MIRV technology.
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2. Dual-use items critical to catastrophic weapons capabilities
should be subject to strict export controls based on the inherent
danger posed by the material or technology. Some restraints,
however, should be targeted at only those recipient nations that
pose the greatest threats to international security.
3. The production of militarily critical items should be subject
to strict reporting, monitoring, and inspection requirements in
order to expedite efforts to regulate their export. Nations can
reduce the intrusiveness of such verification activities by adopting
and enforcing strict controls on the international sale of critical
items.
4. Exports of militarily critical items should be traced both
through a system of manifests and, where possible, by tagging to
ensure that the identified recipient actually takes possession of the
items and uses them for their declared purpose.
5. An organ should be established within the national govern-
ment of each nation to implement these obligations, and these
national organs should cooperate with each other to detect
noncomplying activities.
6. When evidence of noncompliance is discovered, the offending
person and the offending nation should be penalized by the
imposition of predetermined sanctions that are levied by all state
parties.
7. The United States should initiate many of the above reforms
by consolidating its nonproliferation efforts and by implementing
trade sanctions against foreigners engaged in proliferation.
At the second and somewhat more general level, the international
community should recognize that strengthening and integrating
nonproliferation efforts requires a commitment to employ legal
structures and legal process. Accordingly, while lawyers have long
contributed their skills as negotiators and crafters of words to
international fora, they have acted as diplomats. 52 What is needed
now is the contribution of substantive legal expertise: the knowledge
of how institutions are structured and operate, a familiarity with and
respect for established procedures, experience with regulatory and
licensing systems, and commitment to the concept that law can work
only when those who violate it are held accountable for their
noncompliance.
Clausewitz's maxim that "war is the extension of diplomacy but by
other means"5 3 is out of date. War is now the extension of industri-
552. SeeJohn H. McNeill, U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Negotiations: The Process and the Lawyer, 79
AM.J. INT'L L. 52, 65-67 (1985) (discussing role of lawyers in nuclear arms negotiating process).
553. KALEVIJ. HoLSI, PEACE & WAR: ARMED CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 1648-
1989 13 (Cambridge University Press 1991) (discussing Carl von Clausewitz's maxims on war).
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al regulation but by other means. The Gulf War proved that the
failure to regulate the international proliferation of catastrophic
weaponry can force resort to war with all its horrors. In defeat,
Saddam Hussein's sole legacy is the lesson that proliferation will cease
only when it is put under tight legal control, enforced by expensive
sanctions against the masters of war who sell catastrophic weapons for
profit.
The new strategic era demands adoption of the regulatory
approach. During the Cold War, when much of foreign affairs was
divided East-West, there may indeed have been a need for a realpoli-
tik approach capable of balancing diverse interests through the adroit
use of diplomacy. By contrast, pursuit of strategic security in the
coming era must depend less on political relations than on the ability
to control the trade of catastrophic weaponry by stipulating adverse
consequences for merchants of mass destruction.
For too long, diplomats and politicians have determined which
nation gets what weaponry, as the industrialized nations stoked the
flames of an international arms race with disastrous results. Weapons
proliferation is too important to be left to the diplomats. The legal
profession must shoulder the responsibility to build a true strategic
defense initiative: an international regime for controlling militarily
critical items. Only the rule of law through formal institutions offers
a meaningful opportunity to corral the masters of war.
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